

JOURNAL OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES

Winter 1998

CONTRIBUTORS

John-Paul Himka
Jolanta T. Pękacz
Feodosii Steblii
Mark Bakér
David McDonald

JOURNAL OF

UKRAINIAN

STUDIES

Volume 23, Number 2

Winter 1998

CONTRIBUTORS

John-Paul Himka

Jolanta T. Pękacz

Feodosii Steblii

Mark Baker

David McDonald

Editor
Roman Senkus

Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies

Editorial Board

Zenon E. Kohut, David R. Marples, Marusia K. Petryshyn,
Danylo Husar Struk, Frances Swyripa, Frank E. Sysyn,
Maxim Tarnawsky

Journal of Ukrainian Studies

Advisory Board

Olga Andriewsky (Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario), L'ubica Babotová (Prešov University), Iaroslav Hrytsak (Institute of Historical Studies, Lviv State University), Heorhii Kasianov (Institute of the History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv), Bohdan Krawchenko (Academy of Public Administration and Local Government, Kyiv), Marko Pavlyshyn (Monash University, Melbourne), Iurii Shapoval (Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv), Myroslav Shkandrij (University of Manitoba, Winnipeg), Vladyslav Verstiuk (Institute of the History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv)

The *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* is published semiannually by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 352 Athabasca Hall, Edmonton, Alta., T6G 2E8, Canada. Telephone: (403) 492-2972; fax: (403) 492-4967; e-mail: cious@gpu.srv.ualberta.ca. Annual subscriptions are \$26.75 (GST incl.) for individuals and \$37.45 (GST incl.) for libraries and institutions in Canada. Outside Canada annual subscription rates are U.S.\$25.00 for individuals and U.S.\$35.00 for libraries and institutions. See inside back cover for prices on available back issues. Subscribers outside of Canada should pay in U.S. funds. Subscriptions are payable at the above address by cheque or money order (made out to the Journal of Ukrainian Studies) or by VISA or MasterCard. Please do not send cash.

The *Journal* publishes articles and book reviews in Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Canadian studies. Persons wishing to submit articles should first send a letter of inquiry and an abstract to the Editor, Journal of Ukrainian Studies, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ont., M5S 1A1, Canada. Telephone: (416) 978-8669/978-6934; fax: (416) 978-2672; e-mail: r.senkus@utoronto.ca. For additional guidelines, see the note for contributors on the last page of this issue.

Copyright © Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1999.

Printed in Canada. ISSN 0228-1635

Contents

Articles

Introduction / 1

John-Paul Himka

The Transformation and Formation of Social Strata and Their Place in the Ukrainian National Movement in Nineteenth-Century Galicia / 3

Jolanta T. Pękacz

Galician Society as a Cultural Public, 1771–1914 / 23

Feodosii Steblii

Vasyl Podolynsky's *Słowo przestrogi* and Ukrainian-Polish Relations in Nineteenth-Century Galicia / 45

Mark Baker

Lewis Namier and the Problem of Eastern Galicia / 59

Review Article

David McDonald

Nationhood and Its Discontents: Ukrainian Intellectual History at Empire's End / 105

Book Reviews

Iaroslav Iu. Tynchenko, *Ukrainske ofitserstvo: Shliakhy skorboty ta zabuttia. Chastyna 1: Biohrafichno-dovidkova* (Orest Subtelny) / 117

Michael O. Logusz, *Galicia Division: The Waffen-SS 14th Grenadier Division, 1943-1945* (Christine Anne Kulke) / 118

Eugeniusz Misiło, comp., *Akcja "Wisła": Dokumenty* (John Jaworsky) / 120

Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine under Kuchma: Political Reform, Economic Transformation and Security Policy in Independent Ukraine* (David R. Marples) / 122

Yuri Shcherbak, *The Strategic Role of Ukraine. Diplomatic Addresses and Lectures (1994–1997)* (Taras Kuzio) / 124

Tor Bukvoll, *Ukraine and European Security* (Sherman Garnett) / 127

Anna Reid, *Borderland: A Journey through the History of Ukraine* (Frank E. Sysyn) / 129

Sukumar Periwal, ed., *Notions of Nationalism* (John-Paul Himka) / 132

- Dmytro Čyževs'kyj, *A History of Ukrainian Literature (From the 11th to the End of the 19th Century)* (Marko Pavlyshyn) / 134
- Tamara Hundorova, *Proİavlennia slova: Dyskursiia rannoho ukrainskoho modernizmu. Postmoderna interpretatsiia* (Myroslav Shkandrij) / 137
- Oleh S. Ilnytskyj, *Ukrainian Futurism, 1914-1930: A Historical and Critical Study* (Myroslav Shkandrij) / 138
- Futuryzm na Ukrainie: Manifesty i teksty literackie*, comp. Bazyli Nazaruk;
Ukrainskyi futuryzm: Vybrani storinky, comp. Mykola Sulyma (Oleh S. Ilnytskyj) / 142
- Samuel H. Baron and Nancy Shields Kollmann, eds., *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine* (Serhii Plokyh) / 146
- Michael Bourdeaux, ed., *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Serhii Plokyh) / 147

Books Received / 149

Contributors

MARK BAKER is a Ph.D. student in history at Harvard University.

JOHN-PAUL HIMKA is a professor of history at the University of Alberta. His monograph *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867–1900* will be published by McGill-Queen's University Press in 1999.

DAVID McDONALD is an associate professor of history at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. A specialist in the institutional and intellectual history of the Russian Empire, he is the author of *United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900–1914* (Harvard University Press, 1992).

JOLANTA T. PEKACZ is a post-doctoral fellow at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario. Her monograph *Conservative Tradition in Pre-Revolutionary France: Parisian Salon Women* (New York: Peter Lang) will be published in 1999.

FEODOSII STEBLII is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Ukrainian Studies (Lviv) of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. He is the author and editor of many publications in Galician history.



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016

Introduction

The cluster of four articles on Galicia in this issue of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* has its origin in a conference on "Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians in Galicia: 1772–1918" sponsored by the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen and held in Vienna on 26–28 June 1992. However, none of them were actually presented as papers at that conference.

As one of the conference's four "project co-ordinators," I was charged with assembling articles to fill out the projected volume of conference papers. I had heard Jolanta Pękacz's paper at the University of Alberta and was impressed by her conceptualization of the "cultural public" of Galicia. It was a fresh approach, partly inspired by her explorations of French socio-cultural history, and I asked for it for the conference volume.

I had directed Mark Baker's M.A. thesis, which had a chapter on Lewis Namier and the problem of Eastern Galicia after World War I. Thematically it filled a major gap in the volume, since the war and its aftermath were absent from other contributions. Mark's contribution fit the volume profile particularly well because the relations among Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews in Galicia figured so prominently in it. After completing his M.A. thesis, Mark moved on to Harvard and is working there on a Ph.D. dissertation on the Ukrainian revolution. In fact, he was doing archival research in Ukraine when he thoroughly revised his original text for inclusion in the volume.

Feodosii Steblii, the dean of Galician historians in Ukraine, had participated in the Vienna conference, but had delivered a different paper than the one he eventually submitted for publication. I had been charged with acquiring his final Ukrainian text and seeing that it was translated into English.

After accepting these three contributions for publication in the conference volume, I was informed that it was not going to be published as such; instead, most of the conference presentations, supplemented with additional articles on the history of Galician Jews, were to appear in a special issue of *Polin*, a journal devoted to Polish-Jewish relations.

Consequently I had three excellent articles on Galicia that I was free to publish elsewhere, and I submitted them to the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*. Encouraged by Roman Senkus, the *Journal's* editor, I supplemented these original texts with a piece of my own that I thought made some interesting points on the formation and transformation of social strata; it had been published

previously, but only in Italian, in *Quaderni storici* 28, no. 3 (December 1993): 657–78.

The particularities of Galicia remain important today. It is hoped that this cluster of articles will stimulate additional reflection and research on this aspect of the Ukrainian legacy.

John-Paul Himka

The Transformation and Formation of Social Strata and Their Place in the Ukrainian National Movement in Nineteenth-Century Galicia

John-Paul Himka

Resting like an epaulet on the shoulder of the Carpathians, the Austrian crownland of Galicia affords rich material for the study of nationality in nineteenth-century east-central Europe. It was home to three peoples who might be regarded as archetypical representatives of the east-central European nations. Clustered more in the western part of the province, around Cracow, were the Poles, who retained a traditional elite—the gentry (*szlachta*)—and a strong tradition of statehood from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. They thus constituted a “historical nation” like the Hungarians; they owned the large estates throughout the crownland, even in the east where there were few Polish peasants, and (especially after 1867) dominated the local Galician administration. Prior to the annexation of Galicia by Austria in 1772, the territory of Galicia had been part of Poland for four centuries. In the east of the province were Ukrainians (or, as they were called at that time, Ruthenians), who were overwhelmingly peasants. With only a remote tradition of statehood (the medieval Rus’ kingdom of Galicia and Volhynia had collapsed in 1340) and an underdeveloped and discontinuous high culture, they conformed closely to Miroslav Hroch’s model of a “small people.”¹ The Poles and Ukrainians each accounted for over forty

1. The “small peoples” exhibited three characteristics. (1) In the era of nation-building they lacked upper classes belonging to their own ethnic group, but were dominated by ruling classes of another nationality (in this case the Poles); their social structure was thus for a certain period “incomplete,” not possessing all the elements typical for that historical situation. (2) They formed an ethnic unity, but not an independent political unit. (3) They

percent of Galicia's population, and their rivalry formed the main content of Galician political history between the revolution of 1848 and the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy in 1918. Settled throughout the province, but more thickly in the east, was a large Jewish minority (over ten percent), which through most of the Austrian period maintained a largely traditional, religiously structured culture and engaged primarily in commercial activities.

Apart from its ethnic mix, Galicia's cultural location made it a unique microcosm of the whole east-central European universe. The border between the Western and Eastern branches of Christianity ran right through the province. Indeed, Lviv, Galicia's capital, was the seat of three Catholic archbishops: Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and Armenian Catholic. The Poles were Roman Catholic. The Ukrainians had been Orthodox until the beginning of the eighteenth century, when they accepted union with Rome but retained their Church Slavonic liturgical language, Greek rite, and Eastern-Christian traditions. The small Galician Armenian community, which had united with Rome earlier than the Ukrainians, was largely Polonized by the nineteenth century. In addition to this ancient cultural-religious division, the province also exemplified the modern fate of east-central Europe caught between German and Russian cultural and political influences. All educated Galicians read both German and Russian, and both the Poles and the Jews had co-nationals in the German and Russian empires (the Ukrainians only had co-nationals in the latter). Galicia's exposed position at the crossroads is well illustrated by considering all the regimes that the city of Lviv has experienced in the twentieth century: tossed back and forth between Austria and Russia during World War I, briefly the capital of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918, Polish between the wars, Soviet in the years 1939–41 and 1944–91, German in the years 1941–44, and Ukrainian since 1991.

The present article concerns only one of Galicia's three major nationalities, the Ukrainians or Ruthenians. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ruthenians were divided over the question of national identity between those who argued that they constituted a branch of the Russian nationality and those who defended the idea of a separate Ukrainian nationality that included both the Ruthenians of the Habsburg Empire and the "Little Russians" of the Russian Empire. Although this conflict between Russophiles and Ukrainophiles is of great interest in light of recent theoretical work on the "construction" of nationality, this article will abstract from that particular problem and treat the Ruthenian national movement as if it were unified. This abstraction should not affect the

lacked a continuous tradition of their own literary language. See Andreas Kappeler, "Ein 'kleines Volk' von 25 Millionen: Die Ukrainer um 1900," in *Kleine Völker in der Geschichte Osteuropas: Festschrift für Günther Stökl zum 75. Geburtstag*, ed. Manfred Alexander, Frank Kämpfer, and Andreas Kappeler, Neue Folge, Beiheft 5 of *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1991), 33–4, 39.

general arguments of the article, but it will simplify the presentation. Consistent with this abstraction, I will use the term "Ukrainian" when referring to the Ruthenians in the nineteenth century, even though that identification was then under dispute and even though it did not pass into popular usage among the Galicians until the early twentieth century.²

The chief purpose of this article is to explore qualitative changes within the traditional class structure of Ukrainian Galicia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ukrainian nation consisted of "priests and peasants";³ at the end of the nineteenth century the nation retained basically the same composition, but, it will be argued, both the priests and peasants had undergone crucial transformations that allowed the Ukrainian national movement to make considerable progress. These transformations were largely in the cultural sphere, and the primary agency initiating them was the Austrian state. This article seeks to comprehend political, cultural, and social change as a unity. First it deals with the priests and their offspring—the secular intelligentsia—then with the related strata of cantors (*diaky*) and teachers, and finally it turns to the peasants.

* * *

There is a passage in Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* that affords a crucial insight into the emergence of the national movement in Ukrainian Galicia:

The reproduction of social individuals and groups can be carried out either on the one-to-one or on-the-job principle, or by what may be called the centralized method....

The one-to-one, on-the-job method is practiced when a family, kin unit, village, tribal segment or similar fairly small unit takes the individual infants born into it, and by allowing and obliging them to share in communal life, plus a few more specific methods such as training, exercises, precepts, *rites de passage* and so forth, eventually turns these infants into adults reasonably similar to those of the preceding generation; and in this manner the society and its culture perpetuate themselves.

The centralized method of reproduction is one in which the local method is significantly complemented (or in extreme cases, wholly replaced) by an educational or training agency which is distinct from the local community, and which takes over the preparation of the young human beings in question, and

2. The Greek Catholics of Galicia traditionally referred to themselves as "Ruthenians" (*rusyny*) or as "Rus" (a collective noun). Until about 1900 even Ukrainophiles generally reserved the term "Ukrainians" (*ukrainitsi*) for their co-nationals in the Russian Empire.

3. This was a popular catch phrase in Galician politics. A member of the Polish gentry had once quipped: "There is no Rus', just priests and peasants."

eventually hands them back to the wider society to fulfill their roles in it, when the process of training is completed.⁴

Up until the end of the eighteenth century the society of Ukrainian Galicia was reproduced entirely by what Gellner calls the “one-to-one, on-the-job method.” Peasant men and peasant women integrated their children into the work of the family and gradually prepared them for the future. A young boy would first help his mother in the kitchen, then tend the geese, then tend more valuable livestock, then help his father in the field; a young girl would first help in the kitchen and garden, then learn to spin, then participate in all the mother’s tasks. By the time they were married, young men and young women were expected to be proficient in all aspects of their gender-appropriate division of labour in the farm or household. The few Ukrainian artisans and merchants in the small towns of eastern Galicia practiced a similar method of training children to carry on their professions. This traditional method of social reproduction was typical enough of east-central Europe in the late eighteenth century and even long afterwards. What was somewhat unusual about Ukrainian Galicia was that this “one-to-one, on-the-job” parental training had extended also to the clergy.

The Greek Catholic (Uniate)⁵ Church of Galicia retained the Eastern Christian tradition of ordaining married men as priests. In fact, the parish clergy was almost universally married. Priesthood became a largely hereditary occupation, and great priestly dynasties emerged. Because the sons of priests regularly became priests themselves, the sons were mainly trained by their fathers after much the same pattern as the son of a peasant or potter.⁶ Formal seminary training was rare and inconsequential. Thus the Ukrainian church, like the Ukrainian peasantry, was able to reproduce itself without much of an institutional superstructure. This self-sufficiency was an important element in the survival of the Ukrainian church (and hence of the Ukrainians as a distinct ethnic group in Galicia). During the four centuries of Polish rule in Galicia, the Ukrainian church had suffered neglect and discrimination (for over a century there was not even a Ukrainian bishop in Lviv), and, except for a brief flourishing in the sixteenth century, it showed few signs of life as a cultural entity. Yet it was able to survive, like the peasantry it served, because of its

4. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 29–30.

5. The Eastern-rite Catholic Church in Galicia was generally known as the Uniate Church until 1774, when Empress Maria Theresa officially changed its name to the Greek Catholic Church.

6. Sophia Senyk, “The Education of the Secular Clergy in the Ruthenian Church before the Nineteenth Century,” *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 53, no. 2 (1987): 389–93.

reproductive self-sufficiency. The other side of this self-sufficiency, however, was cultural isolation.

The principle of nationality that was beginning to circulate in the east-central European cultural world in the late eighteenth century would have had no social base in Ukrainian Galicia upon which to alight if Galician Ukrainian social reproduction had continued to be restricted to "one-to-one, on-the-job" self-sufficient isolation. There would have been no point of entry for the new ideas on national culture, which presupposed participation in the all-European high culture.⁷ However, the end of the eighteenth century witnessed a revolution in education that profoundly transfigured the traditional clergy of Ukrainian Galicia and had equally profound repercussions for the entire cultural and political development of the Galician Ukrainian population. The reproduction of one social group, the clergy, was "centralized," i.e., the Ukrainian priests were sent to seminaries.

The first steps toward a centralized education of the Ukrainian clergy had already been taken in the decades immediately preceding the Austrian annexation of Galicia, when Bishop Lev Sheptytsky made a point of sending at least enough seminarians to the Pontifical Seminary in Lviv to provide him with the cadres he needed to administer his eparchy.⁸ But this educational reform only affected an elite destined for high office in the seat of the eparchy, not the parish clergy. The centralization of clerical education was somewhat extended by Empress Maria Theresa, who founded the Barbareum, a Greek Catholic seminary residence in the imperial capital, Vienna, in 1774. Her son and successor Joseph II completed the process of centralization; he established a network of general seminaries throughout his realm, including one in Lviv for the Ukrainian Greek Catholics (1783). As a result of Joseph's reform, *all* the Galician Ukrainian clergy underwent a centralized higher education.

The centralizing educational reform went hand in hand with other reforms in the life of the Ukrainian church that shored up the position of the Ukrainian clergy. The church was strengthened as an institution by the promotion of the Greek Catholic bishop of Lviv to the rank of archbishop (the Roman Catholic hierarch in Lviv had already been an archbishop). Moreover, the Greek Catholic metropolis of Halych was created in 1808, with the archbishop of Lviv as metropolitan. The administration of the eparchies was improved by the creation of cathedral chapters and consistories. The ascendancy of the religious clergy

7. The all-European high culture to which I refer here is essentially the same as Gellner's "industrial culture" and Benedict Anderson's "print culture."

8. John-Paul Himka, "The Conflict between the Secular and the Religious Clergy in Eighteenth-Century Western Ukraine," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 15, no. 1/2 (June 1991): 42.

(the Basilian monks) over the secular clergy was broken at the end of the eighteenth century; before that time the monks had monopolized both episcopal office and the administration of eparchies, but now they were largely excluded from both. The income of the parish clergy was regularized and improved, with the state providing cash salaries to supplement the income from parish farms from which Greek Catholic priests had traditionally lived.

Thus, an essentially new social stratum was created from the traditional clergy—an intelligentsia. It was, to be sure, a clerical intelligentsia, but it could perform the primary function of that stratum: it could join the European cultural discourse. This stratum furnished almost all the “awakeners” of Ukrainian Galicia; to be more precise, with one exception—the historian Denys Zubrytsky—all the prominent contributors to the Ukrainian national awakening in Galicia before 1848 were clerics.

Let us put the point another way by comparing the cohort of Ukrainian Greek Catholic priests of the 1770s and of the 1830s. Except for the Basilian monks and a minuscule elite recently created by Bishop Sheptytsky from among candidates for the secular clergy, the priests of the 1770s had been trained by their fathers. The training was largely practical, with the emphasis on the performance of liturgical services. At home they also picked up enough knowledge of reading to make use of the liturgical books in Church Slavonic. Some of them were probably also literate in Polish. Their formal “seminary” education, if they even had one, was limited to a six-month stay at an institution resembling a summer camp, located in an undistinguished locality such as Biała Podlaska; here instruction was also practical, with some training in crafts and agriculture. After this excursion into the world, the newly ordained priest might return to his father’s village and assist him in serving the parish; eventually he would inherit his father’s parish, just as the peasant’s son would inherit his father’s farm. The priest of the 1770s would tend to socialize with other priests, cantors, and peasants; he would work his farm, satisfy the ritual needs of his flock, and perhaps seek his amusement, like his parishioners, in the tavern. The gentry in the manor house would belong to a wholly separate social and cultural world; if books were being discussed there, the priest would have had no inkling of their contents.

His grandchildren of the 1830s were completely different. They received their initial education in schools located in towns. They learned so little of the sacerdotal profession from their fathers that seminary authorities complained that they arrived at the seminary without even the ability to read the Cyrillic alphabet. On the other hand, they were fluent in Polish, which their grandparents often were not, and had acquired the basics of German and Latin. They attended seminary in a cultural capital, either Lviv or Vienna. There their German and Latin were perfected and they were exposed to other languages as well. They attended courses on philosophy and history and passed around books that were

forbidden by the seminary authorities. While in Vienna or Lviv they might even have met the great Slavic awakeners Jernej Kopitar and Vuk Karadžić, or participated in the compilation of a Ukrainian miscellany. After ordination they were less likely to return to the village of their birth, and more likely to engage in a decade of wandering from post to post as assistant and administrator. Some would keep in touch with their colleagues from the seminary by making use of the improved postal system. The latter also allowed them to subscribe to Polish or German periodicals (there were as yet no Ukrainian periodicals) and thus keep abreast of the cultural developments that had interested them in the capital. The cultural distance between them and the peasantry was growing, while that between them and the manor was shrinking.⁹

Looked at one way, nothing had changed from the 1770s to the 1830s. The number of priests and their proportional weight in the total Ukrainian population remained about the same. Looked at another way, however, everything had changed: a new social stratum had emerged.

Of course, the last statement was meant figuratively, in the sense that a pre-existing social stratum had been fundamentally transformed. But there is a literal truth to the statement as well, because by the middle of the nineteenth century a genuinely new social stratum did appear, and primarily as a result of the same socio-cultural processes that have already been described. This newcomer to the Galician Ukrainian social spectrum was the secular intelligentsia. It was formed to a large degree from the sons of priests who had decided not to follow their fathers' calling. A proper sociological analysis of the origins of the Ukrainian secular intelligentsia has yet to be undertaken, but there can be no doubt that individuals from sacerdotal families constituted a major component of that intelligentsia during the first century of its existence. Clerical origin cut completely across ideological divisions, encompassing a spectrum ranging from the Marxist Roman Rozdolsky to the radical-right nationalist Stepan Bandera. When the Vatican attempted to encourage priestly celibacy in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, during the synod of Lviv in 1891 numerous participants protested against this, arguing that it would stop up the primary source for the recruitment of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.¹⁰

9. I have described the intellectual formation of the Greek Catholic clergy and their role in the national awakening of the early nineteenth century in greater detail in two articles: "The Greek Catholic Church and Nation-Building in Galicia, 1772–1918," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, no. 3–4 (December 1984): 426–52; and "German Culture and the National Awakening in Western Ukraine before the Revolution of 1848," in *German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Hans-Joachim Torke and John-Paul Himka (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1994), 29–44.

10. For example, Omelian Ohonovsky, a priest and professor of Ukrainian literature at

Why did a secular intelligentsia emerge from the clergy? Partly this was the result of one specific reform introduced by the Austrian state at the end of the eighteenth century. Before Galicia was incorporated into Austria and was still part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Ukrainian priests' sons who did not follow their father's calling were often enserfed. Empress Maria Theresa, however, was determined to raise the status of the Greek Catholic Church and put an end to this practice. Since the priests had more sons than could be taken into church service, a small stratum of Ukrainians who came from a culturally increasingly advantaged background and belonged neither to the clergy nor to the peasantry (nor, of course, to the gentry) was created. This stratum (akin to the Russian *raznochintsy*) found its niche in the expanding Austrian administrative apparatus.¹¹

But more was at work than this one reform. The deeper and ultimately more vital roots of the formation of the Ukrainian secular intelligentsia should be sought in the very cultural transformation of the Ukrainian clergy described earlier. The change in education from the "one-to-one, on-the-job" method to the centralized method meant that the father-son linkage in the preparation of future priests was critically weakened. The passage of clerical status from one generation to another was undermined. This was particularly so because the education required before entering seminary was the same general education that prepared anyone aspiring to higher education, whether in theology or law. The training that once could only be received from one's father was now primarily available in institutionalized form. This meant that eventually, by the end of the nineteenth century, increasing numbers of peasants' sons were also able to enter the clergy; that this was possible, of course, depended on the peasantry's own socio-cultural transformation (to be discussed below). By the end of the century, then, the great priestly dynasties were in decline.¹² Peasants seeking social advancement sent their sons to the seminary, while priests' sons sought to rise in secular spheres.

Lviv University, said: "The Ruthenian clergy preserved the Ruthenian nationality in the [18]40s and created the intelligentsia.... By the introduction of celibacy, the intelligentsia would diminish until only peasants were left" in the Greek Catholic Church (Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorichnyi arkhiv Ukrainy [Lviv], fol. 201/1a/424, p. 31).

11. Anton Korczok, *Die griechisch-katholische Kirche in Galizien* (Leipzig and Berlin: Osteuropa-Institut in Breslau, 1921), 14, 28.

12. It would be possible to analyze the social origins of the Greek Catholic clergy over time on the basis of the schematisms published annually by each eparchy, but this has not yet been done. However, the decline of the priestly dynasties has been noted in a recent Ph.D. diss. on the Galician parish clergy: Andrew Dennis Sorokowski, "The Greek-Catholic Parish Clergy in Galicia, 1900–1939" (University of London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 1991).

With the emergence of first the clerical and then the secular intelligentsia one of the most important social preconditions for the rise of nationalism in Ukrainian Galicia had been met. Social strata had crystallized that were capable both of conducting the cultural work associated with nationalism (especially the codification and enrichment of the vernacular language and the elaboration of a history) and, when the revolution of 1848 thrust it upon them, of providing political leadership.

The socio-cultural transformation of the priestly caste stands out in relief when one considers another, related stratum in Galician Ukrainian society—that of the cantors. In the Greek Catholic Church, the primary function of cantors was to sing liturgical responses. Although in the Eastern-Christian tradition they constituted a branch of the lower clergy, the practice of ordaining them to their rank had long ago fallen into disuse. Some cantors had been born into the community they served and were peasants who performed their liturgical functions in addition to farming. Other cantors were more professional and more mobile. They hired themselves out to parishes, generally on one-year contracts until they finally settled in a particular community. They were allotted a house and garden as their main form of payment. Both the peasant cantors and more professional cantors also received irregular payments in kind or money. Although a cantors' school was founded in Przemyśl in 1818, few cantors attended it. The overwhelming majority received their training by the "one-to-one, on-the-job" method. Older cantors would take boys under their wing, have them help with the services, and teach them how to read the Church Slavonic liturgical books and sing the rather complicated responses; these boys could be their own sons or else peasants' sons who displayed the appropriate talents (intelligence, musical ability).

Until the introduction of a reformed, compulsory educational system at the end of the 1860s and beginning of the 1870s, cantors also served as teachers. Earlier in the nineteenth century their role was informal and very limited, because schools hardly existed in the countryside and few peasants sought to acquire literacy. The exceptional peasants who did want their children to learn to read sent them to the cantor for lessons. When parish schools sponsored by the Greek Catholic hierarchy began springing up in the villages in mid-century, particularly after the abolition of serfdom in 1848, cantors served as the teachers in these makeshift institutions. The formalization of their role as teachers was generally accompanied by some improvement and regularization in their material position. It was, however, a short-lived improvement. With the reform of the educational system in the Austrian Empire, the cantors were replaced as teachers by certified professionals who had attended a four-year teachers' college. The houses and gardens that had formerly been allotted to the cantors were now transformed into school property and reserved for the use of the teachers. In fact,

the reform of the educational system critically undermined the material conditions of existence as well as the prestige of cantors.

In the latter third of the nineteenth century, in response to this crisis, activists among the cantors articulated a new vision of the place of the cantor in Galician Ukrainian society. They founded a number of new schools for cantors and formed a professional association. They lobbied the church hierarchy, the government, and even the organized Ukrainian national movement to regulate the status of cantors. Their chief demands were: compulsory education at a cantors' school, universal certification of cantors, and a regularization and raising of cantors' salaries. In short, they sought to make a transition similar to that of the priests, who had had their education centralized and their livelihood guaranteed by the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II a century earlier.

Had the cantor-activists succeeded in their aspirations, the cantors would have been transformed into a lower-clerical intelligentsia. In reality, however, neither the government nor the church was willing to invest the funds that would have been required to satisfy the cantor-activists' demands. Thus, except for an elite of the cantors who attempted to live up to the vision they articulated, the majority of the cantors remained at the level they had been at the beginning of the century—a step above the peasants culturally, but about equal with them materially. It is true that the cantor of the 1890s stood on a much higher cultural level than the cantor of the 1800s, but this was not because of anything that had happened to the cantors as cantors; it was, rather, because they shared in the same socio-cultural transformation that elevated the whole Ukrainian peasantry of Galicia, including peasants who sang liturgical responses.

A few words need to be said about the certified instructors who replaced the cantors as teachers. The primary-school teachers in the countryside were a new social stratum called into existence by the introduction of compulsory education in 1869–73. The Galician school system was underdeveloped in the late nineteenth century, and not every village had a school. Only a minority of the Galician teachers, about a quarter or a third, were Ukrainian, although they may have constituted about half of the teachers who served in Ukrainian villages. There were probably less than half as many Ukrainian teachers in the Galician countryside as there were Ukrainian priests. Although they might, because of their own “centralized” education and their profession as transmitters of elements of that same education, be considered a part of the secular intelligentsia discussed above, several characteristics set them apart. The most obvious is level of education; a four-year teacher's college was simply not the same as a university. The secular intelligentsia proper lived in cities and towns; the teachers lived in villages. The secular intelligentsia enjoyed at least a modicum of economic security; the teachers were very poorly paid. The secular intelligentsia was largely of clerical origin; the teachers were of plebeian origin (peasants, burghers, and *szlachta chodackowa*, i.e., peasants with gentry status). Still, the

teacher was considered close to a social equal by the upper levels of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. It is characteristic that there seems to have been no social barrier obstructing marriages between priests' daughters and teachers, while there was one between priests' daughters and both peasants and cantors.¹³

The social strata discussed above constituted a minute proportion of Galician Ukrainian society in the late nineteenth century. The number of priests and cantors, structurally related to the number of parishes, ranged from two thousand to three thousand each in the nineteenth century. The number of Ukrainian teachers, structurally related to the number of schools, probably just exceeded one thousand around 1885. Altogether these three strata accounted for only about 0.2 percent of the entire Ukrainian-speaking population of Galicia in the late nineteenth century (2.5 million in 1880, 2.8 million in 1890).¹⁴ The size of the Ukrainian secular intelligentsia, which had fewer structural limitations, increased dramatically over the course of the late nineteenth century, but it still remained small. I would estimate that the Ukrainian intelligentsia grew from around one thousand in 1850 to about five thousand in 1875 to over ten thousand in 1900. In any case, it is unlikely that the four strata discussed above—clergy, secular intelligentsia, cantors, and teachers—ever exceeded one percent of the Ukrainian Galician population at any point in the nineteenth century.

Yet these four strata played a role in the development of the Ukrainian national movement that was vastly disproportionate to their numerical strength. Before 1848, as has already been mentioned, the priests formed the cadres of the national awakening. In the revolutionary year the amorphous, largely cultural Ukrainian movement suddenly acquired an organizational structure and a political dimension (to use Hroch's terminology, it moved from phase A to phase B). The first representative political organization of the Galician Ukrainians was the Supreme Ruthenian Council established in Lviv in May 1848. Its composition was as follows:

13. This discussion of cantors and teachers is based upon chapter 3 of my monograph *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement* (Edmonton, London, and New York: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Macmillan, and St. Martin's Press, 1988).

14. *Ibid.*, 105.

TABLE 1: THE OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SUPREME RUTHENIAN COUNCIL, 1848¹⁵

Civil servants	31.8%
Clergy	28.8%
Students	21.2%
Urban property owners	7.6%
Educators	4.6%
Writers	4.6%
Estate owners	1.5%

There was a hiatus in the development of the Ukrainian movement during the decade of neo-absolutism, but the movement revived in the 1860s. One of the most important organizations of the constitutional period (and, indeed, a pillar of the Ukrainian movement up until Galicia came under Soviet rule in 1939) was the Prosvita (Enlightenment) society. Prosvita was the primary instrument of the national movement in the countryside. It fostered adult education, infused with a Ukrainian national perspective, among the peasantry. It did this by establishing and supporting a network of reading clubs (*chytalni*) in the villages, that is, centres where peasants gathered primarily to read newspapers, but also to listen to others read aloud, to hear the occasional lecture by a student or a guest from the town, and to celebrate various national holidays (e.g., the anniversary of the abolition of serfdom, the anniversary of the birth of the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko). I have analyzed the membership of Prosvita during the first years of its existence, 1868–74.¹⁶ At that time the society had not yet conquered the countryside as it would later in the century,¹⁷ so its membership is reflective of the leadership of the national movement rather than of its rank and file.

15. Source: Jan Kozik, *Miedzy reakcja a rewolucja: Studia z dziejów ukraińskiego ruchu narodowego w Galicji w latach 1848–1849* (Warsaw and Cracow: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1975), 36.

16. See my Ph.D. diss., “Polish and Ukrainian Socialism: Austria, 1867–1890” (The University of Michigan, 1977), 126–42.

17. In the years 1868–74 Prosvita recruited an average of thirty-nine new members annually and was the patron of two reading clubs; by the years 1896–1900 this average had grown to 1,098, and by 1914 it supported 2,944 reading clubs. See my *Galician Villagers*, 90–1.

TABLE 2: THE OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF PROSVITA, 1868–74¹⁸

Clergy	33.4%
Lawyers and civil servants	24.9%
Educators	20.3%
Students	10.0%
Artists and writers	2.3%
Estate owners	1.2%
Urban property owners	0.4%
Other occupations	7.7%

The similarity of the social structure of the Ukrainian national leadership in 1848 and 1868–74 is striking. It consisted primarily of the secular intelligentsia and the clergy. It should be pointed out, however, that the proportion of the clergy, about one-third in both cases, is undoubtedly under-representative of the actual state of affairs in the Ukrainian movement. In 1848 the Polish opponents of the Ukrainian movement tried to depict it as a mere conspiracy of the Austrian bureaucracy and the Greek Catholic clergy. Sensitive to charges by Polish democrats that the Ukrainians consisted only of priests and peasants and that the Ukrainian clergy was attempting to establish a “theocracy” in eastern Galicia, the Supreme Ruthenian Council deliberately restricted participation of the clergy in the organization to one-third and reserved places in the executive for the secular intelligentsia. As to Prosvita, it was clearly identified with the Ukrainophile tendency in Galicia, which many priests in the 1860s and 1870s regarded as an overly secular, extremist political current. The true weight of the clergy in the Ukrainian movement, broadly conceived, was much higher. Clerics accounted, for example, for about seventy percent of the subscribers to the 1860 almanac *Zoria halytskaia*; this important miscellany marked the revival of Ukrainian publishing when the neo-absolutist decade ended and the constitutional era began.¹⁹

A major and, for the development of the Ukrainian national movement, crucial difference between the secular intelligentsia and the clergy was that the former tended to reside in urban centres and the latter in the countryside. Of eighty priests in Prosvita, only 1.4 percent lived in Lviv; 7.0 percent lived in other localities with populations of over 9,000; and 91.7 percent lived in villages and small towns.²⁰ Of forty-five lawyers, 29.6 percent lived in Lviv; 34.1

18. Source: Himka, “Polish and Ukrainian Socialism,” 136.

19. “Spysok VPChT prenumerantov,” *Zoria halytskaia, iako album na hod 1860* (Lviv: Typom Instytutu Stavropihiiskoho, 1860).

20. I have excluded seven priests who were also educators; 85.7 percent of them lived in Lviv, and none lived in the villages.

percent lived in other cities; and 36.4 percent lived in villages and small towns. Of twenty civil servants, fifty percent lived in Lviv; forty percent lived in other cities; and ten percent lived in villages and small towns.²¹ To put it another way: excluding peasants, priests made up sixty-five percent of Prosvita's members in the countryside. These figures lay bare the fundamental structure of the leadership of the Ukrainian national movement in the late nineteenth century: a nucleus of secular intellectuals in Lviv and other cities who published periodicals and co-ordinated organizations at the all-national level; and a network of priests distributed across the countryside who brought the message of the national movement to the peasantry and helped them to establish the reading clubs, co-operatives, and other voluntary associations that constituted the cells of the all-national organizations.

The data cited above provide a top-down view of the Ukrainian national movement. It is also possible to look at related data that offer a perspective from the bottom up. I have attempted to identify the composition of the Ukrainian movement in the Galician countryside through an analysis of the popular newspaper *Batkivshchyna* in the years 1884–85.²² I collected several types of data: a list of all activists mentioned in the paper; a list of all officers of reading clubs mentioned in the paper; and a list of all who contributed articles to the paper in the rubric reserved for reporting on the progress of the national movement in rural localities. The results were as follows:

21. Of the 275 individuals on Prosvita's membership list, I was able to identify 95 percent by occupation and only 84 percent by place of residence. Of fifty-three (non-priest) educators in Prosvita, 33.3 percent lived in Lviv; 47.1 percent lived in other cities; and 19.6 percent lived in villages and small towns. Thus only about one-fifth of the "educators" referred to in the Prosvita membership are identical to the "teachers" discussed above; most belonged, rather, to the category of secular intelligentsia.

22. For details, see my *Galician Villagers*, esp. xxv–xxvii.

**TABLE 3: ACTIVISTS IN THE RURAL UKRAINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT
(AS REPORTED IN *BATKIVSHCHYNA* IN 1884–85)²³**

Occupation	Number	%
Peasants	206	56
Priests	53	14
Burghers and artisans	35	10
Cantors	23	6
Teachers	23	6
Scribes	6	2
Merchants	5	1
Seminarians	3	1
Others	3	1
Unidentified	11	3

**TABLE 4: READING CLUB OFFICERS (AS REPORTED IN *BATKIVSHCHYNA* IN
1884–85)²⁴**

Peasants	65.1%
Priests	12.0%
Burghers and artisans	11.2%
Teachers	4.8%
Cantors	4.0%
Others	2.8%

TABLE 5: RURAL CONTRIBUTORS TO *BATKIVSHCHYNA* IN 1884–85²⁵

Peasants	37.1%
Cantors	25.7%
Teachers	14.6%
Priests	10.4%
Others	10.6%

23. Source: Raw data in Himka, *Galician Villagers*, 319–27. Individuals with more than one occupation were counted fractionally in each relevant category.

24. Source: Himka, *Galician Villagers*, 89.

25. Source: Himka, *Galician Villagers*, 85.

This bottom-up perspective confirms the prominent role of priests as agents of the national movement that was evident also from the top-down perspective. However, it brings into relief the importance of the cantors and teachers.²⁶ Considering their weight in the population, they contributed disproportionately to the rural national movement. The intensity of their participation can be appreciated by keeping in mind that there were roughly as many cantors as priests and roughly half as many teachers. Their level of participation approximated that of the priests and far surpassed that of the peasants. In fact, the data may slightly exaggerate the importance of priests relative to that of cantors and teachers, since priests might have found mention more frequently as activists simply because of the prestige they enjoyed in the community and the priests' role as officers in reading clubs may sometimes have been honorific (86.7 percent of the priests who were officers served as president).

There were thus three leading strata involved in the national movement in the countryside: the priests, the cantors, and the teachers. These strata complemented one another nicely. Both the priests and the teachers had close cultural links with the secular intelligentsia and daily contact with the peasantry. Both also, however, were separated by a certain social distance from the peasants, which sometimes impeded their ability to communicate effectively with them. The cantors made up for that, since they were culturally and socially so close to the peasantry yet able to understand the ideas promoted by the priests, with whom they worked closely, and by the newspapers, which they were able to read. They could translate the national message into a form more accessible to the folk. The failure of the cantor-activists to transform their estate after the manner of the clergy probably helped the national movement more than hindered it. It left the cantors in the position of the peasantry's advance guard, striving to emulate the example of the social strata immediately above it.

This brings us to the peasantry itself. The linkage between the four social strata discussed above and the class that made up, at any point in the nineteenth century, at least nine-tenths of the Ukrainian population in Galicia was the source of the national movement's strength. Given certain conditions, such a linkage may not have been formed. Certainly before 1848, when the peasantry was enserfed and the Metternichian reaction hindered the development of the press and associations, the linkage was hard to imagine and, indeed, did not exist. The Ukrainian national movement before mid-century was essentially a head without

26. For the purposes of this article, I am leaving the burghers and artisans out of consideration. I have dealt with their place in the national movement in "Voluntary Artisan Associations and the Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia (the 1870s)," in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia*, ed. Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982), 178–95.

a body, a literary and cultural exploration conducted by educated men (in clerical collars) without reference to the mass of the nation except as vessels who had preserved songs, customs, and turns of phrase that begged to be enshrined in books.

In Russian-ruled Ukraine the national intelligentsia (where it was almost exclusively secular) also failed to link up with the peasantry; this failure proved catastrophic when the attempt was made in the years 1917–20 to establish an independent Ukrainian state. The failure to connect with the peasantry was due to a number of factors, including the absence of a Ukrainian clerical intelligentsia to serve as the facilitators of the movement in the countryside and the persistence of “Metternichian” political conditions into the twentieth century. But there was more to it than that. There was also the problem of the cultural level of the peasantry throughout the Russian Empire. The cultural distance between the intelligentsia and the peasantry there was notoriously great, and it hindered the development of other political movements besides the Ukrainian national movement. Why was the Galician Ukrainian peasantry different?

Over the course of the nineteenth century the Galician peasantry underwent a transformation in many ways as fundamental as that of the priests. It was a complex transformation, and I cannot hope to do more within the limits of this article than present a rough sketch of its general contours. There were three great moments in this transformation.

The first was the era of enlightened absolutism, the same period in which the main tasks leading to the transformation of the clergy were accomplished. For the peasantry the results were more modest, in spite of far-reaching intentions on the part of Emperor Joseph II, but they were not negligible. Whereas before Austria’s annexation of Galicia the peasantry had essentially been outside the law and under the direct jurisdiction of their local landlords, the Austrian state hemmed in the authority of the landlords, subjected the peasantry to state law, and made it possible for peasants to initiate legal proceedings. Serfdom was not abolished, but it was mitigated by legislation that restricted the number of days a serf had to perform corvée labour (*Robot*), limited the corporal punishment of peasants, and prohibited the most egregious abuses of the feudal system. Steps were taken to make the peasants owners of the “rustical lands,” i.e., the holdings that the peasants worked for their own sustenance. Where it existed, the repartitional commune was destroyed.²⁷ A modern bureaucratic

27. Roman Rosdolsky, “Die ostgalizische Dorfgemeinschaft und ihre Auflösung,” *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 41 (1954): 97–145. For comparison: “In contrast to the peasantry of Western Europe, the *muzhik* lacked a developed sense of property and law, which made him poor material for citizenship” (Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution* [New York: 1990], 113). Already at the end of the eighteenth century, the Galician Ukrainian peasantry began evolving in the direction

structure—something that had been lacking in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth—was erected; the division of the whole province into administrative units (“circles”) brought this bureaucratic apparatus into the countryside.

The second major moment was the abolition of serfdom in 1848 (thirteen years earlier than in Russia). Without the emancipation of the peasants, the development of a national movement among them was patently precluded, and 1848 must therefore be considered the most important turning point. However, the defeat of the revolution and restoration of absolutism meant that other changes in the situation of the peasantry that followed in the immediate wake of emancipation were either half-hearted and incomplete (e.g., the expansion of the network of parish schools, the first steps towards the introduction of village self-government) or mixed blessings if blessings at all (e.g., the conversion of pastures and forests to private property, during the course of which the peasantry lost ownership or access to most of these lands).

The third wave of change was probably most responsible for the difference in evolution between the Galician and Russian peasantry, namely, the multi-faceted transformation initiated in connection with the Austrian constitutional reforms of the 1860s. Perhaps most important was the introduction of compulsory elementary education; although the Galician implementation of this reform left much to be desired, especially before the twentieth century, Russia did not even admit the principle. In school the peasant child made a direct connection with “print culture” and experienced “centralized education.” At the same time, the peasant was drawn into high-political life by being granted the right to vote in elections to the parliament and local diet, even if on a restricted and indirect basis at first (universal male suffrage was introduced in 1907). A sphere of local politics also emerged with the introduction of municipal self-government in which peasants, formally elected by their fellow villagers, managed the affairs of their community (the scribes mentioned in Table 3 worked in village councils). The new civil liberties brought the city-based national movement’s newspapers and voluntary associations to the village; the reading clubs reinforced the literacy that had been acquired in school. The peasant’s land was now made completely his own private property, legally alienable and divisible for the first time.²⁸ A series of economic laws and the construction of railways precipitated the emergence of a money economy that connected the Galician peasantry with

of the west European peasantry. Pipes’s characterization of the Russian peasantry is admittedly a caricature, but it is a useful caricature because it limns an ideal type of the “untransformed” peasant.

28. Before the 1860s the peasants could neither sell their land nor divide it among their sons. The latter prohibition was in practice ignored. The peasant’s right to dispose of his landed property as he saw fit was another mixed blessing: too many peasants sold all or part of their landholdings to pay off debts.

the global economy (e.g., tea, lemons, and white sugar entered the peasants' diet) and began altering their material folk culture in the direction of conformity with the new, universal, industrial material culture (e.g., thatched roofs began to be replaced by sheets of tin).

The problem with selecting and listing the critical moments in the transformation is that it does not adequately suggest the rich complexity and concrete diversity of the process. For example, for some peasants the year 1846 marked a milestone. Galician peasants had traditionally measured time by the position of the sun and the stars and by the crowing of cocks. This was, of course, quite different from the way time was measured in "industrial culture,"²⁹ which demanded a more precise, universally shared measurement. In 1846 an imperial patent reiterated a law of 1786 that the working day of serfs in summer should not exceed twelve hours, including a two-hour rest period. A number of peasant communities in the Przemyśl region therefore invested in clocks so that they would not have to work any longer than the law specified. In this case, then, a product of the state—a law—led peasants, at least in a particular locality, to expand their conception of time to include the new "industrial" conception. Myriads of such individual moments accumulated to bring about the great qualitative changes in the situation and mentality of the Galician Ukrainian peasantry. Peasants visiting licensed physicians and travelling to the capital for a political rally, universal conscription, and accordions, gymnastic societies, and insurance companies—all and more would figure in a fuller picture of the process of the peasantry's transformation.

To summarize: initiatives undertaken by the state transformed the peasants from serfs into free peasant farmers, fostered in them the development of a shared cognitive base with the (clerical and secular) intelligentsia, and made them participants in political life.³⁰

Of course, these changes affected the peasantry differentially. Some localities and some individuals were more affected, others less. Younger, prosperous, male peasants were in the forefront of change. Older peasants were steeped more deeply in the traditional, oral culture and less open to the new ideas and new ways penetrating the countryside. Poorer peasants found the transformation from

29. Again, I am using this term in the way Gellner develops it in *Nations and Nationalism*. It is a type of culture appropriate to his third, industrial stage of history (following the hunter-gathering and agrarian stages). In Galicia industrial culture existed without the industrialization of production and co-existed with agrarian culture.

30. For an examination of the development of transportation and communications, formal and popular education, agricultural innovation, public health, and changing attitudes in Galician Ukrainian peasant communities, see Stella Hryniuk, *Peasants with Promise: Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia, 1880–1900* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1991).

a natural to a money economy difficult and had few resources to allocate to their own and their children's cultural elevation. Peasant women were excluded from political life, able neither to vote in parliamentary elections nor to participate in village self-government; they were less likely to attend school than men and constituted only a small fraction of the membership of reading clubs.³¹ Still, in spite of the limitations, there did emerge a sizable component of the Galician Ukrainian peasantry that was well prepared to enter into partnership with the other strata of Ukrainian society and work together with them to further the interests of the developing national collectivity.

31. It is also worth noting here that the other strata discussed in this article were overwhelmingly male. Priests and cantors were all male. Both the teachers and the secular intelligentsia were predominantly male. Priests' wives often aided their husbands in their efforts to raise the peasants' national consciousness and improve their general cultural level. Priests' daughters formed the leadership of the Ukrainian women's movement that emerged in Galicia in the late nineteenth century. See Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Feminists despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life, 1884-1939* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988).

Galician Society as a Cultural Public, 1771–1914¹

Jolanta T. Pękacz

The formation of modern Polish society and culture that began at the end of the eighteenth century was connected with the gradual decline of the social position of the nobility, and not—as in western Europe—with the rapid social rise of the bourgeoisie. Although the stratification (first of all financial, then social and cultural) of the Polish nobility existed long before the eighteenth century, it did not threaten the nobles' formal unity, solidarity, and sense of self-identity. The weak bourgeoisie achieved such unity to a much lesser degree.² The partitions of Poland in 1772, 1792, and 1795 became the turning point in the process of social transformation. The foreign authorities started limiting Polish nobility's rights and privileges, which were unique in Europe, as well as their number.³

The stratification of the Polish nobility in Galicia formally came about on 13 June 1775, when a patent issued by Empress Maria Theresa introduced an Austrian system that divided the nobility into two classes—magnates (*Hochadel*, including princes, counts, and barons) and knights (*Ritterschaft*, untitled

1. This article deals with the territory of Galicia as an Austrian crownland from 1772, including Cracow even though that city did not formally belong to the crownland in the years 1772–96 and 1809–46.

2. See Jerzy Jedlicki, *Klejnot i bariery społeczne: Przeobrażenia szlachectwa polskiego w schyłkowym okresie rozwoju feudalizmu* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1968); Stanisław Grodziski, *Obywatelstwo w szlacheckiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Cracow: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1963), 201.

3. At the end of the eighteenth century, nobles constituted about sixteen percent of the Polish population, compared to about two percent in the western European countries. See Andrzej Zajączkowski, *Główne elementy kultury szlacheckiej w Polsce* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1961), 6.

noblemen).⁴ One's noble status in the Polish Commonwealth did not guarantee that one would be recognized as such under Austria. Further regulations issued by Maria Theresa (1775) and Joseph II (1782 and 1785) introduced new ways of obtaining noble status. The Austrian government, as well as the governments of the two other partitioning powers, assumed a decidedly negative attitude towards lesser nobles who owned or leased small plots of land, and towards the landless "noble proletariat" debasing the noble rank. Austrian policy contributed to the rapid degradation of these groups: those who had neither land nor money to buy it lost their noble status. On the other hand, those who had not been nobles before the partitions could now buy noble titles. As a result, the nobility recognized by Austria formed a new social group and contributed to the breakdown of the formal unity and equality of the pre-partition nobility. The new aristocracy, tempted by the splendours of imperial Vienna and the possibilities of a court career, cut itself off from the rest of the nobility and formed a separate group not only in a formal sense, but also in a material and cultural one.⁵

In 1772 there were not many more than three hundred urban settlements in Galicia—fewer than in other parts of the Habsburg Empire.⁶ Lviv (Lemberg, Lwów), Galicia's capital and its biggest town, had about twenty-five thousand inhabitants in 1772 and almost forty-four thousand at the beginning of the nineteenth century.⁷ Lviv became the seat of civil and military authority and the centre of academic, cultural, and social life in the crownland. Very few other Galician towns had several thousand inhabitants (Przemyśl, Rzeszów, Jasło, Sambir); most of them had no more than several hundred. About fourteen thousand burghers formed a social group between the bourgeoisie and the

4. Walerian Kalinka, *Galicya i Kraków pod panowaniem austriackim* (Cracow: Spółka Wydawnicza Polska, 1898), 24; Jan Leniek, *Dzieje i ustrój polityczny monarchii austriacko-węgierskiej* (Tarnów: Z. Jeleń, 1914), 127; Stanisław Schnür-Peplowski, *Z przeszłości Galicyi (1772–1862)* (Lviv: Jakubowski and Zadurawicz, 1895), 48; C. A. Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire, 1790–1918* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), 52–7.

5. Wacław Tokarz, *Galicya w początkach ery Józefińskiej w świetle ankiety urzędowej z 1783 roku* (Cracow: Akademia Umiejętności, 1909), 305; Zajączkowski, *Główne elementy*, 105.

6. Franciszek Bujak, *Rozwój gospodarczy Galicyi (1772–1914)* (Lviv: Księgarnia Polska B. Połonieckiego, 1917), 8; Ryszard Kołodziejczyk, "Miasta polskie w okresie porzbirowym," in *Miasta polskie w tysiącleciu*, vol. 1, ed. Mateusz Suchniński (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1965), 97; Witold Hensel and Jan Pazdur, eds., *Historia kultury materialnej Polski w zarysie*, vol. 5, (1795–1870) (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1978), 28; Antoni Mączak et al, eds., *Encyklopedia historii gospodarczej Polski do 1945 roku*, vol. 1 (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1982), 526.

7. *Gazeta Lwowska*, 1811, no. 40.

peasantry. In general, at the beginning of the nineteenth century only about ten percent of the Galician population lived in towns and was involved mostly in farming. Until 1848 Galicia's towns were mostly privately owned, economically less developed than the villages, and, in many cases, functioned as local marketplaces. The Austrian government soon began taking over indebted towns. In 1807, forty-nine of them were deprived of their municipal rights, ninety others were recognized as towns proper (*urbs*), and the rest were reclassified as small towns (*oppidum*).

Compared to the tempo of urbanization in Austria proper, Bohemia, and Hungary, Galicia's was very slow and did not correspond to its rapid increase in population. The reason was the absence of a rich bourgeoisie like the one that ensured prosperity to the towns of the Netherlands, Holland, France, and Germany. Such a class could not develop in a region that had experienced long and numerous wars for more than a century before the partitions, during which the towns were plundered, commerce ceased, and development was set back. Furthermore, Galician trade declined from after 1772 on after Russian and Prussian tariff policies blocked the traditional transportation routes from Galicia to the shipping centres along the Baltic. Although Brody (until 1879) and Cracow (until 1846) were free international marketplaces, a prohibitive Austrian import tariff blocked the old through-trade between Russia and the German lands.

In 1774 Maria Theresa issued a patent concerning the colonization of towns by merchants, artisans, entrepreneurs, and artists, and of villages by farmers. Protestant colonists were allowed to settle in Lviv, Zalizhchyky, Jarosław, and Zamość. Newcomers were granted rights to live in towns and temporary exemption from guild and government taxes. In order to encourage people to build new houses and to repair ruined ones, the government announced a tax exemption for new or restored buildings in Lviv, Brody, Jarosław, Zalizhchyky, Zamość, and Kazimierz. In 1778, in order to stimulate a more dynamic development of the trades, special regulations reforming old guilds were issued.⁸

During Maria Theresa's reign colonization was insignificant. It increased substantially after Joseph II issued a patent in 1781 based on the colonization practices of Frederick the Great of Prussia. Joseph II expanded the Maria Theresa's patent and allowed artisans to settle in all the towns and villages of Galicia, offering them a tax exemption for ten years and exempting newcomers and their sons from military service. Regulations issued in 1782 further encouraged foreigners to settle in Galicia's towns; two years later, Christian burghers

8. Schnür-Peplowski, *Z przeszłości Galicyi*, 30–2; Tokarz, *Galicya w początkach*, 273; Horst Glassl, *Das Österreichische Einrichtungswerk in Galizien (1772–1790)* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975), 229–30.

were exempted from industrial taxation, and free loans from the state and agrarian colonization were introduced.⁹

Joseph II's patent elicited quick responses in the overpopulated parts of the Habsburg Empire. In the years 1782–83 over five thousand people migrated to Galicia; in 1784 over seven thousand more arrived.¹⁰ The great influx of immigrants to Galicia discovered that the government was unprepared to settle all of them, and the whole enterprise was halted in 1785. The exact number of newcomers is unknown; according to recent estimates, thirteen thousand to fifteen thousand people arrived during the years 1782–85.¹¹ Directed primarily to the poorly populated and economically backward eastern part of Galicia, they settled there in groups that gave rise to many small colonies. Usually they became Polonized or Ukrainianized rather quickly; only a few German and Bohemian settlements in eastern Galicia survived until World War II.¹²

In December 1785 German was introduced as the official language at all levels of administration in Galicia (the legal system used Latin) and remained thus until 1869. This reflected the Austrian policy of integrating all provinces of the empire into one coherent, centrally governed state organism, and it was followed by an influx of foreigners into Galician administration and the civil service, especially at the higher levels. Many of these foreigners had insufficient qualifications for the posts they obtained; numerous sources present them in a very unfavourable light. "On the one hand they consisted of adventurers, titled but of ambiguous conduct; on the other, of parvenus without education and without tact," noted a nineteenth-century historian.¹³ For example, the director of Lviv district, Ferdinandi, was said to be a lackey in Vienna before he came to Galicia.¹⁴ One German author characterizes his compatriots in the following way: "I met some diligent, gifted, and honest civil servants in Lviv, but only a few; only every tenth one deserves the opinion that he is useful for the government and that he serves it honestly.... One does not have to be a keen

9. Henryk Lepucki, *Działalność kolonizacyjna Marii Teresy i Józefa II w Galicji, 1772–1790* (Lviv: Instytut Popierania Polskiej Twórczości Naukowej, 1938), 26; *Continuatio edictorum, mandatorum et universalium in Regnis Galiciae et Lodomeriae...* (Lviv, 1783), in *Galicja od pierwszego rozbioru do Wiosny Ludów, 1772–1849: Wybór tekstów źródłowych*, ed. Marian Tyrowicz (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1956), 113; Tokarz, *Galicja w początkach*, 277.

10. Tokarz, *Galicja w początkach*, 281.

11. Glassl, *Das Österreichische Einrichtungswerk*, 232.

12. Bujak, *Rozwój gospodarczy Galicyi*, 12; Stanisław Inglot, ed., *Historia chłopów Polskich*, vol. 2 (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1972), 24.

13. Schnür-Peplowski, *Z przeszłości Galicyi*, 11.

14. Józef Sierpniak, *Rządy niemieckie w Galicyi* (Cieszyn: "Dziennik Cieszyński," 1906), 5.

observer to notice an evident lack of religion, stupid brutality, and ungovernable inclination to debauchery among most of them.”¹⁵ To subdue bribe-taking and the abuse of power by civil servants, the government introduced severe penalties and, in 1780, special “lists of conduct.” These were, however, withdrawn shortly after Joseph II’s death in 1790.¹⁶

In Cracow the first wave of foreigners appeared between 1796 and 1809, when the town was incorporated into Galicia, and established numerous merchant families. A new influx came shortly after the collapse of the Cracow Republic in 1846, when Austrian rule was reintroduced. Very soon foreign officers and civil servants replaced Polish functionaries. The Austrian annexation of Galicia also meant an influx of military personnel from the other provinces of the Habsburg Empire; they were quartered in all the larger towns of Galicia. In the mid-nineteenth century the number of such troops in Cracow was about four thousand.¹⁷

At first the foreigners created their own social circles. In Lviv, for example, a German club, seldom visited by Poles, and public gardens with restaurants were established after the Austrian fashion.¹⁸ In time, however, most of the foreigners assimilated into Polish society. Polonization, even as early as in the second generation of the in-migrants, was a common phenomenon. It revealed itself, for example, during the November Uprising of 1830: among the young Galicians who took part in it there was quite a large group consisting of the sons of foreign-born civil servants. In the next generation, during the January Uprising, among the volunteers from Galicia there were again many representatives from the families of foreign-born bureaucrats.¹⁹ Because they usually came from the lower social classes, the foreigners were attracted by the nobility-defined character of Polish culture. Between 1815 and 1848 Polish culture was even more appealing to them than the Austrian, which they identified with Metternich’s reactionary politics.²⁰ Polonization was also fostered by the

15. Franz Kratter, *Briefe über den itztigen Zustand von Galizien*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1786), as quoted by Stanisław Schnür-Pełowski in his *Galicjana (1778–1812)* (Lviv: H. Altenberg, 1896), 41–2.

16. Schnür-Pełowski, *Z przeszłości Galicyi*, 65.

17. Juliusz Demel, *Stosunki gospodarcze i społeczne Krakowa w latach 1853–1866* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1958), 519–20.

18. Józef Białynia-Chołoddecki, *Lwów w czasie powstania listopadowego* (Lviv: Towarzystwo Miłośników Przeszłości Lwowa, 1930), 11.

19. Ludwik Dębicki, *Z dawnych wspomnień, 1846–1848* (Cracow: Spółka Wydawnicza Polska, 1903), 75; Zygmunt Kaczkowski, *Mój pamiętnik z lat 1833–1843* (Lviv, 1899), 87; Józef Białynia-Chołoddecki, *Lwów w czasie powstania styczniowego* (Lviv: Towarzystwo Miłośników Przeszłości Lwowa, 1922), 8.

20. Henryk Wereszycki, *Pod berłem Habsburgów: Zagadnienia narodowościowe*

absence of large concentrations of German speakers in Galicia, the relatively long distances from the centres of German cultural life, and by many intermarriages, which religious identity facilitated: most of foreigners who came to Galicia were Catholic.

In addition to becoming Polonized, many foreign newcomers retained their own customs and system of values, which exerted a significant influence on Polish life in Galicia. For example, they started the first commercial cultural enterprises, such as print shops, bookshops, and musical-instrument workshops. The monopoly of people of foreign descent in these occupations in Galicia in the first half of the nineteenth century was due not only to the lack of indigenous specialists, but also to the antipathy of many Poles toward entering urban occupations, which they associated with a low social status—an attitude reflecting the Polish nobility's system of values and its contempt for selling one's own labour to earn a living. Foreigners were also responsible for a number of cultural initiatives, including the organization of music societies and regular concerts. For example, the German theatre in Lviv, founded in 1789 and directed by a Bohemian, Henryk Bulla, employed actors, musicians, singers, and dancers from all over the Habsburg Empire.²¹ Germans and Bohemians predominated in the orchestra of the Polish theatre in Lviv in the 1860s.²² In Przemyśl, from 1829 until 1887, three consecutive generations of conductors of the Greek Catholic choir came from Bohemia.

In 1774 the Theresian school system, named after Empress Maria Theresa, was formally introduced in Galicia. It provided for three types of schools: primary *Trivialschulen* in every village, secondary academic *Hauptschulen* in the larger centres, and vocational-technical *Normalschulen*. The language of instruction was to be German, and for all children aged five to twelve school attendance was compulsory. In practice the Theresian school system did not come fully into effect in any province of the empire, but it served as the basis for all subsequent reforms of the Austrian educational system. In Galicia this system really started to develop only after the "political" school legislation authorized by Emperor Francis I was introduced in 1805; it remained in force until 1869. In spite of these new regulations, primary schools in Galicia were of a very low standard, and as late as in 1865 only twenty percent of children aged six to twelve really attended schools. Between 1773 and 1850 only six secondary schools were established in Galicia. Elementary-school teachers usually had

(Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1975), 60.

21. Barbara Lasocka, *Teatr lwowski w latach 1800–1842* (Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1967), 25.

22. *Rocznik teatralny wydany przez Felicjana Kozińskiego, suflera teatru polskiego we Lwowie na rok 1888* (Lviv, 1887).

insufficient qualifications because the only training required of them was a course that lasted several months. Nevertheless, few became teachers because they were poorly paid.²³

Politically and legally Galicia formed a unit. Ethnically, however, its eastern and western parts differed a great deal. East of the San River and its tributary the Wisłok, the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) population predominated: it consisted largely of illiterate peasants with little sense of their national identity, who were tended by a small number of intelligentsia, most of whom were priests. The awakening of a Ruthenian ethnic identity was expressed before 1848 through the attempts to introduce the vernacular a literary language by a group of student—the Ruthenian Triad—at the Greek Catholic Theological Seminary in Lviv. In 1837 they published a miscellany, *Rusalka Dnistrovaia*, containing samples of folk poetry and some original works. The initiative was paralyzed on the one hand by the Austrian authorities, who were suspicious of all nationalistic movements within the empire, and on the other by an even more hostile Greek Catholic hierarchy, for whom the “peasant” language in print seemed undignified, indecent, and possibly subversive.²⁴ At that time, only a very small part of the Ruthenian population was nationally conscious.

Jews comprised a separate group in Galicia’s population. Because of the trade routes connecting Lviv and Cracow, they had lived in the region long before the partitions. In 1776 Jews constituted 8.7 percent of eastern Galicia’s and 3.1 percent of western Galicia’s population.²⁵ They lived mostly in villages, because the law (*de non tolerandis Judaeis*) forbade Jews to settle in most of the royal towns (such as Biała, Bochnia, Brzozów, Jasło, Krosno, Wieliczka, and Żywiec) and allowed them to live in other towns (for example, Lviv, Tarnów, and Nowy Sącz) only in designated ghettos. In some eastern Galician towns, however (such as Brody, Drohobych, Stryi, or Staryi Sambir), the majority of the inhabitants were Jews. In the 1790s one-third of Lviv’s thirty-five thousand inhabitants were Jews.²⁶

23. On the state of elementary education in Austrian-ruled Galicia, see Mieczysław Baranowski, *Pogląd na rozwój szkolnictwa ludowego w Galicyi od 1772 do 1895 roku* (Lviv: Gubrynowicz and Schmidt, 1897); Tadeusz Fiutowski, *Szkolnictwo ludowe w Galicyi w dobie porządkowej* (Lviv: Wydawnictwo Krajowe, 1913); and Stanisław Gruński, *Szkoły ludowe galicyjskie w dobie przedkonstytucyjnej* (Lviv: Wydawnictwo Krajowe, 1916).

24. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule,” in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia*, ed. Andrei A. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982), 27–8.

25. Lepucki, *Działalność kolonizacyjna*, 132.

26. Ibid.; Majer Bałaban, *Dzieje Żydów w Galicyi i Rzeczypospolitej Krakowskiej*,

Maria Theresa's policy was unfavourable to Jews: they were considered a superfluous and even harmful element in the empire. By the mid-1770s, through a number of legal decisions, the rights of Jews to settle and trade were limited, higher taxes and prohibitions were imposed on them, and the poorest were expelled from Galicia.²⁷ In 1776 Maria Theresa issued a comprehensive *Judenordnung* for Galicia that introduced a new system of self-administration. Joseph II, in a draft edict he submitted to the Imperial Council on 13 May 1781, stated clearly that the Jews' social isolation, above all their linguistic separateness, made it difficult to "improve their condition" or make them useful to the state. He assailed the old laws that bound the Jews to their separateness, insisted that they drop the use of Hebrew in public documents, and encouraged them to wear "Christian" clothing, acquire a German education, and otherwise enter the Austrian body social.²⁸

The main occupation of the Jews living in villages was the leasing and management of taverns, tenancy, and mediation in various matters. The patent of 1784 issued by Joseph II commanded that by 1787 all Jews be removed from tenancies of breweries and all taverns. The patent of 1785 imposed even greater restrictions. As a result, many Jews were deprived of a means of livelihood. The authorities intended to force them to take up farming: Joseph II founded some Jewish colonies, such as New Babylon and New Jerusalem, but the enterprise proved unsuccessful. In 1787 new regulations ordered Jews to adopt permanent first names and surnames, and a year later Jews were required to perform obligatory active military service.²⁹

In 1789 Joseph II issued the so-called toleration patent (*Judenpatent*) for Galicia that made Jews answerable to public courts, limited the power of rabbis, introduced secular schooling for Jewish boys, and allowed Jews to engage in free trade and craftsmanship (except in tavern management and tenancy).³⁰ Jews were unwilling to accept the patent, and they continued to settle their matters in the *kehillot* and to send their children to denominational schools.

In 1840 there were about 300,000 Jews in Galicia. By 1857 there were 450,000. Most of them lived in the small towns and villages of eastern part of

1772–1868 (Lviv: B. Połoniecki, 1914), 21, 29; Stanisław Grodziski, *Historia ustroju społeczno-politycznego Galicji, 1772–1848* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1971), 99–100;

27. Kalinka, *Galicja i Kraków*, 110–14.

28. William O. McCagg Jr., *A History of the Habsburg Jews, 1670–1918* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 29–30.

29. See Bałaban, *Dzieje Żydów*, 36–43; Lepucki, *Działalność kolonizacyjna*, 133; Kalinka, *Galicja i Kraków*, 112–13.

30. Bałaban, *Dzieje Żydów*, 46–55.

the crownland and were engaged in moneylending and in tax-farming.³¹ Before 1848 they were not allowed to work in the civil service. Austrian policy contributed to their growing financial and social differentiation. According to estimates, in the 1820s more than forty percent of Galicia's Jews did not have any occupation or means of sustenance and formed a proletariat (*Luftmenszen*). The Jewish Enlightenment movement (Haskalah), which originated in Germany and called upon the Jews to modernize and assimilate with the non-Jewish majority, resulted in the cultural Germanization and, later in the nineteenth century, Polonization of many Galician Jews. In the first half of the century the assimilation movement attracted only a very small part of the Jewish urban intelligentsia and faced strong opposition from tradition-oriented Jews. Consequently, in 1830 Galicia's Jewish elementary schools had a total enrollment of only 408 children.³² The German-language schools established by enlightened Jewish intellectuals (*Maskilim*) in Ternopil (1813), Brody (1815), Cracow (1830), and Lviv (1844) had few students. Hasidism, which was widespread among Galician Jews, was a great obstacle to assimilation.

The principal centres of cultural life in Galicia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were the residences and manors of the Polish aristocracy and rich nobility, such as the Lubomirskis (and later the Potockis) in Łańcut and Przeworsk, the Tarnowskis in Dzików, and the Czartoryskis in Sieniawa. The latter hosted many artists, such as the composer Wincenty Lessel, the painter and writer Ksawery Prek, and many men of letters, among them Feliks Bernatowicz, Adam Kłodziński, and Zorian Dołęga-Chodakowski, who wrote his book *O Słowiańszczyźnie przed Chrześcijaństwem* (1818) while staying at the Czartoryskis' residence. Balls, theatrical performances, *tableaux vivants*, and charades were favourite pastimes. Some aristocratic residences were known for their collections of books, paintings, and relics of the Polish national past.³³

As a rule, the Galician Polish aristocracy was cosmopolitan and pro-French, and it manifested its preferences in various spheres of life. "Beginning with the bed and finishing with the footrest, French products prevail everywhere. In most noble houses Frenchmen occupy the posts of tutors, secretaries, readers, librarians, and procurers," comments a German observer who travelled through Galicia in 1787.³⁴ According to one Polish aristocrat, "the French upbringing

31. Philip Friedmann, *Die galizischen Juden im Kampf um ihre Gleichberechtigung, 1848–1868* (Frankfurt am Main: J. Kauffmann, 1929), 43.

32. Bałaban, *Dzieje Żydów*, 210.

33. Henryk Barycz, *Wśród gawędziarzy, pamiętnikarzy i uczonych galicyjskich: Studia i sylwety z życia umysłowego Galicji XIX w.*, vol. 1 (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1963), 177.

34. Stanisław Schnür-Pełowski, *Cudzoziemcy w Galicji (1787–1841)* (Cracow: Spółka Wydawnicza Polska, 1898), 31.

of children and the use of the French language was for us a shield against Germanization.”³⁵ In reality, however, the widespread taste for things French among the upper nobility (not an exclusively Polish phenomenon at that time) in many cases disguised their contempt for their native language and culture. According to the diarist and writer Zygmunt Kaczkowski, “[Polish] literature was not accessible to these [noble] spheres; it was considered meager, written in bad taste, uninteresting, and unworthy of any attention. Only French mawkish love stories were read [by them], Alexandre Dumas’, Balzac’s, and Mrs. George Sand’s.... From these spheres came youth who were unable to write even a letter in Polish; they also wrote incorrectly in French.”³⁶

In addition to the aristocracy and rich nobility, there were numerous lesser nobles in Galicia who cared little about culture; cultivating “Sarmatian” manners, they belonged mentally to the remote past.

Few in the old [generation] and almost no one in the new one had any idea about national history; similarly, hardly anybody could write in Polish correctly.... Every young man, after happily finishing the Gymnasium, first of all grew a great moustache and whiskers, bought a britzka, put four horses to it, and dubbed himself a citizen; thus Dąbrowa and Rzeszów in the western districts and Mostyska and Ternopil in the eastern districts, with their annual horse markets, were for Galicia a Mecca and a Medina, where both the youth and elders of our nobility regularly rushed in entire herds and with religious devotion to get drunk officially in the company of landowners [and] to lose at least half of their annual income playing cards.... Then again, a nobleman spent the whole year in a village farming sedulously, with few changes in [his] everyday life, such as [celebrating] a name day at home or with a neighbour, a parish retreat, or some business in a court or a district [office].³⁷

During the first decades of Austrian rule, the centres of urban cultural life in Galicia were the salons held at the residences of lawyers and aristocrats in Lviv and Cracow. The most frequented salons in Lviv were those of the castellaness Katarzyna Kossakowska and the lawyers Stanisław Wronowski and Józef Dobek-Dzierzkowski. After the third partition of Poland many in-migrants from other parts of Poland came to Galicia, and at the end of the eighteenth century Lviv became famous for its social life and a “passion for entertainment.” “One was entertaining oneself with unparalleled frivolity, without regard to the painful

35. Ludwik Grzymała Jabłonowski, *Pamiętniki*, ed. Karol Lewicki (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1963), 41.

36. Kaczkowski, *Mój pamiętnik*, 147–8.

37. Wojciech Goczałkowski, *Wspomnienia lat ubiegłych*, vol. 2 (Cracow: the author, 1862), 108–9.

fate of the country,” writes Władysław Łoziński.³⁸ He was not alone in his opinion. The indifference of that society to Poland’s fate can be frequently found in contemporary reports. “Lviv’s *monde* consisted of the richest, best educated, and most well-mannered persons,” writes Jan Duklan Ochocki. “Nobody, however, ever mentioned the collapse [of Poland] or the new situation. It seemed that there was no past behind us and no future before us; nothing to be afraid of, nothing to be done. One amused oneself without end, as in the old days.”³⁹

The rhythm of Lviv’s cultural life was regulated by various official festivities organized by the Austrian authorities and, most of all, by the annual trade fairs (*kontrakty*), which attracted landed nobility from across the region and became a symbolic form of the crownland’s nobles’ cultural life.⁴⁰ During the trade-fair period (which lasted three weeks and until 1808 coincided with carnival), the troupes staging theatrical performances in German and in Polish made a profit, which was otherwise a rare occurrence. The theatre-going public was rather small. In the 1790s Lviv had about thirty-six thousand inhabitants, one third of whom were Jews who did not attend the theatre. According to Jerzy Got, the theatre-going public consisted at most of two thousand people; consequently three performances of a play were enough to satisfy its needs. Other forms of entertainment successfully competed with the theatre, such as the *heca*, a kind of corrida that came to Vienna (and then to Lviv) in the late 1790s owing to the Habsburg’s links with Spain. The *heca* was less bloody than the Spanish corrida; involving the tearing apart of a horse by starved dogs and wolves, bull-riding, and the taming of a bear, it attracted hundreds of spectators in Lviv at the end of the eighteenth century.⁴¹

Until well into the nineteenth century, the only permanent theatres in Galicia were in Lviv and in Cracow, where it was founded about 1780. A German theatre company with six members was founded in Brody in the 1790s, but it was short-lived. “Performances were staged once a week, on Sunday, and the [price of] admission was very cheap.... Unable to live from their wages, the

38. Władysław Łoziński, *O towarzystwie lwowskim przy schyłku XVIII stulecia* (Lviv, 1872), 31–2.

39. Jan Duklan Ochocki, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 3 (Vilnius, 1857), 63, as quoted in Krystyna Poklewska, *Galicja romantyczna (1816–1840)* (Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1976), 16. See also “Z pamiętników Leona Dembowskiego,” *Ateneum* (Warsaw), 1882, no. 2: 85–7, 94, 106–9, 299, and 304.

40. Janina Bielecka, *Kontrakty lwowskie w latach 1768–1775: Wpływ pierwszego rozbioru Polski na kontrakty lwowskie* (Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, 1948); Fryderyk Papée, *Historia miasta Lwowa w zarysie* (Lviv: Książnica Polska, 1924), 166–7.

41. Jerzy Got, *Na wyspie Guaxary: Wojciech Bogusławski i teatr lwowski, 1789–1799* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1971), 143 and 54.

actors did other work. One of them maintained a second-rate coffee shop, and the director himself unsuccessfully applied at the town hall for permission to open a beer hall."⁴²

The first permanent Polish theatre in Lviv was founded in 1809. Because the public favoured uncomplicated comedies and comic operas, they dominated the repertoire. One early observer divided the theatre-going public in Lviv into three groups—the mob, the connoisseurs, and others who followed the fashion of going to the theatre. He emphasizes that the connoisseurs formed a very small group: "You can be sure that when plays by Corneille, Voltaire, Schiller, or [August Wilhelm] Iffland are performed, the [size of the] audience can be counted on your [ten] fingers; but when a large poster announces [a performance of] *Syrena z Dniestru*, you'd better stay at home, because they will strangle you in the theatre. It is not difficult to discern that the reason for such [poor] taste is a lack of education."⁴³ The attempts for more than twenty years at transcending the monopoly of the popular repertoire by the director of the Polish Lviv Theatre, Jan Nepomucen Kamiński, were unsuccessful, and each time they led to a financial shortfall that endangered the existence of the theatre. A more challenging repertoire was staged by the German Theatre, which received government subsidies from time to time.

The first newspaper in Galicia, the French-language *Gazette de Léopol*, lasted only two years (1776–77). The first Galician newspaper in Polish, *Pismo Uwiadamiające Galicyi*, did not appear until 1783; it survived under various names until 1788. Also short-lived was *Dziennik Patriotycznych Polityków*, which appeared with interruptions from 1792 to 1798. Owing to government subsidies, the German-language *Lemberger Wöchentliche Anzeiger*, survived from 1786 to the end of the eighteenth century, and *Lemberger Kaiserlich-Königliches Intelligenzblatt* existed from 1796 to 1811. In Cracow, *Gazeta Krakowska* appeared twice a week from 1796 for over fifty years; it had a circulation of up to six hundred copies, which was very high for Galicia. Cracow's German-language newspaper, *Krakauer Zeitung*, circulated in one hundred and fifty copies from 1799 to 1808. Information about local cultural life was first published in *Gazeta Lwowska* (est. 1811), in the form of announcements or reviews of concerts at the Lviv Theatre; a regular theatre column appeared in that paper from 1830.

The Galician newspapers of that time reprinted items from the Austrian press, particularly from the Viennese *Wiener Zeitung* and *Österreichischer Beobachter*. Outside Lviv and Cracow, other Galician towns did not publish their own

42. Schnür-Peplowski, *Cudzoziemcy w Galicyi*, 70.

43. ...i [Adam Chłędowski], "Teatr lwowski: Wystawienie Alżbry. Wyjątek z listu pisanego na wieś," *Pamiętnik Lwowski*, May 1818, 42. *Syrena z Dniestru* is a comic opera that was staged in Lviv from 1814 to 1841.

newspapers before the 1860s. The average press run of Galician newspaper in the years 1831–47 did not exceed five hundred copies. The only exceptions were Lviv's *Dziennik Mód Paryskich* (1840–48), which reached one thousand copies; and *Gazeta Lwowska*, which, because of the popularity of its weekly supplement *Rozmaitości*, also circulated in a thousand copies in the 1830s.⁴⁴

Until well into the nineteenth century, literary periodicals in Galicia did not have broad public support. Instead they reflected the aspirations and tastes of a small intellectual elite, and the small number of their subscribers and contributors made their editions very small and their existence ephemeral. For example, *Pamiętnik Galicyjski* survived only a year (1821), as did *Haliczanin* (1830); *Ziewonia* appeared three times between 1834 and 1839; and a periodical issued by the Ossolineum Institute in Lviv had only twenty-six subscribers in 1832 and forty-nine in 1833. A similar situation existed in Cracow, where the local intelligentsia had to struggle with both censorship and an indifferent public. The cultural climate in Galicia in the first half of the nineteenth century neither stimulated the development of literature and journalism nor encouraged discussions of theory and aesthetics. More successful were those popular periodicals whose aim was entertaining an undemanding, average reader: the bilingual semi-weekly *Mnemosyne—Galizisches Abendblatt für gebildete Leser* (1824–31), the commercial monthly *Lwowianin* (1835–42), and the various almanacs published by Stanisław Jaszowski.⁴⁵

For several years after the first partition of Poland, Galicia still received books published in Warsaw, Cracow, and Lublin; this distribution was soon blocked, however, by various trade restrictions introduced by the Austrians. According to a decree issued by Francis II in 1806, print shops and bookstores could exist only in the main or district towns in Galicia “as the need arose,” which was determined by the authorities. In 1834 there were fifteen print shops and ten bookstores in Galicia; they easily satisfied the cultural needs of the crownland's inhabitants. Only several books were published in Galicia annually before 1830,⁴⁶ and books and periodicals were distributed mainly by itinerant

44. Wilhelm Bruchnalski, “Czasopiśmiennictwo galicyjskie, 1773–1811,” in *Stulecie “Gazety Lwowskiej”, 1811–1911*, ed. Wilhelm Bruchnalski (Lviv, 1911), 38–40; Jerzy Łojek, ed., *Prasa polska w latach 1661–1864* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1976).

45. Poklewska, *Galicia romantyczna*, 168–72; Łojek, *Prasa polska*, 97–9, 172, 199–246; Zbigniew Sudolski, “Czasopiśmiennictwo w Galicji i Krakowie do Wiosny Ludów,” in *Literatura krajowa w okresie romantyzmu, 1831–1863*, vol. 1, ed. Maria Janion, Bogdan Zakrzewski, and Maria Dernałowicz (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1975), 387–98.

46. *Dodatek Tygodniowy przy Gazecie Lwowskiej*, 1859, no. 2 (15 January): 5, no. 3 (22 January): 9.

booksellers. Karol Szajnocha noted that until the middle of the nineteenth century the favourite reading materials of most Galicians were Jan Chryzostom Pasek's seventeenth-century memoirs, similar stories from the Bar Confederation period, historical romances by Henryk Rzewuski and Michał Czajkowski, and various tales, memoirs, and anecdotes.⁴⁷

The tempo of cultural life in Galicia at the end of the eighteenth century and during the first decades of the nineteenth was slow. The cultural public was very small; consisting almost exclusively of Poles, it was concentrated mainly in Lviv and Cracow. The cultural initiatives undertaken by the small elite had little public support. The vast majority of Galician society was completely backward and did not have a need to read serious political or literary periodicals or books. For most Galician Poles, Polishness was identical with the cultivation of the old, seventeenth-century "Sarmatian" traditions and anachronistic forms of life and with the rejection of the reforms introduced by the Austrians. The slow development of cultural life and the lack of broader cultural interests in Galician society was the result of the stagnation of the crownland's economic development; of its separation from the rest of Poland, making it impossible for it to profit from the reforms developing in Warsaw; of a relatively rigid and hierarchical social structure, in which the aristocracy and rich nobility were in privileged positions; of the low level of education and cultural aspirations of most of its inhabitants; and of the strict censorship and policy of Germanization imposed by the Austrian government, which inhibited the development of local cultural initiatives.

The first indications of a change in this situation appeared in the towns and were connected with the development of a social group that—because of its way of life and earning money—did not fit into the traditional Polish social structure. This group consisted of civil servants, clerks, and professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, who owed their position to their education rather than to their origins or social status. One of the first Polish statistical reports published in Galicia, in 1846, provided data about civil servants and clerks in addition to noble landowners, merchants, and industrial workers.⁴⁸ Another set of statistics published anonymously at that time listed lawyers and civil servants as a separate professional group.⁴⁹ The changes in social structure were inevitable but slow. In the 1840s Cracow had about forty thousand inhabitants, but only about eight hundred of them could be considered members of the intelligentsia (clerks,

47. Karol Szajnocha, "O typie narodowym w powieściach naszych," *Dziennik Literacki* (Lviv), 1852, as quoted in Bruchnański, *Stulecie "Gazety Lwowskiej,"* 38.

48. Hipolit Stupnicki, *Galicya pod względem geograficzno-topograficzno-statystycznym* (Lviv: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1846).

49. Schnür-Pełowski, *Z przeszłości Galicyi*, 356.

teachers, learned professionals).⁵⁰ In 1844 Lviv had about sixty-five thousand inhabitants, of which about two thousand were members of the intelligentsia. In Cracow an aristocratic and noble elite still predominated. In Lviv, however, the bourgeoisie was more numerous, and the cultural public consisted of members of the middle class and of professionals; there the influence of the aristocracy was much less significant than in Cracow.⁵¹

A contemporary observer describes the “middle class” in the Cracow Republic thus:

The middle class in the Cracow Republic consisted mainly of merchants, tenants of national estates, civil servants, clerks, teachers, and priests. There were no factories in the Cracow Republic; the crafts, [which were] underdeveloped, lay fallow in contempt. The social life of the middle class, [which was] limited to the city of Cracow, was also not lively, [but] very modest and simple. Except for the several richer merchant families that held open houses and tried to imitate the higher *monde*, the wine merchants and hucksters making money, poorly paid teachers and clerks, sparingly endowed pensioners from the Polish Kingdom, and modestly remunerated lawyers, doctors, and notaries, all of whom had cramped apartments in old-fashioned houses in town, did not stimulate any entertainment [whatsoever]. “Feasting” from planed and soaped boards with tallow candles on coffee, tea, watery wine, and cutlets with kasha to the accompaniment of the ubiquitous clavichord, one celebrated festivities, baptism parties, name days, and Shrovetides, for which merchant youth provided frenetic dancers.⁵²

At that time Cracow was still a small, provincial town, and the tone of its political and social life was set by the magnate or noble families, such as the Potockis, the Małachowskis, the Wodzickis, the Morstins, and the Mieroszewskis. In addition, “[Cracow’s] population was divided into two enemy camps, and these [were divided further] into numerous quarrelsome coteries.... Unemployment in Cracow made sharper the difference between the aristocracy of blood and money and the middle class.”⁵³ “Owners of landed estates living in Cracow permanently or temporarily, nobles coming there to educate or outfit their children ... [and] finally richer youth looking for entertainment formed within the Cracow population a distinct and closed circle, access to which was not only difficult, but often unpleasant. In the eyes of this elite circle, the inhabitants of

50. Demel, *Stosunki gospodarcze*, 37.

51. Łojek, *Prasa polska*, 241.

52. Jerzy Wawel-Louis, “Życie światowe i towarzyskie w Rzeczypospolitej Krakowskiej (1772–1858),” *Kalendarz Józefa Czecha na rok 1886* (Cracow: Drukarnia “Czasu,” 1886), 50–1.

53. Stanisław Schnür-Peplowski, *Obrazy z przeszłości Galicyi i Krakowa, 1772–1858* (Lviv: Gubrynowicz and Schmidt, 1896), 295.

Cracow who were forced to work and earn their living became an object of slight, if not something even much more humiliating.”⁵⁴

After 1848, with the abolition of serfdom in Galicia, new offices were created. Consequently the demand for civil servants increased, and in 1848 the first professional association in Galicia, the Society of Private Clerks, was founded in Lviv. This civil service-cum-middle class was augmented by people of peasant origin; this is evident from the data on the growing number and changes in the social origins of Galicia's university students, who earlier had come mainly from the landed nobility and bourgeoisie.⁵⁵

Awareness of the changes and of the appearance of new social and occupational groups in Galician society was reflected in the contemporary memoirs and journals; they described these groups in various terms—as the clerical caste, the middle class, the bourgeoisie, the urban element, the urban intelligentsia, and even the leading spheres. Meanwhile the aristocracy and nobility became increasingly anxious about the growth of the new urban occupational groups, who, they suspected, had democratic or even revolutionary sympathies. After the November Insurrection of 1830–1 and the Revolution of 1848 lawyers were blamed for all the misfortunes that befell Poland;⁵⁶ Count Ludwik Jabłonowski, for example, wrote that the nobility collapsed because “the biggest [noble] estates were broken up by the bar or stolen by civil servants.”⁵⁷ An anonymous author wrote in 1848 that “lawyers are susceptible everywhere to evil instigation because [this group] consists of people without property and is preoccupied with the property of others. Whenever social upheavals took place, lawyers were always in the foreground.”⁵⁸ Walerian Kalinka, a conservative Cracow historian, described this group as “civil servants, a ragtag ready to do anything,” and he believed that “the nobility, knowing [all about] the civil

54. Hilary Meciszewski, *Historia Rzeczypospolitej Krakowskiej* (Cracow, 1851), 43–6, as quoted in *Rzeczpospolita Krakowska, 1815–1846: Wybór źródeł*, ed. Janina Bieniarzówna (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1951), 40–1.

55. During the 1856–7 academic year at Cracow's Jagiellonian University, 4.8 percent of the students were of peasant origin; at Lviv University this percentage was even higher. In that same year as many as forty-eight percent of the students at the Jagiellonian University came from the families of civil servants. See Irena Homola, “Inteligencja galicyjska w połowie XIX wieku,” in *Spółeczeństwo polskie XVIII i XIX wieku*, vol. 5, ed. Witold Kula and Janina Leskiewiczowa (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1972), 129–30.

56. *Ibid.*, 109.

57. Ludwik Jabłonowski, *Złote czasy i wywczasy: Pamiętnik szlachcica z pierwszej połowy XIX stulecia* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Polskie, [1928?]), 44.

58. Schnür-Peplowski, *Z przeszłości Galicyi*, 356–7.

servants, have the right to despise them.”⁵⁹ Bishop Ludwik Łętowski of Cracow, who came from the nobility, saw the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia as “idlers” who wanted to “turn the world around either because of their hatred towards the higher social classes or because of pure wantonness”; he labelled them “revolutionary communists.”⁶⁰

By the mid-nineteenth century civil servants, clerks, and teachers (who, according to Austrian regulations, constituted a category of civil servants) had become numerically significant professional groups in Galicia’s towns. But in relation to all of the crownland’s inhabitants, in 1855 the intelligentsia was very small—only 0.32 percent of the population.⁶¹ Only senior civil servants, university professors, and secondary-school teachers (forming altogether a relatively small group of employees) were well paid. Elementary-school teachers, junior civil servants, and clerks had very modest incomes, which in most cases covered only basic living expenses. In Cracow, for example, an elementary-school teacher was paid 300–700 guildens annually; and a teacher’s assistant, only 150–200 guildens. Teachers at provincial elementary schools earned even less. The lowest salaries were paid to women teachers, especially if they taught music or handicrafts. Postal employees earned 150–375 guildens annually; railwaymen, 150–240 guildens. Meanwhile the average daily cost of living in Cracow was about fifteen kreutzers, and a four-person family’s annual cost of living was 300–400 guildens. In comparison, a ticket for a concert usually cost one or two guildens (but could reach six guildens for a special event); a public ball, about two guildens; and private daily piano lessons, six guildens per month.⁶²

In 1867 Galicia was granted political autonomy. On 5 June 1869 a ministerial decree introduced Polish as the official language of public administration, finance, and the judiciary in Galicia, but gave some concessions to the Ruthenians. As a result, Poles were appointed to administrative posts at all levels; Ruthenian participation was limited at first to the lower levels of the administration.⁶³

59. Kalinka, *Galicya i Kraków*, 382–5.

60. Barycz, *W kręgu*, 154.

61. Homola, “Inteligencja galicyjska,” 120; Ireneusz Ilnatowicz, “Urzędnicy galicyjscy w dobie autonomii,” in *Spółeczeństwo polskie XVIII i XIX wieku*, vol. 6, *Studia o uwarstwieniu i ruchliwości społecznej*, ed. Janina Leskiewiczowa (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1974), 208.

62. Juliusz Demel, *Stosunki gospodarcze i społeczne Krakowa w latach 1846–1853* (Cracow: Towarzystwo Miłośników Historii i Zabytków Krakowa, 1951), 206–12; idem, *Stosunki gospodarcze ... 1853–1866*, 577.

63. Konstanty Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa Polski*, vol. 4 (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1982), 382.

Meanwhile the urban population increased rapidly throughout the second half of the nineteenth century owing to the economic migration of peasants to the towns. A shift in political and social power away from the aristocracy and nobility towards the newly emerging middle class became very clear after 1867. A contemporary writes that "the middle class, the bourgeoisie, [had become] one of the best Polish elements—in it one can find real patriotism, sacrifice, and Polish feelings, with which everybody is imbued, beginning with the paterfamilias and ending with the lowliest servant in the house. This class consists of doctors, lawyers, artists, and all people performing intellectual work."⁶⁴

Criticism of the aristocracy became widespread: they came to be regarded as a relic and, more importantly, were accused of contributing to Poland's collapse and loss of independence. New values reflecting the spirit of the time and stressing education and industriousness, through which, it was assumed, Polish independence would be regained, ousted the traditional system of values based on the nobles' mores and way of life, and with it their birthrights and other "fallacious noble honours."⁶⁵ As democratic attitudes and the levelling of social differences increased, the nobility's fear of social degradation declined. After 1867 people with surnames of noble origin prevailed among Galicia's civil servants and clerks; meanwhile the percentage of nobles within the senior civil service decreased, while that of non-nobles increased.

As the end of the nineteenth century drew near, increasingly more people with noble roots were employed in public institutions such as the post office or the railway, where it had once been unbecoming for a noble to work.⁶⁶ Changes away from the traditional social structure were also reflected in the increasing number of university students preparing for teaching careers who came from peasant families.⁶⁷ At the same time, however, the traditional vertical divisions within Galician society remained relatively strong. Belonging to the upper nobility still meant a great deal in terms of social prestige and making professional promotion easier; the class solidarity of its members and their family connections, which facilitated access to profitable and prestigious positions, remained a trait of Galician society.⁶⁸

64. Col. Struś [Jan Stella-Sawicki], *Moje wspomnienie, 1831–1910: Rosja, Polska, Francja* (Lviv: H. Altenberg, 1921), 73–5.

65. *Henryka Schmitta listy do żony (1845–1880)*, ed. Stefan Kieniewicz (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1961), 17–18.

66. Ihnatowicz, "Urzednicy galicyjscy," 218.

67. Irena Homola, "Nauczycielstwo krakowskie w okresie autonomii, 1867–1914" in *Inteligencja polska XIX i XX wieku: Studia*, ed. Ryszarda Czepulis-Rastenis (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1981), 106.

68. Kazimierz Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 1 (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1951), 135.

Although education became available to increasingly more inhabitants of Galicia, the number of schools grew slowly and did not correspond to existing needs. There was one elementary school for every 2,174 inhabitants in the 1880s and for every 1,907 inhabitants in 1897–98; this ratio was one of the lowest in Austria-Hungary.⁶⁹ School attendance, although compulsory in Galicia from 1873 on, was in practice very poor. Consequently the level of illiteracy remained very high: in 1880 only 17.3 percent of men and 10.3 percent of women in Galicia could read and write;⁷⁰ only fifty-three percent of Cracow's inhabitants and fifty-seven percent of Lviv's were literate.⁷¹ In time the situation improved, and by 1910 the rate of literacy in the crownland as a whole had risen to 59.4 percent.

Besides Lviv and Cracow, provincial towns introduced their own cultural initiatives. Some towns, for example, Przemyśl, Rzeszów, Tarnów, Nowy Targ, Nowy Sącz, Stanyslaviv, Kolomyia, Ternopil, Brody, Stryi, Sambir, and Drohobych, started publishing newspapers, usually once a week. In 1895, 129 newspapers and other periodicals in Polish, twenty-four in Ruthenian, and fifteen in Hebrew or Yiddish were being published in Galicia; in 1911 the respective numbers were 341, forty-four, and eighteen.⁷² Many of these periodicals turned out to be ephemeral, but some survived for a few decades, for example, *Echo Przemyskie* (1896–1913), *Kurier Stanisławowski* (1896–1918), *Głos Rzeszowski* (1897–1919), and *Pogoń* (Tarnów, 1881–1914). Their circulation was limited by the high rate of illiteracy in Galicia and by widespread indifference. In 1910 the combined press run of all daily newspapers in Galicia amounted to ten copies per inhabitant per year; only every thirtieth literate inhabitant of Galicia regularly read newspapers.⁷³

Various associations, amateur theatre troupes, choirs, and orchestras were also created. Although their quantity was impressive,⁷⁴ closer examination of their activities reveals that in most cases they were ephemeral: they were usually

69. *Podręcznik statystyki Galicyi*, vol. 6 (Lviv: Krajowe Biuro Statystyczne, 1900), 68 and 90.

70. Tadeusz Rutowski, ed., *Rocznik statystyki Galicyi*, vol. 3, 1889–1891 (Lviv: Krajowe Biuro Statystyczne), 2.

71. Tadeusz Pilat, *Najważniejsze wyniki spisu ludności galicyjskiej z dnia 31 XII 1880*, vol. 6, fasc. 2 of *Wiadomości statystyczne o stosunkach krajowych* (Lviv: Krajowe Biuro Statystyczne, 1881), 169.

72. Jerzy Myśliński, *Studia nad polską prasą społeczno-polityczną w zachodniej Galicji, 1905–1914* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1970), 42–6.

73. *Ibid.*, 368.

74. See, e.g., the proliferation of various initiatives in Rzeszów described by Aleksander Codello in his "Rzeszów na przełomie XIX i XX wieku," *Kwartalnik Rzeszowski*, 1966, no. 1: 3–11.

activated only to celebrate some national anniversary; most of their members did not attend meetings or pay dues; and in time their membership declined.

Although after 1867 the cultural public of the crownland became more numerous, more democratic, and more decentralized than it had been earlier in the century, it was far from homogeneous. In addition to the traditional vertical divisions in Galician society, new ones appeared as economic differentiation grew. The period of Galicia's political autonomy was not one of economic prosperity. The number of civil servants, clerks, and teachers had increased, making them the largest occupational groups in Galicia. In Cracow, for example, in 1880 they made up sixty-eight percent of the intelligentsia.⁷⁵ Their numerical increase, however, was accompanied by a dramatic decrease in their standard of living and by growing differences in income within the same occupational group. The elite was well paid, but the average salary of a clerk or an elementary-school teacher was almost swallowed up by the daily cost of living and was enough to maintain just one person. Contemporary correspondence, memoirs, and literature often portray the poor, insecure living conditions of teachers and clerks.⁷⁶ According to a survey conducted in 1909 by the Association of Professors and Teachers, the situation of teachers in Galicia's elementary schools was often tragic: poverty and indebtedness were common, and there were even some cases of starvation.⁷⁷ According to a prominent Polish historian of Galicia, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Galician intelligentsia generally had a rather low level of cultural development, and the poverty of most occupational groups limited their opportunities to participate in cultural life or to buy books and periodicals; they also had no time to read them.⁷⁸

The Galician cultural public also exhibited a great ethnic differentiation. The Poles remained dominant,⁷⁹ but democratization of the society had fostered the growth of national consciousness among the Ruthenians and a growing sense of difference between them and the Poles. In the 1860s and 1870s the first genuine generation of Ruthenian secular intelligentsia and numerous Ruthenian cultural

75. Homola, "Nauczycielstwo krakowskie," 88.

76. See, e.g., Waław Nałkowski, *Jednostka i ogół: Szkice i krytyki psycho-społeczne* (Cracow: Ursyn Czatowicz, 1904), 398; Walentyna Najdus, *Szkice z historii Galicji*, vol. 1 (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1958), 303–5; and Homola, "Nauczycielstwo krakowskie," 122–3.

77. Irena Homola, "Kwiat społeczeństwa ...": *Struktura społeczna i zarys położenia inteligencji krakowskiej w latach 1860–1914* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1984), 124.

78. Franciszek Bujak, *Galicja*, vol. 1 (Lviv and Warsaw: H. Altenberg, 1908), 149.

79. For example, at the beginning of the twentieth century all Ukrainian and Jewish dailies combined did not account for more than twenty percent of the total press run of all the dailies published in Galicia. See Myśliński, *Studia nad polską prasą*, 367.

organizations emerged in eastern Galicia; all of them were concerned with promoting a Ruthenian national identity. In 1861 the Ruska Besida cultural-educational society was founded in Lviv; from 1864 on it maintained a professional touring theatre that performed plays in the vernacular. In 1868 the first Prosvita national-populist society devoted to promoting enlightenment and popular education among the Ruthenians of Galicia was founded in Lviv; from it sprang many other institutions and organizations. By 1914 Prosvita had seventy-seven branches, 2,944 local reading rooms, and 36,500 members in Galicia.⁸⁰ The Russophile Kachkovsky Society was founded in 1874 in Kolomyia; it attracted far fewer members than Prosvita and gradually declined together with the Galician Russophile movement. By 1914 there were 255 Ukrainian public primary schools in Galicia, but only sixteen secondary school gymnasiums (ten of them private) and ten teachers' colleges.⁸¹

In 1867 the Jews of Galicia obtained the same rights as the rest of the society. Nevertheless, they modernized much more slowly than the Jews in the crownlands farther west. Despite the assimilation movement that had penetrated into Galicia at the beginning of the century, most Galician Jews were still Orthodox and Yiddish-speaking. Assimilated Jews formed an elite and were no less isolated from the masses than the early Enlighteners.⁸² Leading members of the Galician rabbinate opposed any and every sort of cultural assimilation among the Jews, especially enlightened schooling. In 1869 Jewish students comprised only 8.2 percent of all students in the Galician gymnasiums; by the 1910–11 school year their number had grown to 20.51 percent.⁸³ Political splits within Galician Jewry made modernization even more difficult. In the early 1880s the assimilation movement reached its peak with the foundation of the Covenant of Brothers (Przymierze Braci), the organization continuing the Enlightenment tradition. It declined later in the 1880s with the rise of the Zionist movement in Galicia. Unassimilated Jews formed their own cultural circles. In the late nineteenth century Jakub Ber Gimpel founded a permanent Jewish theatre in Lviv. After 1900 the unassimilated Jewish population published a number of periodicals in Lviv and Cracow and in the provincial towns. Most of them

80. Bohdan Kravtsiv et al, "Prosvita societies," in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 4, ed. Danylo H. Struk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 246.

81. Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al, "Galicia," in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 2, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 7.

82. Ezra Mendelsohn, "Jewish Assimilation in Lviv: The Case of Wilhelm Feldman," in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism*, 106.

83. Bałaban, *Dzieje Żydów*, 210.

existed only for a short time; Cracow's Jewish daily, *Der Tag*, however, had a press run of fifteen hundred copies in 1909 and four thousand in 1913.⁸⁴

* * *

The partitions of Poland initiated the transformation of Galicia from a feudal society into a modern society in which distinct social groups evolved based on their members' education, function, occupation, or financial status, and not on their noble or non-noble origins. The abolition of serfdom in 1848 and the granting of political autonomy in 1867 were turning points in this transformation. The formal equality of all citizens and the development of public education was intended to lead, and in many cases did lead, to a higher cultural level for most people and, consequently, to a greater uniformity of attitudes, interests, and needs.

Galician society was a complex structure. Although it underwent a vertical economic differentiation, the traditional sense of class affiliation remained quite strong owing to centuries of serfdom, which had reinforced the division between lords and peasants, to the weak development of capitalism in Galicia, and to the Austrian policy of traditionally seeking support from the nobility. Hence, the importance of the nobility was much greater than its legal or financial status suggested. Consequently the middle class, which consisted mainly of pauperized nobles, partly preserved the nobility's traditions, customs, attitudes, and behaviour in order to emphasize its noble origins. Even those who did not have such origins imitated the nobility and its corresponding cultural interests.

The democratization of life under Austrian rule contributed to the horizontal separation of Galicia's principal ethnic groups, the Poles, Ruthenians, and Jews. Although the three groups partly overlapped and all of them identified with the dominant (Polish) culture, towards the end of the period under discussion the Ruthenians and the Jews had begun searching for different means of expressing their own identity.

84. Myśliński, *Studia nad polską prasą*, 363.

Vasyl Podolynsky's *Słowo przestrogi* and Ukrainian-Polish Relations in Nineteenth-Century Galicia

Feodosii Steblii

The democratic transformations in the Austrian monarchy during the Spring of Nations provided the impetus for the intensification and politicization of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia. One of the important things the Galician Ukrainians attained during the Revolution of 1848–49 was the ability to manifest and defend their national interests at international forums such as the Slavic Congress in Prague and the Reichstag in Vienna. There, in the spirit of Austro-Slavism, they called for the reconstruction of the Habsburg monarchy on federal principles, and they tried to implement as fully as possible the fundamental points of the program they had adopted even before 1848. Ivan Franko wrote that “the scope for a just, broad, and all-encompassing national life at that time was very good, so that later generations have almost always had to take into account what had already been begun or at least conceived in 1848.”¹

The Ukrainian national movement's politicization in 1848, the creation of its own national political, cultural, and educational structures, and the gradual realization of the program of Ukrainian national self-affirmation in Austrian-ruled Galicia was a great surprise to Polish civic circles, which considered themselves the only rightful masters in the crownland of Galicia. From the very beginning of the revolution, these circles nursed plans for the rebirth of Polish statehood, initially in the guise of autonomy for the entire crownland. To them the Ukrainians' actions were incomprehensible, the more so because they held

1. Ivan Franko, *Zibrannia tvoriv u p'iatdesiaty tomakh*, vol. 47 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1986), 122.

obsolete, stereotypical notions that the Ukrainians were part of the Polish people and differed from the Poles only in terms of their religious rite, that the language the Ukrainians spoke was a Polish dialect, and that their culture and literature were components of Polish culture and literature.²

The Poles considered the Ukrainians' violation of this imaginary link a betrayal of Polish national interests. Consequently, large sectors of Polish society united against the Ukrainian movement in a single anti-Ukrainian democratic-liberal-noble bloc.³ The only difference among them was that the democrats ascribed the "discovery" of the Ukrainians to Governor Franz Stadion, while Count Agenor Gołuchowski, a representative of the crownland administration, denounced Moscow for this to the central authorities in Vienna.⁴

Despite this general anti-Ukrainian attitude, some Poles did try to evaluate and deal with the Ukrainian movement soberly and to find a solution to the problem through an accord or a compromise. Most of these attempts came from within the Polish magnate milieu that had links with the émigré monarchist camp headed by Prince Adam Czartoryski. Among those who insisted on the principle of complete equality of the Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia were Prince Leon Sapieha⁵ and Prince Jerzy Lubomirski; the latter even proposed awakening in the Ukrainians the idea of creating their own state.⁶ *Postęp*, a newspaper sponsored by Count Leon Rzewuski, tended toward the concept of an independent Poland federated with Ukraine and other Slavic lands.⁷ Because of such tolerant attitudes, at the Slavic Congress in Prague on 7 June 1848, after lengthy discussions, the Polish (including Sapieha and Lubomirski) and Ukrainian delegations were able to work out an accord that guaranteed the administrative and educational equality of all nationalities and religions in Galicia and the creation of a joint Ukrainian-Polish national guard, a governing body, and an estates diet. These points were included in the congress's address to the emperor.⁸ Until 1914 this accord remained the "only instance of a Polish-

2. Jan Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją: Studia z dziejów ukraińskiego ruchu narodowego w Galicji w latach 1848–1849* (Warsaw and Cracow: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1975), 184.

3. Ibid., 185.

4. Stefan Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha (1828–1903)* (Lviv: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1939), 351.

5. Julian Horoszkiewicz, *Notatki z życia*, ed. Henryk Wereszycki (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1957), 236–7.

6. Władysław Tadeusz Wisłocki, *Jerzy Lubomirski, 1817–1872* (Lviv: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1928), 84, 90; Václav Žáček, ed., *Slovanský sjezd v Praze roku 1848: Sbírka dokumentů* (Prague: Československá akademie věd, 1958), 348–52.

7. *Postęp*, 1848, nos. 21–3.

8. Žáček, *Slovanský sjezd*, 314–15, 372–3.

Ukrainian compromise.”⁹ It was not implemented, however, because the leaders of both the Polish and the Ukrainian national movements did not accept it.¹⁰ In general, examples of a sober Polish approach to the Ukrainian question remained very rare.

The official Polish position on the Ukrainian question was determined by the Polish National Council (Rada Narodowa), which declared itself the representative of both the Poles and the Ukrainians in Galicia, took on the responsibility of representing them on an equal basis, and exhorted the Galician Ukrainians to influence their compatriots in Russian-ruled Ukraine to support the goal of creating a common state called Poland.¹¹ But the Council's assurances of equality in no way meant a political affirmation of Ukrainian identity. To realize its policy on the Ukrainian question more effectively, the Council inspired the creation of a subordinate body—the Ruthenian Assembly (Sobor Ruskyi)—with the aim of guiding the Ukrainian movement in a pro-Polish direction. But the latter body did not attract much support from the Ukrainian public and did not achieve this goal.¹²

An extremely intolerant position on the Ukrainian question was held by circles of the Polish intelligentsia grouped around the newspaper *Dziennik Narodowy*. Categorically denying that a separate Ukrainian people existed, they presented Galicia as an ethnically homogeneous crownland and tried to influence European public opinion to think likewise.¹³

As a result of this inadequate understanding of the Ukrainian national movement in Polish society, during the revolution Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia became quite strained, sometimes to the point of inter-ethnic conflict. A bitter polemic erupted around the Ukrainian question. On the Polish side the participants were, besides the journalists of *Gazeta Narodowa* and *Dziennik Narodowy*, Antoni Dąbczański and Kaspar Cięglewicz.¹⁴ The Ukrainian participants included Teodor Leontovych, Antin Petrushevych, Toma Poliansky, Ievstakhii Prokopchyt, and the anonymous author of the treatise *Warunki zgody między Polską a Rusią* (Conditions for an Accord between Poland and Rus').¹⁵

9. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule,” in his *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, ed. Peter L. Rudnytsky (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987), 321.

10. Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją*, 193.

11. Ibid., 187–8.

12. Ibid., 188–9, 204–5.

13. Ibid., 194.

14. See Antoni Dąbczański, *Wyjaśnienie sprawy ruskiej* (Lviv: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1848); and Kaspar Cięglewicz, *Rzecz czerwono-ruska 1848 roku* (Lviv: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1848).

15. See Teodor Leontowicz, *Odpowiedź na artykuł o nieistnieniu Rusinów* (Lviv, 1848);

While most of the Polish participants defended the line of the National Council and the Ruthenian Assembly and their press, most of the Ukrainians upheld the position of the Supreme Ruthenian Council.

During this polemic, the Ukrainian democrats' defense of Ukrainian independence and their support for Ukrainian-Polish co-operation on the basis of democracy and equality was best elucidated by Vasyl Podolynsky in his pamphlet *Słowo przestrogi* (A Word of Warning).¹⁶

Podolynsky was born into a clerical family in Bilychi, Sambir circle, in 1815. After attending a gymnasium in Przemyśl (1837–41), he studied at Lviv University and the Greek Catholic Theological Seminary in Lviv, where the impact of the ideas of the Ruthenian Triad was still great and the propagandistic and organizational activity of the Polish conspiratorial groups that arose after the unsuccessful Polish insurrection of 1830–31 continued.¹⁷ Podolynsky belonged to the Polish clandestine Sons of the Fatherland, a lower-rung affiliate of the so-called Young Sarmatia (Młoda Sarmacja) organization (1837–40). For this he was punished by the Austrian authorities and kept under strict surveillance for a year at the Lavriv Monastery. For several years thereafter he served as a priest in the isolated mountain village of Vetlyna in the Lemko region while maintaining his interest in civic affairs, politics, history, and literature. In 1846 Podolynsky witnessed the failed Polish uprising in Galicia and was suspected of participating in it. In 1848 he was suspected of trying to cross into Hungary to

Antoni Petruszewicz, *Słów kilka napisanych w obronie ruskiej narodowości* (Lviv, 1848); Tomasz Polański, *Słowo jedno w celach wzajemnego porozumienia się* ([Przemyśl], 1848); I. Kołosowicz [Evstakhii Prokopchys], *Die ruthenische Frage in Galizien von Anton Dąbczański, Landrath zu Lemberg* (Lviv: Staupigianisches Institut, 1849); 2d ed.: Eine Russinen [pseud.], *Die ruthenische Frage in Galizien von Anton Dąbczański* (Lviv: Staupigianisches Institut, 1850); and Włodzimierz Borys, "Głos z 1848 r. w sprawie zgody polsko-ukraińskiej," *Przegląd Historyczny*, 1972, no. 4: 717–24.

16. Bazyli Podoliński, *Słowo przestrogi* (Sanok: Karol Pollak, 1848). All page references to the ideas and quotations from this source appear in the text of this article.

17. On the Ruthenian Triad, see Jan Kozik, *The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia: 1815–1849*, ed. and with an intro. by Lawrence D. Orton, trans. Andrew Gorski and Lawrence D. Orton (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), esp. 51–173; and Feodosii I. Steblii, ed., "*Ruska triitsia*" v istorii suspilno-politychnoho rukhu i kultury Ukrainy (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1987). On the Polish conspiratorial groups and their influence, see Kyrylo Studynsky, "Polski konspiratsii sered ruskykh pytomtsiv i dukhovenstva v Halychyni v rokakh 1831–1846," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 80 (1907): 53–108 and 82 (1908): 87–177; Stefan Kieniewicz, *Konspiraacje galicyjskie, 1831–1845* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1950); and Bolesław Łopuszański, *Stowarzyszenie Ludu Polskiego (1835–1841): Geneza i dzieje* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1975).

participate in the uprising there.¹⁸ All of this indicates that by 1848 he had a great deal of experience in political and religious affairs and in Polish civic and political circles. This experience imparted a solid foundation to the views he expressed in his pamphlet and therefore aroused much interest.

In *Słowo przestrogi* Podolynsky directs his critique against everything that has outlived its usefulness and is an obstacle to progress. An implacable opponent of absolutism, he welcomes its defeat and the proclamation of the Austrian constitution, although he understands that this has not resulted in real freedom (pp. 1, 2, 32). He angrily condemns all and any enslavement and violence. His ideal is the equality of all of humanity, without which there can be no freedom. It is from this perspective that he examines the national question and inter-ethnic relations.

Because the Ukrainians¹⁹ are the indigenous population of eastern Galicia and an indivisible part of a nation that has millions of members in Russian-ruled Ukraine (pp. 3, 15), Podolynsky—continuing the tradition begun by the Ruthenian Triad—expresses his support for their unconditional liberation, which, in his conception, is linked with social liberation. For him freedom and national liberation are inseparable ideas (pp. 20–22); freedom means first and foremost the liberation of the common people, and it is precisely for them that liberation must be sought (p. 25).

Podolynsky resolutely rejects the biased statements of certain Polish political journalists (e.g., Józef Supiński and Józef Cybulski in *Dziennik Narodowy*, 1848, nos. 39 and 55) that the Ukrainians are not a separate nation but part of the Polish people. He is of the opinion that history has for centuries remembered the Ukrainians as a separate Slavic people with its own language (p. 12) and that there is therefore no reason to deny this. Podolynsky regards highly those Polish democrats who have aspired to involve young Ukrainians in the Polish national-liberation movement and have supported the idea of the national liberation of the Ukrainian people. He believes that this has only helped to strengthen the national consciousness of the Galician Ukrainians and has thereby facilitated the growth of their national-liberation movement (p. 20).

“Yes, we are Ukrainians,” he declares, “and [we] firmly believe in the resurrection of a free, independent Ukraine.... Nothing can stop us from

18. See Vasyl Shchurat, “Rechnyk nezalezhnosti Ukrainy v 1848 r. o. Vasyl Podolynsky,” in his *Na dosvitku novoi doby: Statti i zamitky do istorii vidrodzhennia halytskoi Ukrainy* (Lviv: Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1919), 134–78; Feodosii I. Steblii, “‘Słowo perestorohy’ V. Podolynskoho,” *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1966, no. 12: 44–51.

19. Podolynsky uses the accepted contemporary terms “Ruthenia” and “Ruthenian” (*Rus'*, *ruskyi*, *rusyn*) instead of “Ukraine” and “Ukrainian” (*Ukraina*, *ukrainskyi*, *ukrainets*).

[pursuing] aspirations that are common to all of Europe.... All of us want to be free together with other peoples.... We want to be a people and shall certainly be one" (p. 17). These words clearly express Podolynsky's desire to examine the question of Ukrainian national independence in a general European context and in a close relationship with contemporary European democratic movements. His approach contrasts with that of the clandestine Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood in Russian-ruled Ukraine, which viewed the question only within the context of the Slavic world.²⁰ Podolynsky is firmly convinced that the national idea ("the spirit of Ukrainian freedom and nationality") that has been awakened among the Ukrainians will never again be extinguished, and that it is in the Poles' own interest not to stand in its way but, instead, to facilitate it in every possible way and to channel it wisely in order to win the support of the Ukrainians (pp. 21, 30).

Podolynsky distinguishes four main political currents, or "parties," in the Ukrainian national movement during the Spring of Nations:

1. The purely Ukrainian party—[which] wants a free, independent Ukraine and is heading toward it unswervingly, directly, or through Slavdom.
2. The Polish-Ukrainian party—[which] wants a free, independent Ukraine and is heading toward it through the mediation of a federative Poland, or a Slavic Poland in federation with Ukraine, with the thought that when it [the "party"] matures and there will be a need, it will become fully Ukrainianized. Both of these parties are already liberal now....
3. The Austro-Ukrainian party—[which] wants a Ukraine that is free only of Poles but not necessarily [free] of captivity; if it must be so, may that misfortune—freedom—exist. In this party there is also liberalism, which awaits Ukrainian freedom from Austria in the same way that the Poles await Polish freedom in Galicia from it.
4. The Russo-Ukrainian party—[which] also wants a Ukraine, perhaps even [one that is] free, and is heading toward it through previous unification with Russia with the thought that it [Ukraine] will be free when Russia becomes free. (Pp. 21–22)

Despite his certain subjectivity when it comes to details, Podolynsky's laconic characterization adequately reflects the general distribution and goals of the political forces in Galician Ukrainian society.

Scholars have tended to include Podolynsky and others in his circle in the first, "purely Ukrainian" current, which was probably numerically small.²¹ The

20. See Mykhailo Lozynsky, *Halychyna v zhyttii Ukrainy* (Vienna: Soiuz vyzvolennia Ukrainy, 1916), 16. On the Brotherhood, see George S. N. Luckyj, *Between Gogol' and Ševčenko: Polarity in the Literary Ukraine, 1798–1847* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1971); and idem, *Young Ukraine: The Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius, 1845–1847* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991).

21. Shchurat, "Rechnyk nezalezhnosity Ukrainy," 173.

second, Polish-Ukrainian current included the Ruthenian Assembly milieu, the member of the Stavropegial Institute and lawyer Kyrylo Vinkovsky, Ivan Hrab'ianka, Fedko z-nad Poltvy (the pseudonymous author of the pamphlet *Rusin do Polaków* [A Ruthenian to the Poles, 1848]), and the author of *Warunki zgody między Polską a Rusią* (Conditions for an Agreement between Poland and Ruthenia).²² The third, Austro-Ukrainian current was represented by the Supreme Ruthenian Council, while the fourth, Russo-Ukrainian current included those forces constituting the nucleus of the future Galician Russophile movement.

Podolynsky does not elaborate which of these currents most corresponds to the Galician Ukrainians' national interests, but he is convinced that such interests exist and that even if not all Ukrainians care about freedom, they all care about being a nation. He cannot imagine, however, how a nation can live without freedom (p. 22). There is no doubt that he is most drawn to the first, purely Ukrainian current, which had as its aim the Ukrainian nation's unconditional independence and its equal rights in the family of free Slavic nations, and saw freedom from feudalism and absolutism as a requirement of national liberation. But, being a realist, Podolynsky sees that the national liberation of his people is dependent on the attainment of national liberation by all the Slavic peoples and their orderly existence according to federative principles. The Ukrainians' aspirations to independence will be realized, he writes, "not earlier than the resurrection of all, federative and liberal, Slavdom, in which I strongly believe as a Ukrainian" (p. 22).

Podolynsky was not the only one attracted to the idea of a democratic federation of equal Slavic republics. It stemmed from the idea of "Slavic mutuality" that had quickly spread in many Slavic lands, and was first placed on the agenda by the Decembrists, especially the Society of United Slavs (1823–25). It was promoted in the 1830s by the clandestine liberation organizations of Slavic (Czech, Slovak, Polish, Ukrainian) students in Vienna and Prague and by military personnel serving on the border in Galicia, and in the mid-1840s by the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood and the Russian revolutionary Mikhail Bakunin.

During the Revolution of 1848 the ideal of a federation of Slavic republics became even more popular, particularly while the Slavic Congress in Prague was being prepared and held. In contrast to the liberal Austro-Slavist circles' plans of uniting all Slavs under the aegis of the Habsburgs and to the Russian Slavophiles' plans of uniting all of the Slavs under the Romanovs, the radical democratic circles raised the slogan of replacing the feudal, absolutist monarchies of Europe with a Slavic federation. Although this slogan was not very realistic under the conditions that existed in 1848, its democratic essence nevertheless attracted many progressive civic and political activists, who viewed it as their

22. Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją*, 208.

political ideal. It had supporters among the Polish democrats (e.g., Karol Libelt) and the many young Ukrainians and Poles studying in Vienna.²³

At the Slavic Congress in Prague, Bakunin actively promoted this slogan in his project on "The Principles of a New Slavic Politics."²⁴ The original version of his project was brought from Prague to Lviv by Ivan Borysykevych, the head of the Ukrainian delegation at the congress. It appeared in Polish translation in *Gazeta Narodowa*, and Podolynsky was of course familiar with it.²⁵ Edited by Feodosii Steblii et al. This slogan elicited a lively discussion in the European press and even gained the support of democratic circles in several non-Slavic countries. For example, on 10 March 1848 a Society for the Liberation of the Slavic Peoples was created in Paris for the purpose of supporting the struggle of these peoples for their national and social liberation and the creation of a federation of equal, democratic republics;²⁶ and the Frankfurt Parliament's radical democratic wing expressed its support for the liberation of the Slavic peoples from the rule of feudal, absolutist regimes and for the creation of a "holy alliance of nations."²⁷

Finally, this slogan received quite an original treatment in a pamphlet by the Polonized Ukrainian political thinker and church figure Hipolit Vladimir Terlecki, *Słowo Rusina ku wszęj braci szczepu słowiańskiego o rzeczach słowiańskich* (A Ruthenian's Word to All Brethren of the Slavic Race on Things Slavic, Paris, 1849). Terlecki foresaw the creation of a democratic federation of equal Slavic nations built on the Christian principles of freedom and justice; the basis of this federation was to be a Polish-Ukrainian union; in this federation the leading roles would be played by Poland among the Slavs of the Latin rite and by Rus'-Ukraine among the Slavs of the Greek rite; and Ukraine's historic mission would be to unite all Orthodox Slavs with the Catholic Church through a Kyivan patriarchate in which the equality of the Latin and Greco-Slavic rites would be fully guaranteed.²⁸

23. Žáček, *Slovanský sjezd*, 208, 214.

24. Natalia M. Pirumova, *Mikhail Bakunin: Zhizn i deiatel'nost* (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 46–7, 52–3.

25. Feodosii I. Steblii, "Rasprostranenie idei revoliutsionnoi demokratii i utopicheskogo sotsializma na zapadnoukrainskikh zemliakh nakanune i v period revoliutsii 1848–1849 gg.," in *Revoliutsionno-demokraticheskoe dvizhenie v stranakh Vostochnoi Evropy i ego rol v razvitii internatsionalnykh svyazei: Tezisy dokladov i soobshchenii respublikanskogo nauchnogo simpoziuma. Lvov, 30 oktiabria–2 noiabria 1985 g.*, ed. Mykhailo V. Bryk and Pavlo Sokhan (Lviv, 1985), 74.

26. *Gazeta Narodowa*, 1848, no. 72.

27. *Gazeta Narodowa*, 1848, no. 48.

28. See Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Hipolit Vladimir Terlecki," in his *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, 143–72.

This slogan long remained on the political agenda, even after 1848. Thus Podolynsky's position was in harmony with the position of a significant part of European democracy of the mid-nineteenth century. Mykhailo Lozynsky was correct, however, when he wrote that given the real situation at that time, the postulate of Ukraine's national independence as it was understood by the "purely Ukrainian" current that Podolynsky represented, and, after all, by the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood and by Terlecki, was only a very distant ideal and sooner a political dream than a political program.²⁹ The same could be said of their idea of Slavic federation. Yet, the significance of these slogans and ideas cannot be overestimated. Podolynsky's ideal of Ukrainian national independence and his vision of its attainment through Ukraine's membership in a federative association of free, equal Slavic republics signalled the beginning of a new stage in the development of the national political idea in Galicia—a stage that corresponds to the level of national political thought in Russian-ruled Ukraine articulated by the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood, and to a large part of mid-nineteenth-century European democratic political thought in general.

Podolynsky's intense patriotism is combined with a respectful, positive attitude toward other peoples. He loves his native Ukraine most of all, but he also loves Poland like a sister and all of Slavdom like a mother (p. 19); he is ready to give his life for the Ukrainian people and for the freedom of any people (p. 32).

Podolynsky shows particular sympathy for the Polish people, which he considers as "unfortunate and enslaved" as the Ukrainian people. He singles out the Poles' great cultural achievements and has a high regard for that nation's struggle for freedom and democracy. Pointing out that, because of historical conditions, a great many Poles live alongside the Ukrainians in Galicia, he believes that they could also coexist in the future as long as both nations fully reject the rule of one nation over another and uphold the principle of equality. By maintaining an association with the Poles, the Ukrainians will become stronger and find it easier to attain their national rights. Any and all Polonization or Ukrainianization of the crownland's population would reek of past absolutism. "He who does not want to recognize a Ukrainian is not worthy of being called a Pole," Podolynsky writes, "but also he who does not want to recognize a Pole is not worthy of being called a Ukrainian" (pp. 3–4). At the same time he proposes what for that time was quite a civilized way of guaranteeing the rights of national minorities—Jews, Armenians, Germans, and others. "If we were in their home," he writes, "we would adapt to them, but because they are in our [home], let them adapt to us. After all, by [stating] this I do not forbid them to be and remain who they themselves want [to be]. We, according to [this] logic,

29. Lozynsky, *Halychyna v zhyttiu Ukrainy*, 17.

are the masters of our home, and they are [our] friends. Therefore they deserve our complete and most delicate courtesy, while we [deserve] their amity. It is inappropriate for them or for us to demand [anything] more" (p. 3).

Podolynsky does not condone the bitter Polish-Ukrainian polemic, for he believes that it only brings harm to both nations. He reproaches representatives of the Polish democratic camp for exhorting the Ukrainians to be agreeable and fraternal while they themselves do practically nothing to achieve accord and fraternity but instead, by their insinuations about the Ukrainian liberation movement, only aggravate hostilities (p. 4) and thereby help the bureaucracy to strengthen its position. Podolynsky considers those who stubbornly talk to the Ukrainians about Polish freedom without mentioning anything about Ukrainian freedom to be short-sighted. This gives the Ukrainians a reason to suspect the danger that they would be completely Polonized. But all Polonization attempts are doomed to fail (pp. 5–7), while the land where a great and monolithic people becomes denationalized is a model of political imperfection (p. 14). That is why the Polish democrats who are struggling for the liberation of their people (which should only be welcomed) should not refuse another people the right of freedom or deny the Ukrainians' national identity (p. 14).

In the interest of drawing the Ukrainian and Polish nations closer together and assuring their success in their struggle for national freedom, Podolynsky calls upon the Polish democrats to discard their unfeasible positions on the Ukrainian question, to recognize the Ukrainians as an independent nation, to guarantee them the same rights in Galicia as the Poles, and, instead of Polonizing them, to bring them knowledge, strengthen their patriotism, and elucidate the principles of freedom, for only that is needed by the citizens of a free land (p. 24). Podolynsky believes that the Ukrainians can help the Poles to revive their state and are ready to sacrifice as much for an independent Poland as the greatest Polish patriots. But Poland must respect and protect the Ukrainians; it must be federative and not egoistical (p. 19). Poland can arise and be strong even when its eastern half maintains its Ukrainian character and speaks in Ukrainian (p. 24).

Although Podolynsky directs most of his polemical passion against the Polish democrats' inflexible positions on the Ukrainian question, he does not ignore the conservative-tinged liberal leadership of the Ukrainian national movement. He believes that the latter is partly to blame for the deepening of Polish-Ukrainian conflicts and that certain Ukrainian activists who have polemicized with the representatives of the Polish liberation movement have been just as one-sided and unjust in their approach (pp. 2–3). He rebukes them for their biased attitude and for accusing all Poles of behaving like aristocrats. But here Podolynsky himself engages in another extreme: he proclaims all Poles to be democrats and liberals without exception, obviously transferring to them his sympathies for Polish progressive figures (pp. 30, 32). He also refutes the Ukrainian official circles' view that freedom-loving Ukrainians who sympathize with the Poles have

renounced their people and become Polonized; on the contrary, he considers such people to be Ukrainians "in spirit and in body" who do not, however, support the pro-Austrian orientation (p. 32).

Podolynsky does not agree with the Ukrainians' positive attitude toward the Austrian government. He believes that all they will get in return is persecution and that one should not expect to receive any support from the bureaucracy in the future, because "there is no doubt that as soon as it [the bureaucracy] succeeds in removing the Polish nationality from the Ukrainian land, it will immediately begin persecuting the Ukrainian [nationality] as a sister of the Polish and a child of the Slavonic hydra, and particularly as a subject and non-bureaucratic nationality," i.e., a plebeian nation (p. 30). That is why, in his opinion, the Ukrainians were still rather far from being a free nation; the Poles were somewhat closer to that goal, but not by much (pp. 34, 36). The defeat of the revolution, the decade of restored absolutism in the 1850s, and later developments completely confirmed this prognosis.

Podolynsky's reflections on the national self-assertion of the Ukrainians and on Ukrainian-Polish relations are supplemented by a number of ideas and observations that have relevance not only for Galicia and for his epoch, but are of a more general significance. Very instructive, in particular, are his views on the need for political activists to be worthy of the acquired liberty and not to encroach on the liberty of others (p. 1), on the need to avoid intolerance toward the representatives of other nations (pp. 16, 18, 36), to take into account the level of consciousness of the popular masses (p. 36), and to eradicate political fanaticism, which is sometimes suicidal (pp. 10, 11). Also important are his calls for moderation in the national sphere (pp. 4, 5) and his statements on the inadmissibility of the existence of one people and language at the expense of the absorption of others (p. 26), on the futility of a policy of forced assimilation of peoples (pp. 7, 8), and on looking for the reasons for inter-nationality conflict in the real conditions of national existence (pp. 30-32).

No less convincing are Podolynsky's statements on how a nation arriving at self-consciousness at a certain stage of its development is an objective historical process; he refutes false ideas about the "invention" of nations and the artificial inspiration of national movements by political forces with an interest in their existence (p. 19). His reflections on the preconditions and means for elevating the culture and patriotic formation of citizens penetrate to the core problems: the need for liberty and education, the enchanting influence of hearing one's own language and the name of one's own people while allowing—given the unfavourable conditions—the use also of another language, and the need for a national and democratic government to adopt a systematic approach and apply constant care in the sphere of education (pp. 9, 23, 30). At the same time Podolynsky warns against artificially, mechanically transplanting norms from other countries and peoples (p. 28). He also profoundly criticizes the erroneous

views on religion and rite as national characteristics; such views have given rise to perverse interpretations of the Union of Brest of 1596 as something forced upon the Ukrainians, and consequently antipathy to the church union among contemporary Ukrainian Greek Catholics has become widespread (pp. 17, 31).

These are the principal ideas expressed in *Słowo przestrogi*. Naturally, given the level of humanitarian knowledge in his time, Podolynsky was not always able to be absolutely exact in his treatment of social phenomena or specific episodes of the past; consequently some of his judgments are rather one-sided or too categorical. On the whole, however, the conclusions he draws are the fruit of serious reflections by a political thinker and uncompromising publicist who was ahead of his time and tried to look decades and centuries into the future. His ideas reflect the political credo of the democratic current in the Galician Ukrainian national movement during the Spring of Nations, more concretely in the late summer of 1848. This credo, however, was unacceptable to those to whom it was addressed directly—the extremely anti-Ukrainian Polish civic circles, whose entire attention was aimed at the time on preparing an armed insurrection and taking power in Galicia—or to those to whom it was addressed indirectly—the Ukrainian Austro-Slavists, who were oriented on co-operating with the Austrian government and who set the tone of the national movement.

Under such conditions Podolynsky's pamphlet did not see the light of day. Vasył Shchurat speculated that its distribution was blocked by the Greek Catholic consistory in Przemyśl.³⁰ In my opinion, this is unlikely. During the summer and first autumn months of 1848 the Greek Catholic Church bodies did not fully control the situation and therefore had few opportunities to influence publishing matters. The appearance of the pamphlet must have depended much more on sentiments in Galician Polish society, the more so that it was printed in Sanok, where the Poles dominated politically.

Thus, because it did not become known to his contemporaries, Podolynsky's pamphlet did not fulfill its immediate task. That honour fell to another book—Iulian Bachynsky's *Ukraina irredenta*, which was published in Lviv almost fifty years later, in 1895. But *Słowo przestrogi* is an important monument of Ukrainian political thought during the Spring of Nations. Shchurat found the its only known exemplar (the proofreader's copy) in 1913, that is, sixty-five years after it was written, in the attic of the manse in the village of Stezhnytsia (Stężnica), Sanok circle, where it had been preserved among the papers of the Greek Catholic parish administration in Baligród, which had been headed in the 1840s by Podolynsky's father-in-law, Fr. Mykhailo Chaikivsky.³¹ Shchurat published an announcement of his discovery in *Dilo* in 1914 (no. 64) and analyzed

30. Shchurat, "Rechnyk nezalezhnosity Ukrainy," 153.

31. Ibid.

the pamphlet's contents in his article on Podolynsky in his 1919 book on the Galician revival.

Since that time, Podolynsky and his ideas have attracted the attention of increasingly more scholars and politicians. In the 1910s and 1920s his ideas were widely promoted in courses on the history of Ukrainian political thought and by several works of political journalism.³² In the 1930s, on the occasion of the 120th anniversary of Podolynsky's birth and the sixtieth anniversary of his death (he died on 24 August 1876 in Maniv [Maniów], Lesko county, where he had served as a pastor since 1852), Mykhailo Vozniak prepared a special article about Podolynsky; it was never published.³³ Since the 1940s Podolynsky and his ideas have been discussed in many scholarly and general books and articles published in Ukraine,³⁴ the West,³⁵ and Slovakia and Poland;³⁶ finally, a few

32. See Lozynsky, *Halychyna v zhyttii Ukrainy*, 16–17; Lev Hankevych, "Rechyny nezalezhnosti Ukrainy v 1848 r.," *Vpered* (Lviv), 1919, no. 71–2; Mykhailo Vozniak, *Iak probudylosia ukrainske narodnie zhyttia v Halychyni za Avstrii*, no. 1 of Biblioteka "Novoho chasu" (Lviv, 1924); V'iacheslav Budzynovsky, "Ishly didy na muky: Vvedenie v istoriiu Ukrainy," *Ukrainske slovo* (Lviv), 19 April and 3 May 1925; and Kost Levytsky, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky halatskykh ukrainsiv, 1848–1914*, vol. 1 (Lviv: the author, 1926), 11–14.

33. The article, "Pam'iaty nepokhytnoho provisynta nezalezhnosti Ukrainy," is preserved in fond 29 (M. Vozniak), spr. 128 at the Manuscript Division of the Stefanyk Scientific Library of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in Lviv.

34. See Fedir P. Shevchenko, *Luk'ian Kobylitsia: Z istorii antyfeodalnoi borotby seliansstva Bukovyny v pershii polovyni XIX st.* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Akademii nauk Ukrainkoi RSR, 1958), 169, 191; Hryhorii Iu. Herbilsky, *Rozvytok prohresyvykh idei v Halychyni u pershii polovyni XIX st. (do 1848 r.)* (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo Lvivskoho universytetu, 1964), 248; Feodosii I. Steblii, "'Slovo perestorohy' V. Podolynskoho"; idem, "Vasyl Podolynsky — patriot, internatsionalist," *Zhovten*, 1970, no. 10: 112–16; idem, "V. Podolynsky — pobornik edinstva ukrainskoho i polskoho osvoboditelnogo dvizheniia v Galitsii vo vremia revoliutsii 1848 g.," in *Voprosy pervonachalnogo nakopleniia kapitala i natsionalnye dvizheniia v slavianskikh stranakh*, ed. Vladimir I. Freidzon (Moscow: Nauka, 1972), 144–51; Myroslav M. Oleksiuk et al, eds., *Torzhestvo istorichnoi spravedlyvosti: Zakonomirnist vozz'iednannia zakhidnoukrainskykh zemel v iedynii ukrainskii Radianskii derzhavi* (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo Lvivskoho universytetu, 1968), 226–7; Arnold H. Sheveliev et al, eds., *Istoriia Ukrainkoi RSR u vosmyi tomakh*, vol. 3 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1978), 184; Vladimir I. Freidzon et al, eds., *Osvoboditelnye dvizheniia narodov Avstriiskoi imperii: Vozniknovenie i razvitie. Konets XVIII v.–1849 g.* (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut slavianovedeniia i balkanistiki, 1980), 477; Iurii Iu. Kondufor et al, eds., *Istoriia Ukrainkoi SSR v desiati tomakh*, vol. 4 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1983), 191–2; Iurii Iu. Slyvka et al, eds., *Istoriia Lvova* (Lviv, 1984), 103; Feodosii I. Steblii, ed., *"Ruska triitsia" v istorii suspilno-politychnoho rukhu i kultury Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1987), 188; idem et al, eds., *Ukrainskie Karpaty: Istoriia* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1989), 91–2; Feodosii I. Steblii et al, eds., *Istorychni peredumovy vozz'iednannia ukrainskykh zemel* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1989), 207; and Leonid H.

years ago the first scholarly edition of his valuable treatise was published in the original Polish and in Ukrainian translation.³⁷

The outcome of history has confirmed the relevance of Podolynsky's views and the far-sightedness of his prognoses. At a moment of great political significance, during the Spring of Nations, he substantiated the inevitability of the Ukrainians' national emancipation as long as their aspirations would be supported by the Poles in the context of the struggle for and attainment of national freedom by all the Slavic peoples and their entrance into the circle of free European nations. The Ukrainian people, having survived the trials and tribulations it has had to endure in the twentieth century and having overcome all of the sharp turns in Polish-Ukrainian relations in the past, has embarked in the 1990s on the revival of its nation-state. In 1991 Poland was the first country to recognize Ukraine's independence. Today both nations envision a common future as members of the European Community. The ideas that Podolynsky expressed in the mid-nineteenth century have become a reality in the late twentieth century.

Melnyk et al, *Istoriia Ukrainy: Kurs leksii u dvokh knyhakh*, vol. 1 (Kyiv: Lybid, 1991), 424.

35. See Ivan Krypiakievych, *Velyka istoriia Ukrainy*, ed. Mykola Holubets, updated by Dmytro Doroshenko and Iaroslav Pasternak (Winnipeg: Ivan Tyktor, 1948), 683–4; Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *The Spring of a Nation: The Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia in 1848* (Philadelphia: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1967), 60; and Mykhailo Demkovych-Dobriansky, *Ukrainsko-polski stosunki u XIX storichchi* (Munich: Ukrainskyi vilnyi universytet, 1969), 26.

36. See Mikhal Danylak, *Halytski, bukovynski, zakarpatski ukraintsi v revoliutsii 1848–1849 rokiv* (Prešov: Slovatske pedahohichne vydavnytstvo, Viddil ukrainskoi literatury, 1972), 79–80; Mikhal Popovych, *Revoliutsiino-demokratychne iednannia slov'ian u XIX st.* (Prešov: Slovatske pedahohichne vydavnytstvo, Viddil ukrainskoi literatury, 1973), 62–9; and Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją*, 208–12.

37. Bazyli Podoliński, "Słowo przestrogi," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 228 (1994): 444–87.

Lewis Namier and the Problem of Eastern Galicia*

Mark Baker

Lewis Namier grew up with the problem of Eastern Galicia. Born in 1888, "so frail that he was initially given up as dead, Ludwik Bernsztajn vel Niemirowski [as Namier was originally known] spent most of his youth on his Polonized Jewish family's estates in Eastern Galicia."¹ He received much of his early education at home from his father Józef Bernsztajn (Joseph Bernstein), a lawyer whom Namier later described as "consistently pro-Polish." But early on in his life Namier also developed a sympathy for the local Ukrainian peasants. At the age of fourteen, concerned about the "coarsening" effect that the marriage of his first teacher, Ella, to a local widower was having upon her intellect, Namier expressed a rather paternalistic yet "intense sympathy for the submerged and inarticulate part of the population whose vision was sadly limited."²

* For their guidance, advice, and encouragement while I researched and wrote this article, I thank John-Paul Himka, Aileen Espiritu, David Marples, and Carolee Pollock. Above all, however, I would like to express my gratitude to the late Phil Lawson, who introduced me to the figure of Lewis Namier in his seminar on Hanoverian England and imparted to me an enthusiasm for history that I hope to carry with me forever. All errors and omissions are, of course, my responsibility alone.

1. Linda Colley, *Lewis Namier* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), 7. While Colley mentions Namier's Eastern Galician origins, the focus of her study is his path-breaking historical work on eighteenth-century Britain. For an analysis of Namier's historical writings on eastern Europe, see my article "Sir Lewis Namier: An Eastern European's Historical Outline," *Past Imperfect* 1 (July 1992): 113–32. Namier was born in Wola Okrzejska, about eighty km. north of Lublin in Russian-ruled Poland. His family moved to Kobylovolyky in Terebovlia county, Eastern Galicia two years later and settled in Novosilka Skalatska, Skalat county in 1896.

2. Quoted in Julia Namier, *Lewis Namier: A Biography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 38–9, 144. Julia Namier (née de Beausobre) was Namier's second wife.

This paper will discuss Namier's involvement in the post-World War One "settlement" of the question of Eastern Galicia. Unlike many of his colleagues at the British Foreign Office, Namier was painfully aware of the national tensions in his home province, and he strove to impress upon those Britons that their model of national development was not suited to the problem of Eastern Galicia. Nationally conscious Ukrainian peasants would not passively accept the consolidation of the pre-existing structural Polish dominion over them or incorporation into reconstituted Poland, and the Poles were not prepared to begin treating their erstwhile servants and peasants as equal citizens with their own distinct nationality. Namier's personal struggle to help the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia in their quest for autonomy opens up an unusual window into the British government's pro-Ukrainian stance, the tragic events in Eastern Galicia, and the later brilliant historian's consistent advocacy of the rights of peoples to their national self-determination. Taras Hunczak has argued that Namier's personal influence, "sense of fairness and intellectual integrity" were instrumental in the formulation of the British pro-Ukrainian policy at the Paris Peace Conference.³ This paper will provide a fuller exposition of Namier's intimate entanglement in the question of Eastern Galicia and of his support for the national strivings of those Ukrainian peasants he once considered "submerged and inarticulate."

While his father's pro-Polish sympathies no doubt influenced Namier's early political ideas, Namier's wife Julia claimed that the influence of his tutor, Edmund Weissberg, was decisive in forming Namier's early political views in general and concerning Galicia in particular: "Whatever elaborations of thought he reached in time, all stemmed in some circuitous way from the convictions of Weissberg, the brilliant publicist steeped in the Galician-Polish mood prevalent at the turn of the century." Weissberg, a young Jewish socialist who soon became known as the writer E. Borecki, was "passionately ethical, deeply concerned with every manner of underdog." Like many turn-of-the-century Galician Polish *intelligenty*, Weissberg's political underpinnings were Marxist, but his main concern was with the agrarian question: "the righting of the

Since most of her husband's personal papers were bequeathed to her and were later destroyed at his request, her book is the major source on his personal life. She wrote it at his request, and it is based largely on his own recollections, which he had recounted to her in his later years. Julia Namier claimed that her book was almost her husband's autobiography: "After much checking and cross-checking I am satisfied that I have got right even the most tricky sequences; and that this biography presents his life such as he deemed it to have been. If any fact is at all distorted, it was unconsciously shifted from true by him, owing to the mental process he called 'telescoping'—an effect of time on memory" (p. xi).

3. Taras Hunczak, "Sir Lewis Namier and the Struggle for Eastern Galicia, 1918–1920," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 2 (June 1977): 198–210.

dispossessed native Ruthenian peasantry's wrongs; a concern that was reinforced by a mounting sense of outrage at vast acres too often seen to be mismanaged by the stewards of the absentee landlords."⁴ While growing up in Eastern Galicia, Weissberg, and subsequently Namier, became well aware of the ethnic tensions that arose because the majority population there—the Ukrainian peasants—were forced to till the soil of Polish landlords. Weissberg believed in and desired the reunion of all Polish lands, but he also thought that the Ruthenians should be given their own state: "Would it not be just for tracts of land tilled by Ruthenians to form a separate state, with laws better suited to the Ruthenian peasants, not exclusively to their Polish landlords?"⁵

Under Weissberg's tutelage, Namier thoroughly studied and became enamoured with the ideologies of nationalism and socialism, which both the tutor and the pupil believed should be applied peacefully and democratically. Namier soon joined Weissberg in the Polish Social Democratic Party. Throughout the time of his involvement in it, this party remained "absolutely true" to its "basic ideals of total ethnic equality among [future Poland's] nationalities headed and guided by the Poles."⁶ At that time in 1902 Namier's solution to the problem of Eastern Galicia included a reunited Polish state for Poles to be administered by socialists "with firm liberal intentions." But by 1905 Namier had already begun questioning the Polish socialists' political programme: "On the one hand they preached national self-determination as the due of every group that ardently wished to set itself free; on the other hand they proclaimed the 'universalism' (the one-ness) of all the dispossessed—a great body of people whose most ardent wishes were assumed to be identical."⁷

By the time Namier matriculated in 1906, he had begun questioning his socialist ideals; but his advocacy of the right of all peoples to national self-determination remained with him and largely informed his later political

4. Namier, *Lewis Namier*, 38, 40–1.

5. *Ibid.*, 41. On the hostile nature of relations between the Ruthenian (i.e., Galician Ukrainian) peasantry and the Polish landlords, see John-Paul Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988). Interestingly, Weissberg's and Namier's viewpoint on the land question brought them closer to the Ukrainian socialism of Mykhailo Drahomanov than to Polish socialism, which was "on the whole, Marxist in allegiance" (John-Paul Himka, *Socialism in Galicia: The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism [1860–1890]* [Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983], 175).

6. Namier, *Lewis Namier*, 41. According to that author, Józef Piłsudski had been the "first political hero to fire L[ewis]'s imagination" (p. 41). "L" was a term of endearment used by Julia and some of Namier's closest friends.

7. *Ibid.*, 42.

activities. In that same year, at his father's insistence, Namier enrolled at Lviv University, where he was exposed to the radical variant of Polish nationalism. His first impression of it was a lasting one:

Apparently, at the faculty of Law L [Namier] at once came up against nationalist students of the extreme type—resembling the Nazis of later days. They took their ideas and inspiration from Roman Dmowski—an aggressively anti-Semitic politician of considerable stature who during World War I became L's personal enemy and proved himself a most unscrupulous intriguer. In 1906 Dmowski had already drawn round him a small but vociferous group of Poles mostly resident in Warsaw, and had gained sympathizers in Austrian Poland too. At Lviv University L was confronted by a closely-knit anti-Semitic gang of fierce young Dmowski-ites—the only politically organized group of students.⁸

Namier's first encounter with Polish anti-Semitism clearly influenced his later criticism of Dmowski and Dmowski's followers and contributed to his opposition to Polish rule in Eastern Galicia. In fact, the animosity between Namier and Dmowski became a central aspect of Namier's involvement in the question of Eastern Galicia.⁹

Soon after, Namier left Lviv and returned to his family, who had just acquired a new estate in Koshylivtsi in Zalishchyky county. But he did not stay there long. His father took him to Lausanne University, where Namier registered in the faculty of law during the winter term of 1906–7. There Namier did not confine himself to the pursuit of his father's profession, but began attending Professor Vilfredo Pareto's lectures in sociology. Pareto left a strong impression on Namier. In fact, it was he who first recommended the London School of Economics to Namier, and in the summer of 1907 Namier used Pareto's recommendation to convince his father that the "School" was the place for him.¹⁰ After one year at the L.S.E., however, Namier again took flight, this time to Oxford University, where he was taken under the wing of the prominent British historian Arthur L. Smith. While residing at Balliol College from 1908 to 1911, Namier blossomed into a promising, bright young scholar. He also

8. Ibid., 61.

9. One article has been written specifically on this animosity: Paul Latawski's "The Dmowski-Namier Feud, 1915–1918," *Polin: A Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies* 2 (1987): 37–49. This article sparked a debate with Jędrzej Giertych over its supposedly "tendentious" nature and the relative merits of Dmowski and Namier in *Polin: A Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies* 5 (1990): 303–26. Neither participant even mentioned Namier's promotion of the Galician Ukrainian cause as they debated Dmowski's anti-Semitism and the question of Jewish autonomy in Poland.

10. Namier, *Lewis Namier*, 67.

became a thoroughgoing Anglophile, perhaps first signified by the act of changing his name to Lewis Bernstein Namyier in 1910.

After graduating from Oxford in 1911 with a first-class degree in modern history, the enthusiastic young scholar was not able to continue his studies. Instead he was forced to go into private business in the United States to help pay off the mounting debts of his father, who had become a terrible gambler. Were it not for the tragic diplomatic and political manoeuvres in Europe during the summer of 1914 and for the World War that followed, Namier may well have languished indefinitely in American commerce. But Britain's entry into the war brought Namier, who had in March 1913 become a British subject, back to England, where he immediately enlisted in the British army.¹¹ He was soon released from military service, however, partly as a result of his very poor eyesight, but also because of the influence of some Balliol "chums" and, more importantly, because of his recently developed association with Lord Eustace Percy. In 1915 Percy helped Namier to obtain a position at the Intelligence Bureau at Wellington House, where he was to be of far greater use to the British war effort than he ever could have been at the front.¹²

At Wellington House, Namier's task was to provide information and advice on the complex problems of eastern and central Europe, and it was there that he began to look for a solution to the question of Eastern Galicia. Immediately put in charge of monitoring the press of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as far south and southeast as its borders with Serbia and Romania, he soon discovered that his home province of Galicia had become "a contentious part of re-emerging Poland."¹³

Yet, he did not submit his first full memorandum on Eastern Galicia to the Foreign Office until 14 September 1917, by which time he had been transferred to the Intelligence Bureau at the Department of Information. Not surprisingly, Namier wrote his exposition, titled "Remarks on 'The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,'" in response to a treatise by Roman Dmowski. In what was to become a very Namieresque approach, he began by criticizing Dmowski's sources: "For his reflections on Austria, he is mainly indebted to memory, for his facts about Russian borderlands, to the toil of his imagination."¹⁴ No doubt

11. On 25 March 1913 he was granted a certificate of naturalization by "one of his Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State" and was declared a British subject. In that same month he swore an oath of allegiance to King George V, and on 17 April he changed his surname to Namier." *Ibid.*, 107.

12. *Ibid.*, 119–21.

13. *Ibid.*, 122–3.

14. Lewis Namier, "Remarks on 'The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe'" (14 September 1917), p. 3, in Public Record Office (London), Foreign Office (hereafter P.R.O./F.O.) 371/3016, fol. 193872, file 194876. According to Oleksandr Pavliuk,

Namier's criticisms, though thoroughly researched and meticulously argued, were partially polemical. But as long as his conflict with Dmowski is kept in mind, one can draw from his "Remarks" certain underlying assumptions about his solution to the problem of Eastern Galicia.

In his "Remarks" Namier expressed his concern with Dmowski's "new Poland." At this stage his comments did not suggest a particular concern for Eastern Galicia, but only for the preservation of a future peace. Insisting that the Allied Powers had to realize the centrality of Russia to any peace settlement in eastern Europe, he argued that Dmowski's demands required the defeat not only of the Central Powers, but also of Britain's ally Russia.

The [Dmowski's] new Poland is to include, besides the provinces in which Poles form a majority (Russian Poland, Western Galicia, Posnania and parts of Austrian and Prussian Silesia), also the Lithuanian and White Russian [Belarusian] governments of Kovno, Grodno [Hrodna], Vilna [Vilnius] and the greater part of Minsk, and the Little Russian [Ukrainian] provinces of East Galicia, Cholm [Kholm] and the western and greater part of Volhynia; East Prussia, most of West Prussia and a slice of Pomerania. Moreover, Austria-Hungary is to be broken up into national states. Obviously the scheme presupposes a crushing and simultaneous defeat both of the Central Powers and Russia.¹⁵

Namier advocated the inclusion of Russia, in whatever political form, in the postwar settlement in all his comments on the reunification of Poland, increasingly arguing that only those areas in which the Poles had a majority should be part of the new Polish state. Revealing his belief in national self-determination and his intimate knowledge of class and national relations in the eastern part of Dmowski's imagined future Poland, Namier pointed out that

The Little Russians, White Russians and Lithuanians of these provinces hate the Poles with a truly fanatical hatred, it is the hatred of a land-hungry peasantry against alien landlords. Polish dominion over the Lithuanians and the two southwestern branches of the Russian nation could be maintained by force alone, and

Dmowski's brochure was submitted to the Foreign Office in July 1917. In it Dmowski argued that independent Poland had to be sufficiently large and powerful to provide a balance between Russia and Germany. He did not consider the restoration of Poland's borders before its first partition (1772) possible, but he did promote the creation of a strong Polish state with borders slightly farther east than those before the 1793 partition. Dmowski proposed that Poland include only as much territory and population as it could assimilate, while the rest—practically all of the territory lost with the first partition of Poland—be left to Russia. He saw in a possibly independent Ukraine "either anarchy or the strengthening of Germany's influence," and therefore proposed that Poland include the Ukrainian-inhabited Kholm region, Podillia, Polissia, Western Volhynia, and Galicia. See Oleksandr V. Pavliuk, "Skhidna Halychyna v ievropeiskii politytsi 1918–1919 rr." (candidate's diss., Kyiv State University, 1993), 20–1.

15. Namier, "Remarks," 1.

the necessary support that the Poles would then require could be obtained exclusively from the Central Powers. In the State as mapped out by M. Dmowski the Poles would form in reality only about 50 per cent of the population.¹⁶

Catering to anti-German feelings, Namier noted that such a state would be inevitably embroiled in a constant conflict "between the dominant and submerged nationalities" and that struggle would only serve "to establish the secure dominion of Germany over all of them."¹⁷ Drawing an analogy with Hungarian-German co-operation, Namier then commented that "the dominant Poles would be like the Magyars who feel of course little enough sympathy for Germany but remain her most faithful allies simply because this is the only way in which they can maintain their dominion over the non-Magyar nationalities."¹⁸

Dmowski claimed that the new Polish state would have a population of about 38 million, of whom those "Polish in language, culture, ideas and feelings would represent no less than 70 per cent."¹⁹ Namier calculated in a most exaggerated fashion the highest possible number of Poles in Dmowski's prescribed state and concluded that "the wildest and highest estimate ever made of the number of Poles, shows up M. Dmowski's calculations as completely fanciful."²⁰ Namier did not disagree with Dmowski over whether states should be organized on the basis of national self-determination, but over whether a particular people should be considered a "distinct" nationality and thus deserving of a separate state. Namier objected strongly to Dmowski's suggestion that Polish rule over other nationalities was justified because those nationalities were "for the most part indifferent to, or at any rate had no clear consciousness of their nationality."²¹

16. Ibid., 2–3. Pavliuk has interpreted such comments to confirm that "overall Namier considered the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands [to be] Russian lands" ("Skhidna Halychyna," 109, citing Namier's reports of 27 December 1918 and 18 January 1919 (P.R.O./F.O. 371/3279 and 371/3897). Yet, as we shall see, Namier consistently and primarily advocated the Ukrainians' right to determine their own fate. He was a true advocate of the right of peoples to self-determination.

17. Namier, "Remarks," 3. Namier expressed his convictions about the evils of German militarism and how the Germans had "caused" the war in his first published work, the propaganda pamphlet *Germany and Eastern Europe*, with an introduction by H. A. L. Fisher (London: Duckworth, 1915).

18. Namier, "Remarks," 3.

19. As quoted in *ibid.*, 4, from p. 77 of Dmowski's memorandum.

20. Ibid., 6. According to the Austrian census of 1910, Ukrainian Greek Catholics constituted 61.7 percent of the population of Eastern Galicia; Roman Catholics (i.e., mostly Poles), 25 percent; and Jews, 12.4 percent; see Volodymyr Kubijovyč, "Ethnic Composition in Various Parts of Ukraine," in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, vol. 1, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 241.

21. Namier, "Remarks," 3. Namier provides no page reference for Dmowski's suggestion. For a good summary of Dmowski's views, see P. S. Wandycz, "Poland's

Dmowski himself had admitted the strength of Ukrainian nationalism, in fact attributing to it such “centrifugal force” that Ukrainians, Dmowski suspected, might be unable to grasp “in sufficient measure the idea of compromise without which no solid federation [i.e., with Russia] can be built.”²²

Namier also questioned Dmowski’s statements about the size and attitudes of the large Jewish minority to be included in his proposed Polish state. “It is easier to get precise figures in the case of the Jews than of any other nationality because of their clearly marked distinction from other communities. No official statistics ever exaggerate their numbers nor have the Jews themselves an interest in doing so, and no Gentiles feel tempted to disguise themselves as Jews.”²³ Namier estimated that there would be about four million Jews in Dmowski’s proposed Polish State, as opposed to the latter’s figure of 2.5 million. But what Namier failed to mention was that many Jews were more than tempted to disguise themselves as Gentiles. His own parents had followed a common fashion among the more prosperous Galician Jews of their time and completely thrown off their Jewishness in favour of the Polish nationality and Roman Catholic faith. His comment suggests that Jewish population figures were accurate because of “their clearly marked distinction”; his parents, however, would not have been counted as Jews in the Austrian census.²⁴

Namier used the term “national unity” throughout his “Remarks”; he clearly saw it as a vital concept in determining the future states of eastern Europe. For example, he disagreed with Dmowski’s assertion that the Ukrainians would agree to a compromise with the Poles; such a compromise would require, as Namier saw it, “a complete disruption of their national unity.”²⁵ Yet what was most vital to Namier was not whether a particular people was empirically “a separate nation,” but rather the degree of allegiance that people expressed toward its nationality:

Whether the Little Russians are a separate nation or merely a branch of the Russian people is here immaterial; in any case the Little Russians of East Galicia, Volhynia and Cholm (which M. Dmowski claims for Poland) insist on being united with the Little Russians of Podolia and the Ukraine. Moreover, having for

Place in Europe in the Concepts of Piłsudski and Dmowski,” *East European Politics and Societies*, 1990, no. 3: 454.

22. Quoted in Namier’s “Remarks,” 4, from p. 11 of Dmowski’s memorandum. Dmowski was clearly referring only to Russian-ruled Ukraine.

23. *Ibid.*, 6.

24. At the age of nine Namier had experienced the terrible shock that his parents, desiring acceptance amongst the Polish Catholic gentry, had concealed their Jewish background from him. Indeed, until then Namier had considered himself of the same faith as his Ruthenian nursemaid. See Namier, *Lewis Namier*, 35.

25. Namier, “Remarks,” 11.

generations experienced at the hands of the Poles the healthy, invigorating treatment that M. Dmowski recommended in his book (*Thoughts of a Modern Pole*), they hate the Poles, and especially their alien Polish landlords, with a truly fanatical hatred.”²⁶

It did not matter to Namier whether the Ukrainians were “a separate nation” or whether they defined themselves mainly by their hatred of their Polish masters. What mattered was that they desired a union with others claiming to be of their nationality, and therefore they should be granted that union. Moreover, not only should the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia be left to be “masters in their own homes,” but the principle of self-determination should be applied more generally to the resettlement of eastern Europe.²⁷ Namier also disputed Dmowski’s claim that the Belarusians wanted to be part of Poland: “As to the White Russians and their desire to be included in Poland the following may serve as an illustration. In April 1917 a White Russian Peasant Congress at Minsk declared against autonomy for White Russia and in favour of a direct union with Russia.”²⁸ It did not matter to Namier that the Peasant Congress did not vote in favour of the creation of a separate Belarusian state. What the congress’s decision provided was an indication of what the people wanted, and it was this that Namier thought should determine the postwar settlement of states and borders in eastern Europe.

Not surprisingly, Namier’s advocacy of popular consent did not extend to the Central Powers. In regard to Dmowski’s territorial claims for Poland to the west and south, Namier was willing to accept the possibility of including hostile ethnic German territory: “It is quite a different matter with the Polish aspirations to recover unity with their kinsmen on the west or south. Even an extension of Poland to the sea at Danzig might be reconciled to some extent with ethnographic justice.... But a realisation of Polish ambitions on the east could end

26. Ibid.

27. The quotation is taken from Namier’s defense of Ukrainian control of the Galician oil fields in response to three letters by Dr. Leon Litowski arguing that the oil fields should be placed under Polish control to protect British investments there; see P.R.O./F.O. 371/3906, file 28011, fol. 48975, pp. 3–4. In 1914 Galicia produced three percent of the world’s petroleum and nine percent of Europe’s (including Russia); see *A Handbook: Galicia (Austrian Poland)* (1919), p. 61, P.R.O./F.O. 373/3/10. In 1918 British capital investment in Galician oil production was 10.125 million pounds; the French, 44.8 million francs; and the Belgian, 20 million francs. At the Paris Peace Conference Litowski represented the interests of the International Committee for the Defence of English, French, and Belgian investments in Galicia, all of whose members agreed and propagated the indivisibility of Galicia and its attachment to Poland as the best guarantee of security for their investments. But, as Pavliuk points out, the French were far more willing than the British to support their compatriots’ financial interests in Galicia (“Skhidna Halychyna,” 113).

28. Namier, “Remarks,” 11–12.

only in making Poland another Hungary, a State dependent for its very existence upon Teutonic support.”²⁹ One would certainly like to know what Namier meant by “ethnographic justice” and why it could be applied in the west and south, while in the east the demands of the population were his most important consideration.

Namier’s “Remarks” were submitted to the British foreign secretary, Lord Balfour, on 19 September 1917 and were, not surprisingly, considered within the context of his dispute with Dmowski. The following note appears on his memorandum:

You will I think like to look at the attached notes by Mr. Namier on the document compiled by M. Dmowski, which you read when you were in the United States. Mr. Namier is an American—half-Pole—half-Jew & is therefore torn by different emotions. His sincerity & patriotism cannot—I think[—]be questioned—they are proved by the fact that when the war broke out he left America to fight for the Allies. I do not however believe in his judgment. He is a violent [!] opponent of Dmowski & much of what he writes & says is colored by this dislike.”³⁰

Balfour then noted on the cover of the file containing the memorandum: “I would think that the Poles have a much better Ethnological claim to Posen (a part of it) than to [missing word] or Lithuania—But I am no expert.”³¹ Therefore expert opinion was requested, and on 26 September Professor Charles W. Oman, one of Namier’s former Oxford examiners, wrote a letter criticizing Namier’s critique of Dmowski. Oman’s comments suggest that Namier’s memorandum was received with considerable skepticism largely because of Namier’s ethnic background and his hostility to Dmowski.

I know Mr. Namier well, having examined him when he was an Oxford undergraduate, and seen him a good many times in later years. He is quite sincere, but very self-centred and disputatious: he used to consider himself as the only authority in England on the Ruthenian question, and to resent any one else having independent views upon it. He was (I believe) though a Jew, a landholder in the Bukovina, where Pole, Ruthenian, and Roumanian Ethnological boundaries meet. In my opinion Mr. Namier’s criticism of “The Problems of Central and Eastern

29. Ibid., 16. Namier also referred the reader to his article in *The Nineteenth Century*, February 1917.

30. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3016, fol. 193872, file no. 194876. Namier was not American at all! He had worked in the United States before the war for a former servant of his father who had prospered after emigrating there. Namier’s father was a compulsive gambler who owed a considerable debt to his former servant, and Namier had gone to work for the latter as an editor of the foreign-language press out of obligation to his father. As already mentioned, he became a British subject in March 1913.

31. Namier, “Remarks.” Noted in Balfour’s hand on the cover.

Europe" is written in a spirit of exaggerated hostility, making the worst of the Polish case whenever it is possible to do so.³²

Yet, the very fact that Namier's memorandum was read by such important decision-makers as Balfour and his private secretary, Sir Eric Drummond, suggests that its impact was considerable. Moreover, as the Paris Peace Conference approached, Namier's comments received increasing attention, particularly after he was transferred from the Intelligence Bureau at the Department of Information to the Political Intelligence Department at the Foreign Office in April 1918.

To understand Namier's role in the deliberations of the question of Eastern Galicia, it is necessary to discuss his employment, near the end of the Great War and during the Paris Peace Conference, as a member of the Foreign Office group dubbed the Political Intelligence Department (P.I.D.). The need for such a group of experts on the internal political situation of foreign countries was expressed at the highest level in February 1917, and it no doubt reflected the unexpected revolutionary events occurring in Russia. During that month Balfour noted that "the course of the war has demonstrated the importance of my receiving regular and accurate reports on the internal political situation in foreign countries."³³ Although Balfour was referring specifically to the importance of receiving such reports from His Majesty's Missions abroad, it was obviously just as important for him to receive such reports from experts based in London.

There were, of course, no ambassadors in the countries of the enemy. The British government, therefore, thought it necessary to gather together a group of experts who would keep abreast of, and make reports on, the internal political situation of these countries as well. Largely as a result of this necessity, in April 1918 the P.I.D. was constituted. The group flaunted considerable expertise: "The Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office was nicknamed the "Ministry of all the Talents." They were indeed a gifted crew. My father [Sir James Headlam-Morley] was assistant director under Sir William Tyrrell. The members included Arnold Toynbee, Lewis Namier, Alfred Zimmern, Rex and Allen Leeper, Edwyn Bevan, George Saunders. The number of inquiries and the output of memoranda constantly increased. They were frequently shown papers and invited to comment before action was taken."³⁴

32. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3016, fol. 193872, file 194876, letter, dated 26 September 1917, from Professor C. Oman to Sir Eric Drummond.

33. Ibid., fol. 3087/W37391/1917, letter, dated 24 February 1917, that appears to have been addressed to the British ambassadors abroad.

34. Agnes Headlam-Morley, introduction to James Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, ed. Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant, and Anna Cienfiala (London: Methuen, 1971), xxi.

Despite their expertise, or perhaps because of it, the group's members could not avoid initially stepping on some bureaucratic and, especially, diplomatic toes, provoking enough resistance that Sir William Tyrrell was prompted to write a memorandum explaining the new department.³⁵ He explained that the P.I.D. had been originated by the Foreign Office and had been working somewhat independently, but had now been brought into the Foreign Office as a permanent department. Actually the Department of Information had originally assembled these experts in its Intelligence Bureau. Namier and Robert W. Seton-Watson, later a prominent historian of eastern Europe, worked together as the East and Central European section of that bureau.³⁶ Created as a group of experts who would generate propaganda, it had gradually turned into a source of political intelligence on foreign countries. Robert Donald, whom Prime Minister Lloyd George had asked in October 1917 to investigate the overlap in propaganda between the War Office and the Department of Information, recommended that the bureau "could be useful as an adjunct of the Foreign Office but not as a branch of propaganda."³⁷ Largely as a result of Donald's report, the Intelligence Bureau was attached to the Foreign Office and renamed the P.I.D.

In accordance with this decision, Tyrrell described the basic duties of the new department, presumably in an attempt to define its mandate more precisely as one of political intelligence:

The primary duty of the new Department is to collect information and take, to some extent, off the shoulders of the administrative Departments the task of keeping up to date, in a readily available form, the knowledge of foreign countries which should exist here. In this connection it will frequently write memoranda for the information of the Government on the situation in particular countries or on current problems of foreign policy, and every effort will be made in future to base these memoranda on the reports of our Missions abroad, as well as on a reading of the foreign press and other sources of information.³⁸

Seton-Watson did not accompany Namier and the other experts when the P.I.D. was transferred to the Foreign Office. His decision was partly a result of

35. Tyrrell noted that "there is some danger that other Departments of the Foreign Office and the Missions abroad will feel that our memorandum[s] in the P.I.D. go over their heads and are based on less accurate information than that in their possession. There has already been a complaint privately corresponded from Copenhagen in this sense" (P.R.O./F.O. 371/4363/[P.I.D. 74], file 74, fol. 50).

36. Hugh Seton-Watson and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe: R.W. Seton-Watson and the last Years of Austria-Hungary* (London: Methuen, 1981), 207. Headlam-Morley, Edwyn Bevan, Allen Leeper, and Arnold Toynbee also worked at the Intelligence Bureau.

37. Quoted in *ibid.*, 253.

38. P.R.O./F.O. 371/4363/(P.I.D. 74), file 74, fol. 54.

his military obligations, but he was also concerned that under the Foreign Office the propaganda work of the Intelligence Bureau would have been “silenced ... at the very moment when propaganda effort is most needed.”³⁹ But as Seton-Watson later admitted, his fears proved unfounded: “Bailey, Headlam, the Leepers, Namier, Powell, Saunders and Toynbee all continued to write for *The New Europe*. In general the P.I.D. continued the activities of the I[n]telligence. B[ureau]. with little change except that it enjoyed greater access to confidential information and could speak with greater authority as part of the Foreign Office.”⁴⁰ As a member of the re-formed P.I.D., Namier was given far greater access to information, allowed to continue to write for various publications, though he could not sign his articles, and even encouraged to provide his expert opinion to the Foreign Office. Moreover, as he was employed directly by the Foreign Office, his comments would now carry greater authority and be regularly seen by the most important British decision-makers.

During his employment at the P.I.D., Namier spent most of his time commenting on the Polish question. As soon as he joined the P.I.D. he pointed out the problems with the direction in which the plans for the future Polish state were heading. Characteristically, Namier focussed on Polish claims in the east, though his argument did not initially promote Ukrainian autonomy specifically. He argued that if Poland was to become truly independent, it would require an eastern buffer zone to protect it from Russia. But “[i]t is obvious that an extension of Polish dominion over White Russian territory would involve Poland in a permanent feud with Russia and possibly also with the Ukraine and Lithuania, and thus render her absolutely dependent on Germany.”⁴¹ At the same time, Namier lamented the “encirclement” of Poland being carried out under the German occupation. “In the east slices of Polish territory are to be ceded to Lithuania and the Ukraine, and a common frontier established between these two states in White Russia is to complete Poland’s encirclement.”⁴² He further reported that the “Extreme Polish Activists” had failed in their attempt to reach an understanding with the German authorities, warning that Poland’s existence as a state was in danger. Hence Namier was concerned about limiting Polish expansion to the east, but he was not willing to limit that expansion to the extent that it extinguished the re-emerging Polish state.

39. Draft letter from R. W. Seton-Watson to John Buchan, dated 14 January 1918, and contemporaneous draft memorandum, cited in Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, 253.

40. Cited in *ibid.*, 254. *The New Europe* was a weekly journal co-founded by Seton-Watson and Thomas G. Masaryk, the future first president of the Czechoslovak Republic.

41. “Confidential—P.I.D. F.O. Poland/001—April 25, 1918,” P.R.O./F.O. 371/4293, file 84, p. 117.

42. *Ibid.*

Namier's report was clearly informed by his belief in the self-determination of peoples and in the need for governing bodies to be representative of the people. He denounced the newly elected Council of State in German-occupied Poland because of its unrepresentative nature. "In these circumstances it is indeed surprising that the Extreme Activists should have secured eight seats in the Council, and this fact serves only as further proof of the unrepresentative character of that Assembly."⁴³ Namier concluded his report by re-emphasizing the need to limit Polish claims in the east, again stressing the pivotal role that he thought Russia would have to play in the reorganization of eastern Europe: "Even whilst the policy of the Inter-Party Union is considered consonant with our own purposes, a very sharp line must be drawn between their attitude in Poland and their attitude with regard to Lithuania, White Russia and the Ukraine, and most of all with regard to Great Russia, which alone can serve as pivot for British policy in Eastern Europe. It is hard to see how a policy of aggression on the part of Poland towards its neighbours in the east can ever square with our anti-German policies."⁴⁴

Although Namier's comments were now being given greater consideration, his Oxford examiner continued to preface them. Regarding Namier's opposition to extending Poland's eastern border into non-Polish ethnic territory, Professor Oman stated: "I agree with Mr. Namier in thinking that this line would be unwise, in face of the growing sense of Ukrainian nationality, to press for the addition to Poland of any Ukrainian population, such as that of the Ruthenian districts of Galicia [which are universally anti-Polish in spirit] or the Western half of Volhynia."⁴⁵ But Oman questioned Namier's comment that the reports on Poland by "individual émigré leaders," clearly referring to Dmowski, were sometimes "misleading." Having conversed with Dmowski and finding him "by no means intransigent on the Eastern frontier of the New Polish State," Oman thought that Namier was too critical of the leader of the Polish National Committee (KNP).⁴⁶

Oman's comments did not temper Namier's attacks on Dmowski, partly because Dmowski continued attacking Namier. In May 1918 an article in the Polish newspaper *Tygodnik Polski*, published in London under the KNP's auspices, commented that "for some time past the English press has shown an interest in the tendencies of the weekly *New Europe*. Several polemical articles have been published discerning in that paper tendencies analogous to those of

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid, 117a.

45. P.R.O./F.O. 371/4293, file 84. My reading of Oman's comment suggests that the bracketed addition ("which are universally anti-Polish in spirit") was his.

46. "Confidential—P.I.D. F.O. Poland/001—April 25, 1918," 117a.

Russian Bolshevism. In that connection the attitude of that paper towards the Polish Question has been raised.” In particular, the article in *Tygodnik Polski* noted that it had recently been determined that the author of a number of articles in *The New Europe* who signed himself “N.” was actually Mr. Ludwik Bernstein, i.e., Namier, who “comes from a Jewish family resident at the village of Koszyłowce [Koshylivtsi] in Eastern Galicia.”⁴⁷ Namier translated and submitted this revealing article to the Foreign Office, suggesting that its intent was not merely to expose him, but to let the Poles in Galicia know the location of his family’s estate.

Namier further illustrated his point with a second translated extract from *Tygodnik Polski*: “It is for us interesting and instructive to know that the author of numerous articles directed against Poland and published in different English papers is Mr. Bernstein from Galicia.... Mr Bernstein is the author of an enthusiastic article in *The New Europe* on Mr. Braunstein (Trotsky), the leader of the Russian Bolsheviks.”⁴⁸ Namier clearly believed this to be a thinly veiled attack on him and his family: “It will be marked that the *Tygodnik Polski*, which is to convey news from London to Polish papers abroad, especially picks out from the article in the *New Witness* the Eastern Galician address, obviously for the use of the Austrian police. For its better convenience the attack will probably be reproduced in the Cracow *Głos Narodu*, the Lemberg [Lviv] *Kurier Lwowski* and in some other papers connected with the [Polish] National Democrats.”⁴⁹

Namier pointed out how widely this issue of *Tygodnik Polski* would be circulated, and he named the source of this intrigue: “The *Polish Weekly* is a National Democrat paper and has therefore plenty of funds. Although its nominal price is 4d., I think they will distribute it gratis and the workmen will not be such fools as to pay for *Pravda* when they can get the *Weekly* free.”⁵⁰ He denied that the campaign was started in the London newspapers *New Witness* or *Morning Post*, stating that it was started by *Tygodnik Polski* in the first weeks of March 1918 “on the very same lines on which it was afterwards developed in

47. P.R.O./F.O. 371/4363/(P.I.D. 137), file 137, fol. 302. The article was translated by Namier and submitted to the Foreign Office on 15 May 1918.

48. Ibid. Namier’s sympathetic article on Leon Trotsky appeared in the 17 January 1918 issue of *The New Europe*.

49. Ibid., fol. 303.

50. Ibid., fol. 302. Namier found *Tygodnik Polski*’s circulation figures in the “Fortnightly Report on Polish Affairs” by M.I.9c, based on letter no. 6, 18 March 1918, p. 6, R. de Truszkowski, Dalston, E.8. to *Przegląd Codzienny* (New York), dated 4 February 1918. His statement about the KNP having “plenty of funds” probably refers to the fact that the KNP had been receiving three thousand pounds per month from the British government since February 1918.

the other two papers. The *Tygodnik Polski* then already hinted at my being the author of the articles on Trotski.”⁵¹

The reaction of the Foreign Office to Namier’s accusations were mixed. Sir Eric Drummond wrote to Sir Charles Harding, the permanent under-secretary to the Foreign Office, that the articles were probably written by Dmowski’s subordinates but that they did not represent a *fresh* attack on Namier. Drummond remarked that it was “certainly not the business of the Foreign Office to defend the *New Europe*. This paper has contained most violent attacks on the F.O. and its members.... I think also that I ought to remind you that it was the *New Europe* who first started the ball, and the articles in the other papers have been replies.”⁵² Harding responded that he did not know about *The New Europe*, but he objected “to articles in the *New Witness* or other papers by certain Poles attacking gentlemen employed by the F.O.”⁵³

Undaunted, Namier continued his critique of the Poles’ “imperialistic” demands in the east in an August 1918 memorandum on the Germans’ attempt to put the Austrian archduke Charles Stephen on the Polish throne, to set up a puppet regime in Poland, and thereby to gain Polish support for the German war effort. Namier noted that “Poland’s adherence to such a scheme can be obtained in no other way than by satisfying the imperialist ambitions of her upper classes, which would of course come at the expense of Russia.”⁵⁴ To Namier these upper classes’ imperialistic demands in the east, including parts of the territories around Hrodna, Minsk, Mahiliou, and Vilnius, were largely motivated by financial gain, and their fulfilment would be disastrous: “Although Poles form hardly more than about one-tenth of their population, the Polish upper classes have very considerable vested interests in those territories. Their population is White Russian, and Russia can never permanently renounce them—even the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had left most of these districts to Russia. If they were assigned to Poland, any recovery of Russia will threaten her long before it threatens either Germany or Austria.”⁵⁵

Though these comments were aimed at a German occupation policy that was never fulfilled, they again reflect Namier’s primary concerns with re-emerging Poland’s eastern borders: to create a lasting peace, it was essential to consider

51. Ibid., fol. 303.

52. Ibid., fol. 304.

53. Ibid. Latawski concludes his article with the statement that Dmowski and Namier’s “struggle for influence in London essentially ended ... in May 1918” (“The Dmowski-Namier Feud, 1915–1918,” 47). Our subsequent discussion will suggest it did not.

54. P.R.O./F.O. 371/4363, file 84, fol. 130. The memorandum was received at the Foreign Office on 19 August 1918.

55. Ibid., fol. 130A. Received at the Foreign Office on 19 August 1918.

seriously the aspirations of the new Bolshevik state *and* the will of the peoples inhabiting the lands of the former Russian Empire.

On 16 October 1918, hoping to attract the support of the many subject nationalities of his empire, Emperor Charles of Austria-Hungary issued a manifesto promising to transform the dual monarchy into a multinational federation and to set in motion a rapid devolution of power in favour of those nationalities. But Austria-Hungary's crushing military defeats and the Czechs' and Poles' demands for complete independence soon extinguished the emperor's hopes. Although the Galician Ukrainians were relatively late in getting organized compared to the other nationalities of the empire, they had begun planning the establishment of their own independent nation-state before the Habsburgs admitted defeat.⁵⁶ On 19 October 1918 Ukrainian parliamentarians, party leaders, and church hierarchs from Galicia and Bukovyna formed the Ukrainian National Rada to act as the Ukrainians' representative body, which then announced its intention to unite all of Austria-Hungary's ethnic Ukrainian lands in a Ukrainian state. At the same time, the Poles prepared to establish their control over Galicia. On 24 October the so-called Liquidation Commission was established in Lviv and was assigned the task "to liquidate the relations of Austrian Poland with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy."⁵⁷

On the night of 31 October a group of young, impatient Ukrainian officers, led by Captain Dmytro Vitovsky of the Sich Riflemen, gathered all available Ukrainian troops in the vicinity of Lviv and quite peacefully disarmed Austro-Hungarian troops and quietly took control of the city. On the morning of 1 November 1918 yellow-and-blue Ukrainian flags flew over Lviv's city hall, all major administrative offices were in Ukrainian hands, and everywhere placards informed the residents that they were now citizens of a Ukrainian state. Ukrainians carried out similar takeovers across Eastern Galicia. On 9 November

56. A recent Polish study Kozłowski has shown that during the First World War Galician Ukrainian politicians directed all their efforts toward attaining an agreement with Vienna; most of their activities carried an "obvious anti-Polish character" and they made no effort to come to an understanding with the Poles (Maciej Kozłowski, *Między Sanem i Zbruczem: Walki o Lwów i Galicję Wschodnią, 1918–1919* (Cracow: ZNAK, 1990), 81 and 96; cited in Pavliuk, "Skhidna Halychyna," 24). As early as 1922 Mykhailo Lozynsky argued that the Galician Ukrainian leaders' exclusive focus on reaching an understanding with the Habsburg monarchy on the eve of its collapse hurt their chances for diplomatic success and gave the Poles the opportunity to discredit them before the Allies as supporters of defeated Austria; see his *Halychyna v rr. 1918–1920* (Vienna: Institut sociologique ukrainien, 1922; New York: Chervona kalyna, 1970), 40.

57. Stanislas Filasiewicz, *La question polonaise pendant la guerre mondiale* (Paris: Section d'études et de publications politiques du Comité National Polonais, 1920), 542.

the Ukrainian National Rada proclaimed the creation of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (Zakhidno-Ukrainska Narodnia Respublika, or ZUNR).⁵⁸

While the Ukrainian and Jewish populations of the territory responded quite positively to this bloodless coup d'état,⁵⁹ the Poles of Eastern Galicia were shocked by the Ukrainians' actions and almost immediately began resisting the new regime. The new Ukrainian authorities were noticeably tolerant of national minorities. They even allowed Polish newspapers to continue publishing until 6 November, and closed them down only *after* they had published the Polish mobilization order.⁶⁰ Initial attempts at negotiation stalled on the question of the sovereignty of the ZUNR: the Ukrainians insisted that the Poles recognize the ZUNR, while the Poles refused to even discuss it, claiming they lacked the authority to do so. Lonhyn Tsehelsky, then the ZUNR's deputy state secretary of foreign affairs, later recalled that neither side took the initial attempts at negotiation seriously and merely delayed matters, uncertain of their own military capabilities and fearing that they were too weak to throw the other out of the city.⁶¹ Both sides appealed for outside help, the Ukrainians to Kyiv and the Poles to Warsaw. Confusion over authority between the Polish Regent Council in Warsaw, the Liquidation Commission in Cracow, and the People's Government in Lublin obstructed the Poles' resistance. But soon the Committee for the Salvation of Lwów (Lviv) was created in Cracow, and Piłsudski ordered the Polish Galician command to reinforce its troops. On the morning of 19

58. Lozynsky, *Halychyna v rr. 1918–1920*, 40–3. As a recent historiographical article has pointed out, the history of the ZUNR is “one of the least studied and discussed questions in the history of Ukraine” (S. M. Derev'ianko and A. M. Panchuk, “ZUNR v ukrainskii istoriohrafii,” *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1995, no. 2: 28). See also Oleksandr Karpenko, ed., *Mizhnarodna naukova konferentsiia prysviachena 75-richchii ZUNR, 1–3 lystopada 1993 r.: Materialy* (Ivano-Frankivsk: n.p., 1993).

59. The Jewish National Council, created in late October 1918 from representatives of the Zionists, Jewish Social Democrats, and the Zionist workers' party Poalei-Zion, came out in support of the newly-proclaimed Ukrainian state in early November 1918; see Froim Ia. Gorovsky, ed., *Evrei Ukrainy: Kratkii ocherk istorii*, vol. 2 (Kyiv: Ukrainskofinskii institut menedzhmenta i biznesa, 1995), 26. This was largely a response to the Ukrainian National Rada's declaration of 1 November, which proclaimed that “all citizens of the Ukrainian state, regardless of nationality or religion, are guaranteed civil, national, and religious equality” and called on all national minorities, especially the Poles, Jews, and Germans, to send their representatives to the Rada (Lozynsky, *Halychyna v rr. 1918–1920*, 42–3).

60. On the tolerant nature of the ZUNR, see Gorovsky, *Evrei Ukrainy*, 31–5; Lozynsky, *Halychyna v rr. 1918–1920*, 41–3; and Lonhyn Tsehelsky, *Vid legend do pravdy: Spomyny pro podii v Ukraini zv'iazani z pershyim lystopadom 1918 r.* (New York: Bulava, 1960), 56–60.

61. Tsehelsky, *Vid legend do pravdy*, 69–70.

November about fifteen hundred Polish troops from Przemyśl arrived in Lviv, where they were put under the command of Gen. Tadeusz Rozwadowski. An attempted truce lasted three days, at the end of which, on the night of 22 November under heavy Polish fire, the Ukrainian troops were forced out of the city. The battle for Lviv soon escalated into an all-out Polish-Ukrainian war. A particularly vicious conflict between erstwhile neighbors, it lasted until July 1919.⁶²

While the Poles and Ukrainians fought a desperate battle for control of Eastern Galicia, the leaders of the Great Powers began deliberating on how to establish a lasting peace in Europe. On 18 January 1919 the peace conference officially began in Paris. Although the problem of Eastern Galicia was certainly not considered the most important question facing President Wilson and Prime Ministers Lloyd-George, Clemenceau, and Orlando and their subordinates, they were forced to spend considerable time attempting to resolve it, largely because the Polish-Ukrainian war had "seriously complicated" their earlier plans for the political reorganization of that region.⁶³

On the eve of the Paris Peace Conference, the most clearly formed pro-Ukrainian position was certainly that of the British, and one can see Namier's influence on it. In an addendum to a November 1918 memo on Russia, the British General Staff proposed the creation of a "strong belt" from the Baltic to the Black Sea as a barrier against the spread of Bolshevism from the east and of German influence from the west. This belt was to include the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, and "that part of Galicia which is not included in Poland or in the new Czechoslovakia, and which is populated by Ruthenians (the regions of Peremyshl, Lviv, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi)." The general staff stressed that the Allies must not ignore the "Ruthenian question," because it had great strategic importance, and also that it was not desirable to allow Polish troops to occupy "Ruthenian Galicia".⁶⁴ In a 9 December 1918 Foreign Office memorandum, Namier's influence on the question of Eastern Galicia is also evident: the memorandum stated that the eastern border of Poland must follow the San river line, hence leaving most of Eastern Galicia out of reconstituted Poland. A supplement to the memo discussed the possibility of the creation of an independent "Ruthenian (Ukrainian) State" on both sides of the Carpathians, stressing the strategic danger of including Eastern Galicia in Russia.⁶⁵

62. Much of this summary of events is paraphrased from Pavliuk, "Skhidna Halychyna," 24–6.

63. Oleksandr Pavliuk, *Borotba Ukrainy za nezalezhnist i polityka SSha (1917–1923)* (Kyiv: Vydavnychiy dim "KM Academia," 1996), 48.

64. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3344, fol. 144338, as translated into Ukrainian in Pavliuk, "Skhidna Halychyna," 108.

65. Kay Lundgreen-Nielsen, *The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference: A*

Hence, even before the peace conference there was sympathy in British ruling circles for the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia. But this was not the case in the United States or France. The Americans held no clear policy on Eastern Galicia, and the French were decidedly pro-Polish. Moreover, the Ukrainian People's Republic, with whom the ZUNR united on 21 January 1919, had in recent memory signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Germans, which did not endear the Allied leaders to the Ukrainian cause. If Namier was to promote the Ukrainians' claims to Eastern Galicia at the peace conference, he would have much work to do.⁶⁶

One of Namier's most influential colleagues at the peace conference was Sir James Headlam-Morley, who played a major role in the drafting of the minorities treaties for the reconstruction of eastern Europe.⁶⁷ According to Headlam-Morley's daughter Agnes, he corresponded regularly with Namier throughout his work in Paris and credited Namier with considerable input and influence on questions concerning the "minorities" of eastern Europe.⁶⁸ On 22 January Headlam-Morley had a discussion with Stanisław Posner, a former leader of the Polish Socialist Party and a close friend of Namier. According to Headlam-Morley, Posner "entirely confirmed Mr. Namier's observations with regard to the personalities of the present [Polish] Government; he said that all members of the Government who had political experience and capacity were National Democrats

Study of the Policies of the Great Powers and the Poles, 1918–1919 (Odense: Odense University Press, 1979), 66–7.

66. The German taint of Brest-Litovsk fell on the ZUNR when its union with the UNR was proclaimed on 21 January 1919 in Kyiv. While the ZUNR (now called the Western Oblast of the UNR, or ZO UNR) continued to act as a separate state, the two governments strove to present a unified front in the international arena. See Lozynsky, *Halychyna v rr. 1918–1920*, 73; and Pavliuk, "Skhidna Halychyna," 173–4. Pavliuk (pp. 106–26) provides an excellent summary of the positions of France, Britain, and the United States on the question of Eastern Galicia on the eve of the conference. For the American position in particular, see also his *Borotba Ukrainy*, 40–66.

67. While Headlam-Morley attended the conference in only a "semi-official" capacity, attached to Sir William Tyrrell, the head of the P.I.D, he conversed quite regularly with the principal heads of state at the peace conference. The value placed on Headlam-Morley's opinions was suggested by a letter that he wrote to S. W. Phillips on 18 April 1919: "Personally, it is interesting to get rather behind the scenes. I had a long conversation with President Wilson and several talks with Lloyd George, and I have been 3 or 4 times to the Council of Four meetings, which of course is the holiest of holies. It is amusing finding oneself sitting in a room with Lloyd George, Wilson and Clemenceau; at any rate one sees the raw material of which history is, or rather ought to be, made" (Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, 82).

68. Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, xxix. Agnes Headlam-Morley helped to compile her father's peace conference correspondence after his death.

and that the others, who did not belong to that party, were men, so far as his knowledge went, entirely without political experience or influence.”⁶⁹

Namier and Headlam-Morley were not in complete agreement on the Polish question. Agnes Headlam-Morley recalled that her father disagreed with Namier’s promotion of “Jewish National Autonomy” in the proposed reconstituted Poland: “My father objected that although it was legitimate for Zionists to seek national independence in Palestine it would be dangerous for them to claim separate nationality within the states to which they owed citizenship.”⁷⁰ Headlam-Morley was also not entirely convinced of the reactionary nature of the Polish National Democratic government, or, rather, that that government was *too* reactionary. In a letter to Namier on 3 February 1919, he questioned “the danger of Polish imperialism”: “I do not deny it exists, but I should have thought that an alternative danger of a complete collapse in Poland would be greater, and that we should do all we could to support any administration which would keep things together during the crisis.”⁷¹ It would seem then that Namier was willing to risk “the complete collapse of Poland,” if supporting Poland entailed support for the intolerant policies of Dmowski and the National Democrats.

According to Headlam-Morley, Namier’s promotion of Polish independence had now become quite conditional. In one letter Headlam-Morley suggested that

69. Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, 12. This was an extract from a memorandum that Headlam-Morley wrote about his interview with Mr. Posner on 22 January 1919. That Dmowski’s National Democrats held sway in Paris is also confirmed by Pavliuk: “In practice Dmowski’s more concrete and clearer conception won out. In distinction from the maximalism of the leader [Dmowski] of the KNP, Piłsudski was more careful. His position was dictated by the desire to create a Ukrainian buffer state and, for tactical reasons, to consider the views of the Great Powers. But the federalists suffered defeat, and their conception was never worked out in detail” (“Skhidna Halychyna,” 45).

70. Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, xxix. Headlam-Morley’s opposition to some form of Jewish autonomy was not surprising, although he professed to “have been fighting for the Jews throughout” the peace conference (*ibid.*, 106). In his letter to Sir Maurice Hankey of 23 June 1919, he argued against the teaching of Yiddish in the schools of the newly created Polish state, warning that “there is ... a real danger that if these schools are placed under Jewish management, the more extreme national elements among the Jews may use these schools in order *artificially* to foster the use of the Yiddish language in such a way as to increase the separation which the use of this language produces between the Jews and other citizens of Poland” (*ibid.*, 158–9). Of course, when it came to the protection of the language rights of many of these “other citizens,” especially the Germans, Headlam-Morley’s chief concern was “Polish imperialism.” In fact, he was even willing to compare the relative merit of Yiddish and German as a justification for advocating such a policy: “Yiddish, moreover, is not a language such as German, which is of high value for educational and cultural purposes[,] and we do not wish that its use for these purposes should be deliberately encouraged” (*ibid.*, 159).

71. *Ibid.*, 20, from a letter to Namier dated 3 February 1919.

this conditionality was possible for Namier because of Namier's partiality towards Bolshevism: "Where I think we differ is that you on the whole are inclined to regard Bolshevism as a lesser evil than Polish Imperialism; in this I cannot follow you; I suppose the difference springs from ultimate causes and our whole attitude of mind towards political affairs, but in the long run if they can get the Polish State started on a liberal basis with the necessary agrarian reform, then in the long run I should not be frightened of Polish Imperialism."⁷² Namier's sympathies for the recent revolution in Russia were unclear.⁷³ But certainly one can hear Namier retorting, in view of his numerous remarks on the National Democrats, that under the latter's authority the new Polish state would hardly be "started on a liberal basis" and that agrarian reform, in Eastern Galicia at least, where Polish landlords held most of the land and all of the political power, would be cosmetic at best.

Yet, Headlam-Morley's position was understandable. Though he was in Paris at the peace conference, had the ear of Lloyd-George, and regularly attended the Council of Four's meetings, he could not have had the whole story on Eastern Galicia. He himself expressed concern that the French government was preventing the Ukrainians from speaking in Paris.⁷⁴ It would have been difficult for Headlam-Morley to confirm Namier's claims when only the Polish National Democrats were allowed to speak with any authority on the various claims to Eastern Galicia.

In January 1919 Namier began criticizing the reports coming into the Foreign Office from Col. H. H. Wade, who was in Eastern Galicia observing the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. He believed that Wade was only hearing the Polish viewpoint and reporting on it to the peace conference. Namier remarked that if the line of demarcation that Wade proposed in his report of 15 January were imposed on the Ukrainians, "then of course one can hardly expect the Ukrainians to stop

72. Ibid., 36, from a letter dated 27 February 1919. How strange such a statement is to the late-twentieth-century Western person! Would we even think of comparing Bolshevism and "Polish Imperialism"?

73. Namier expressed optimism about the revolution as late as 1921. In his article "The Downfall of the Habsburg Monarchy," he argued that the Revolution had spawned a number of social and national movements in eastern Europe and had pulled Europe out of a vicious circle: "The Russian Revolution came like a current of fresh air through a stifling heavy atmosphere. It came like the promise of a new, better world. Europe was turning in a vicious circle, and a struggle was dragging on which by then everyone wished had never broken out" (H. W. V. Temperley, ed., *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. 4 [London: Oxford University Press, 1921], 76).

74. Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, 14. Headlam-Morley wrote of the French intransigence in his note about his 23 January interview with an American professor, the Rev. George Davis Herron, who "to a certain extent had President Wilson's confidence" (p. 193).

fighting. The leaders may agree, the rank and file will not obey.”⁷⁵ In his report of 29 January Wade argued for the Buh River–Stryi line of demarcation for a Polish-Ukrainian ceasefire, claiming that this line prejudged nothing and would not determine the eventual Polish-Ukrainian border. Namier retorted that if the line prejudged nothing, why not adopt a demarcation line that the Ukrainians proposed—running along the San river—which was “in accordance with the distribution of the two nationalities?” He wondered how the Galician Ukrainians could be expected “voluntarily to evacuate half their country?”⁷⁶

I venture to submit once more that no other line of demarcation except that of the San can serve the purpose of peace. The other lines being at variance with the ethnic distribution will never be accepted by the population[,] which the Ukrainian authorities would then be unable to control. The offer made by the Ukrainian government to the Polish minority in article 7 of the document enclosed by Colonel Wade seems very generous, and we might demand that it should hold good even in a provisional settlement[,] which naturally cannot prejudice the decisions of the Peace Conference, and see to it through special Allied representatives that it should be carried out in letter as well as in spirit.⁷⁷

Namier was not arguing that “nation-states” were the destiny of all nations, but simply that in this case, borders along ethnic lines satisfied the demands of the majority of the population, thus limiting the possibility of German influence in eastern Europe and thereby preserving international peace.

Namier also disputed the Poles’ repeated claim that the Ukrainians were basically Bolshevik—a claim that Wade supported in his reports. In his 29 January report Wade included a Ukrainian proclamation to Polish soldiers that supposedly proved the Ukrainians’ “Bolshevik” proclivities. Namier retorted that the proclamation was “more Ukrainian Nationalist in spirit than Bolshevik.” Even if the proclamation could be considered Bolshevik “in spirit,” Namier remarked that “in this War it has not been unknown for other and more important Powers to use Bolshevik propaganda to demoralize the enemy armies.”⁷⁸ Namier

75. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3897, fol. 4306.

76. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3906, file 28011, fol. 30572, pp. 1–2. Wade’s report was written on 29 January 1919 and sent from Lviv to the Foreign Office. Namier’s comments, dated 1 March 1919, were sent with Wade’s report to Sir William Tyrrell in Paris.

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4. Article 7 did not survive. In their January 1919 negotiations with Col. Wade, the Ukrainian delegates at first insisted on the San as the demarcation line. But when Wade informed them that this was simply not possible and that the Poles would soon be reinforced with the arrival of Gen. Józef Haller’s army and additional armaments, the Ukrainians agreed to Wade’s proposed Buh River–Stryi line and the accompanying neutralization of the Galician oil fields. See P.R.O./F.O. 371/3866, fol. 145241, cited in Pavliuk, “*Skhidna Halychyna*,” 28–9.

78. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3906, file 28011, fol. 30572, p. 3. In fact, Wade’s liaison with the Ukrainians, Capt. Thomas F. Johnson, had already informed London in mid-December

concluded that it was “even” in the interest of the Poles of Eastern Galicia that the armistice should be based on “just principles.” Polish chauvinists, and even the Poles who argued for the Buh-Stryi line, “endanger the lives of the Polish minority beyond that line. It seems most unlikely that the Ukrainians should agree to that line. But if their representatives abandon half of East-Galicia to the Poles, there will be an outbreak of despair in the rest of the country which may have the most fearful consequences.”⁷⁹

Namier also questioned the Polish claims that Ukrainians were committing atrocities against Jews. On 4 March he challenged the statistics of the Polish representative in Bucharest concerning Ukrainian atrocities against Jews, noting that they seemed to include Jews massacred in the Polish pogroms that had followed the Polish capture of Lviv in late November 1918, and that a number of the alleged atrocities took place on territory never claimed or occupied by the Ukrainians. The percentage of Polish population had also been exaggerated: “In reality the percentages of Poles in East-Galicia cannot possibly exceed that of the Roman Catholics, which amounts to 23 per cent, and in all probability the proportion of the Polish-speaking population in East-Galicia is not more than about 15 per cent.”⁸⁰

The brutal Polish-Ukrainian bloodletting in Eastern Galicia soon spilled over into the Namier-Dmowski dispute. Dmowski and Ignacy Paderewski, the famous pianist who had represented the KNP in the United States, were appointed as Polish delegates to the peace conference. Namier carefully monitored their declarations at the conference and criticized them on a regular basis. On 20

1918 that he had not noticed “any signs of Bolshevism” among the Ukrainians, remarking, on the contrary, that they “carry on a struggle against the Bolsheviks.” Johnson petitioned London to appoint British officers to the Ukrainian Galician Army’s (UHA) staff. See P.R.O./F.O. 371/3966, 1919, Russia, doc. 145241, cited in Pavliuk, “*Skhidna Halychyna*,” 122.

79. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3906, file 28011, fol. 30572, p. 4. Namier’s comments are dated 1 March 1919.

80. *Ibid.*, fol. 32477. The Poles’ claims were communicated to Lord George Curzon, the acting foreign secretary during Balfour’s absence in Paris, on 19 February 1919. A recent study of Jews in Eastern Galicia confirms that the November 1918 pogroms in Lviv took place *after* Ukrainian troops had retreated from the city and that the pogroms had been carried out with the support of the Polish occupying authorities in response to the Jews’ declaration of neutrality during the battle for Lviv. Some of Lviv’s Ukrainian inhabitants did take part in the pogroms, however. According to the Polish governmental commission that studied the causes and consequences of the pogroms in Eastern Galicia, during the pogroms of 22–3 November in Lviv 152 people were killed, fifty homes were burned and destroyed, and around four hundred stores were ransacked. By 18 December more than seven thousand Jewish families had appealed for aid to the committee set up to help the pogrom victims. See Gorovsky, *Evrei Ukrainy*, 28–30.

February 1919 he attacked Dmowski's statement that the people of Eastern Galicia were incapable of organizing a government because of "the fact that in Eastern Galicia in the intellectual professions, excluding small farmers and clergy, there were 400,000 Poles and only 16,000 Ruthenes."⁸¹ Namier questioned the accuracy of these figures, noting that it was impossible to determine how Dmowski defined "the intellectual professions" in Eastern Galicia, especially if he did not include the clergy. Attempting calculations based on several different definitions, Namier found Dmowski's proportions impossible. Yet, he concluded quite frankly that

as a matter of fact, the Ruthenes have a much smaller intelligentsia than the Poles, this being one of the harmful effects of Polish rule over East-Galicia, but the proportion is certainly not 25 to 1, as M. Dmowski tried to make it. It is much more likely to be 4 or 5 to 1. Moreover[,] the Jews[,] who have a well[-] developed intelligentsia[,] would no doubt loyally co-operate with the Ruthenes in building up their state, and finally even the Polish minority might see its way to doing so.⁸²

Namier wondered if Dmowski had included the Jews among the Polish intelligentsia in his calculations despite the pogroms and the KNP's refusal on principle to issue certificates of Polish nationality to Jews. "If so, his statistics are valueless[,] as the Jews of Eastern Galicia would much rather co-operate with the Ruthenes than with the Poles."⁸³ Namier questioned the absence of any Eastern Galician or Russian representatives or experts at the peace conference, noting that these absences allowed Dmowski to make any allegations and eastern territorial claims that he wished. "Should Poland's neighbours be left without representatives who might enable the Conference to form a balanced judgment?" he asked.⁸⁴

81. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3906, file 28011, fol. 28086, p. 4 of the memorandum dated 20 February 1919.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., p. 1 of the memorandum. A recent study lays out the anti-Semitic acts of the Polish National Democrats and some Polish troops in the Polish-occupied zone, and the Jews' increasing sympathy and support for the ZUNR as the war progressed. See Gorovsky, *Evrei Ukrainy*, 27–8.

84. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3906, file 28011, fol. 28086, p. 4 of the memorandum. One can also see this Polish-bias in the eyewitness account of Gen. Joseph Berthélemy's February 1919 truce-negotiating mission in Lozynsky, *Halychyna v rr. 1918–1920*, 73–85. After the mission spent several weeks in Warsaw and Lviv, which was by then firmly in Polish hands, a ceasefire was established on 25 February. But by then, as Lozynsky, a member of the Ukrainian delegation, illustrates, the mission had been "basically informed by the Poles" (p. 75) and was quite unwilling to listen to the Ukrainians' counter-claims. The mission's final proposition, dispatched in the form of an ultimatum, was by far more favourable to the Poles: it allocated to them more than one-third of Eastern Galicia,

If Headlam-Morley was not entirely convinced by Namier's claims, he was sufficiently aware of the one-sidedness of the information that the peace conference received to write a letter to Tyrrell on 26 February 1919 concerning this matter: "I am a little anxious as to the situation with regard to the method by which a provisional boundary is being established between the Poles and the Ruthenians. It is, I think, unfortunate that[,] as would appear from the available information, the only representatives of the Allies who are in charge of the matter are those who are in a position to hear [only] the Polish side of the case."⁸⁵

Then, in March 1919, largely as a result of the rapidly changing international situation, the Ukrainians obtained tentative Allied recognition. On 19 March a dispatch was sent by the Great Powers to Gen. Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian forces near Lviv, asking him to cease hostilities and informing him that a similar note had been sent to Gen. Rozwadowski, the commander-in-chief of the Polish forces. More importantly, the dispatch recognized the Ukrainians' right to negotiate: "Supreme Council adds that they are ready to hear *the territorial claims of both parties* concerned and to approach Ukrainian and Polish Delegations in Paris or through whatever authorized representation the parties may select with [a] view to changing suspension of arms into an armistice."⁸⁶

Yet, Allied recognition did not mean Allied support for the Galician Ukrainians. To gain such support it would have been necessary for the Allies to have heard the Ukrainian side of the dispute, and neither Namier's nor Headlam-Morley's protestations about the one-sidedness (i.e., Polish bias) of information and representations to the peace conference had much effect. On 20 March Headlam-Morley complained about the exclusively Polish nature of Maj. A. L. Paris's Allied mission that had been sent to Warsaw in March, admitting to Namier that his "prognostications have come quite true and I understand that the members of the Mission to Warsaw have all become pure Poles."⁸⁷

including the oil fields, which were at that time completely under the control of the UHA. See *idem*, 75–9.

85. Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, 35.

86. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3906, file 28011, fol. 43555. Emphasis added. The full text of the dispatch is in Lozynsky, *Halychyna v rr. 1918–1920*, 85.

87. Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, 52–3. Lozynsky (*Halychyna v rr. 1918–1920*, 87–8) argues that the Allied intervention of 19 March 1919 was engineered to break through the Ukrainian forces' encirclement of Lviv. As a condition of intervention, the Allies' dispatch demanded unobstructed transportation links between Lviv and Peremyshl so that Lviv's Polish inhabitants and defenders would receive the daily sustenance they required. Hence, by agreeing to the truce terms the Ukrainian forces had to give up the possibility of starving the Polish forces out of Lviv.

Namier did not limit his comments to defending the Ukrainians; he strove to protect the rights of all minorities that might fall under Polish rule. In another report, dated 27 March 1919, he voiced his concern with the Polish army's advance into largely Lithuanian and Belarusian territories and condemned the army's behaviour towards the Jews in Lithuania: "It seems an undoubted fact that a number of excesses have been committed against the Jewish population and that it has been treated in a brutal and ruthless manner."⁸⁸ Namier also complained of the Polish incursion into Belarus, noting that the Poles had captured the Belarusian government at Hrodna "under the pretence of fighting the Bolsheviks" and that these Polish "bandits" had acted on the same moral level as the Bolsheviks and had been bullying and pilfering the helpless population.⁸⁹ Namier pleaded to the Allies to adhere to their professed principles: "I venture once more to raise the question whether it is compatible with the policy and the principles of the Allies to support the advance of such an [Polish] army into the ethnically Russian territory and to take upon themselves the moral responsibility for its doing? And if not, whether such explicit instructions should not be sent about these matters to the British representatives in Poland?"⁹⁰

Perhaps because Headlam-Morley played the role of conciliator at the peace conference, he never completely subscribed to Namier's almost entirely negative picture of the Polish National Democratic government. Headlam-Morley's correspondence suggests that he was concerned above all with "unreasonable Polish propaganda and the penalisation of the *German* language,"⁹¹ but he remained quite optimistic about the possibility of finding a "liberal basis" and a "Counsel of Moderation" in Poland. He therefore remained open to meetings with the Polish representatives and recounted to Namier, in a letter dated 9 April 1919, his rather positive impression of a meeting that Lloyd George and he had with Prime Minister Paderewski:

88. P.R.O./F.O. 371/4379, fol. 269 (P.I.D. 269). Namier's source of information was M. Mieczysław Łódzia's article in the 12 March 1919 issue of *Robotnik*.

89. *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.

90. *Ibid.* It is worth noting that Namier made no distinction in this comment between "ethnically Russian" and ethnic Belarusian territories.

91. Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, 48. In particular he worried about the decision to grant Danzig to Poland "without conditions or reservations" concerning the large German population there. Unlike most of the peace conference's participants, Headlam-Morley expressed considerable sympathy towards the Germans throughout the conference and tried to preach moderation in an atmosphere of retribution and revenge. His German sympathies predated the war and were perhaps partly the result of the fact he was married to a German woman.

You will be amused to hear that I have just been lunching with the Prime Minister and Paderewski; the conversations turned on a great number of subjects[,] and I felt that we much wanted your knowledge in order to be able to check the truth of much [that] Paderewski said. On the other hand, I must say that he made a very good impression; he talked well and clearly. [August] Zaleski is coming again this afternoon[,] and he is especially attached to Paderewski. I see some hope that we may have found a channel by which to approach what the diplomatists call "Counsels of Moderation."⁹²

Namier quickly attempted to dash Headlam-Morley's hopes, calling Paderewski "a fantastic liar, if anything worse than Dmowski.... Moreover he has a brazen cheek."⁹³ But Headlam-Morley remained unconvinced, and in another letter to Namier, dated April 1919, he insisted upon the sincerity of Paderewski's character.⁹⁴ Surprisingly, Namier yielded to Headlam-Morley's judgment and to closer contact with the Polish president, admitting that "there are people who are better than their reputation[,] and I am quite prepared to accept that Paderewski is personally sincere."⁹⁵ In fact, according to Headlam-Morley it was at Paderewski's request that Lord Harding asked Namier to come to Paris in May 1919, mainly in order to discuss the Jewish question with him.⁹⁶ Zaleski had informed Headlam-Morley that Paderewski would like to talk to Namier. Headlam-Morley wrote: "I do not know precisely what the subject of the conversation would be but I gather that Mr. Namier's name has been so often mentioned in Polish circles, both on other matters, and particularly about the Jewish question, that M. Paderewski feels that an interview with him might be helpful."⁹⁷

92. Ibid., 70. Paderewski had become Poland's prime minister in late January 1919, when Piłsudski invited him to form a new cabinet as a compromise candidate following an attempted coup inspired by the KNP; see Michael Palij, *The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance, 1919–1921: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution* (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1995), 35. Zaleski, who was educated at the London School of Economics, had been working on Piłsudski's behalf in London and had made several contacts in the British government, especially Lloyd George. During the peace conference Zaleski advised Paderewski and helped him to keep in touch with the British delegation. His views were moderate, and he did not share the Dmowski group's anti-Semitism.

93. Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, 70, n. 1.

94. Ibid., 72.

95. Ibid., 73, n. 1. The date of Namier's reply is not given. Pavliuk ("Skhidna Halychyna," 24) argues that Paderewski strove to unite aspects of both Piłsudski's and Dmowski's plans for a reconstituted Poland, and thus for Eastern Galicia.

96. Ibid., 86, n. 3.

97. P.R.O./F.O. 371/4379/P.I.D. 364, letter dated 22 April 1919 and signed by Headlam-Morley.

It was on the Jewish question in particular that Headlam-Morley relied on Namier's expertise. In his diary entry for 30 April 1919, Headlam-Morley noted that a new committee had been created "to consider what guarantees have to be found for the protection of Jews, and other minorities in the New States, especially Poland." Apparently Headlam-Morley found Namier's presence in Paris quite useful, commenting in his diary that "it is very fortunate that Namier is here[,] and I have kept him two or three days longer as he could give me lots of information about the matter, and I think he is really doing useful work buzzing about between Poles and Jews."⁹⁸

In April 1919 Namier continued his promotion of the Ukrainians' position. Commenting on a memorandum from Dr. Ievhen Levytsky, a representative of the Ukrainian National Rada, he wrote: "A very sensible & moderate memorandum. The statistics seem accurate. Especially interesting is the analysis of the population of Lemberg on p. 36–40 that clearly proves that even in that town itself the Poles have not a majority."⁹⁹

In another April 1919 memorandum, Namier again stressed the importance of understanding the hostile national relations on the territories claimed by Poland, expressing dismay that the political party he belonged to in his youth, the Polish Socialist Party, was now virtually indistinguishable from that of Dmowski's National Democrats:

The territorial demands of the national Socialists differ little from those of the National Democrats, Daszyński & Moraczewski in Poland correspond to Schneidmann & David in Germany, & are no more reasonable about East-Galicia & White Russia, than the latter were about German Poland & Alsace-Lorraine. The enclosed memorandum of these Socialists admits that the new Polish State as they plan it would count 20 million Poles in a population of 30 millions; in reality there would not be even 20 million Poles. Anyhow a hostile irredenta of 1/3 is quite sufficient to wreck any State in Poland's position.¹⁰⁰

98. Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, 98–9.

99. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3906, file 28011, fol. 62580, memorandum dated 17 April 1919 and sent through Lord Acton in Berne to Curzon. Namier's comments were dated 30 April 1919. The memorandum was titled "Mémoire relatif à la Guerre Polono-Ukrainienne et à la République Ukrainienne de l'Ouest: Soumis aux gouvernements et aux représentants des Grandes Puissances Alliées à la Conférence de la paix." Levytsky's survey actually showed that although the Poles were not a majority in Lviv ["Léopol"], they were the largest group. "Il en résulté, par conséquent, que la population polonaise de Léopol ne représente que le 46.53% de la population totale, ou, exprimé en chiffres, Léopol ne compte parmi sa population que 93,602 Polonais en regard de 57,387 Juifs, 39,839 Ukrainiens et 10,862 Allemands." Levytsky's statistics were taken from the official 1910 Austrian statistics for Lviv.

100. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3921, fol. 60635, memorandum dated 25 April 1919. Pavliuk ("Skhidna Halychyna," 20–4) shows that, for all their differences, the leading political

Yet, Namier continued to believe there could be a positive outcome to the postwar settlement. While commenting on Lord Acton's recent interview with the Ukrainian representative in Berne, Baron Mykola Vasylo, Namier expressed his faith in the new international order and in the possibilities of a settlement with Bolshevik Russia: "As to the settlement of East-Galicia in the Peace Treaty[,] it would seem best if, until Russia recovers & a final settlement is made, it was put under a High Commission of the League of Nations. This is the solution which seems most favoured by the members of our Delegation dealing with the subject."¹⁰¹ This was to be Namier's basic, temporary solution to the problem of Eastern Galicia.

On 12 May 1919 the Inter-Allied Commission for the Negotiation of an Armistice between Poland and Ukraine, headed by Gen. Louis Botha of South Africa, presented its report. The commission proposed a conditional armistice that included giving Lviv to the Poles but the Drohobych-Boryslav oil fields and much of the rest of Eastern Galicia to the Ukrainians, and limiting both nations' military forces to 20,000 men each. The ZUNR officials accepted these terms, but the Poles took this opportunity to renew their offensive. Lord Curzon found the report "very interesting," but Namier immediately remarked that the report had only sparked further hostilities: "After having received the terms for an armistice unanimously adopted by the Inter-Allied Commission & accepted by the Ukrainians, the Poles opened their offensive on May 18. The Dmowski Press openly declared that the terms for the armistice being based on the war-map, the thing to do is to change it by means of a vigorous offensive."¹⁰²

The Poles' "vigorous offensive" was successful largely due to the arrival of Gen. Haller's army in late April 1919. Formed in France from Polish prisoners of war, Haller's 100,000-man army was well trained and equipped, and led largely by French officers. In November 1918, shortly before the Allies decided to dispatch the army to Poland, Paderewski assured the leaders of the Entente

forces in Poland at this time were united in their desire to create a strong Poland that included Eastern Galicia. The main differences were: the Dmowski "incorporationists" argued for the complete incorporation of all of Eastern Galicia into a strong, centralized Polish state, while the Piłsudski "federalists" argued for a federalist state, and Piłsudski himself would have been satisfied with the inclusion of Lviv, Kalush, and the Drohobych-Boryslav oil basin into Poland. In fact, Namier's calculation turned out to be quite accurate: according to the 1921 Polish census, the Polish Republic had a population of 27.2 million, of which more than one-third were not ethnic Poles. See Gorovsky, *Evrei Ukrainy*, 71.

101. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3907, file 28011, fol. 67131, dated 10 May 1919. Vasylo was a wealthy landowner from Bukovyna who had been one of the leaders of the Bukovynian Ukrainians since the 1880s and was a member of the Ukrainian National Rada.

102. Ibid., file 28011, fol. 77887. Namier's comment is dated 27 May 1919; the memorandum is dated 13 May 1919.

and President Wilson that if they allowed it to be transferred to Poland it would be used exclusively against the Bolsheviks. But soon after the army's arrival in Poland in late April 1919, Piłsudski, under great pressure from Haller himself, Dmowski's National Democrats, and the Polish Sejm, redirected it against the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA), rationalizing that the Ukrainians were Bolsheviks as well.¹⁰³ Namier was quick to bring this to the attention of the Foreign Office. On 14 May 1919 he commented on a memorandum from Lord Acton in Berne to Lord Curzon that "Captain Johnson who has just returned from Poland confirms the news that the Poles have utilized the coming of Haller's army for pressing still further their advance into East-Galicia."¹⁰⁴ Curzon minuted on this memorandum that the Poles' use of Haller's troops was "arbitrary and unjustified." Namier's critique and special knowledge of the Poles' use of these fresh, well-armed forces comes out clearly in Curzon's response to another report:

This Polish misuse of General Haller's army certainly seems a deliberate defiance of the wishes of the Allies. There are also some very ugly reports of pogroms in Galicia which[,] if only partially true[,] corroborate this inherent lack of statesmanship in Polish Politics at the moment. It seems to me that in Poland Pogroms and this Eastern advance against the Lithuanians in the North and the Ukrainians in the South are closely interconnected. The Jews are accused amongst other things of not being in favour of military service[,] and any such use of General Haller's Army as that to which it is now being put is bound to influence the anti-Semitic passions of the non-Jewish populations. Thus causing the intolerable pogroms.¹⁰⁵

No doubt partly owing to Namier's influence, as well as to the Poles' unwillingness to negotiate a truce and to the use of Haller's troops against the UHA in Galicia, on 27 May the president of the peace conference sent a telegram to Piłsudski complaining that

The Polish authorities were in effect, if not in purpose, denying and rejecting the authority of the Conference of Peace. The Council feel it their duty, therefore, in the most friendly spirit but with the most solemn earnestness, to say to the Polish

103. For a good English summary of the assembling, training, and dispatch of Haller's army to fight the Ukrainians, see Palij, *The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance*, 36–47. On Paderewski's promise, see *ibid.*, 43. Palij cites the figure of 100,000 men in six divisions (p. 53). On Piłsudski's very difficult political situation, see Pavliuk, "Skhidna Halychyna," 27–47. On 4 April 1919 the Polish Sejm unanimously passed a resolution stating that all of Eastern Galicia must belong to Poland. Haller and the Polish military in general uncompromisingly insisted on using his troops to drive the UHA out of Eastern Galicia; see Pavliuk, "Skhidna Halychyna," 34–5.

104. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3907, file 28011, fol. 72158. Namier's comment is dated 14 May 1919. Johnson was Wade's assistant and acted as a liaison with the Ukrainians.

105. *Ibid.*, fol. 74033. Curzon's comment is dated 16 May 1919.

authorities that, if they are not willing to accept the guidance and decisions of the Conference of Peace in such matters, the Governments represented in the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Governments will not be justified in furnishing Poland any longer with supplies or assistance.¹⁰⁶

While this document may suggest a change in the Allies' attitude towards the Poles, it was a small and tentative step at best. Moreover, the Allies refused to take action to enforce their declaration. With the support of Haller's army and reinforcements from Poland proper, the Poles soon broke through the Ukrainian encirclement of Lviv and drove the UHA back almost to the Zbruch River. But it was the Allies' inaction that was probably more discouraging to Namier than the Poles' "vigorous offensive." On 4 June 1919 he commented on a report from M. Nattigan in Bucharest on the progress and failure of the negotiations: "The enclosed document gives an account of the several attempts which the Ukrainians made to conclude an armistice with the Poles & of the way in which the Poles managed to keep them cut off from Europe. It is rather pathetic to see how these people counted on the Peace Conference, to enforce its decrees."¹⁰⁷

The events of June 1919 only exacerbated Namier's discouragement. His belief in the Allies' adherence to the principle of self-determination was challenged at every turn. Headlam-Morley, too, had placed much faith in the Allied professions of principle, and by June he had also become quite disillusioned with the peace conference's deliberations. But he still argued with Namier over what would be a "just" reorganization of Poland and whether Poland's borders should be expanded to the east or to the west:

I cannot reconcile myself to the position that it is the right thing to satisfy the Poles by giving them more than they can justly demand on their western frontiers, so as to relieve the tension on the eastern. Of course this arises from the fact that I really know nothing about the problems on the eastern frontier of Poland, but I feel that it would be a fatal thing to give to the Poles more than they can justly demand at the expense of Germany; *in my mind Germany is more important than the White Russians.*¹⁰⁸

106. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: The Paris Peace Conference*, vol. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 62; originally cited in Palij, *The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance*, 53. A more cautious telegram had been sent earlier, on 21 May, asking Piłsudski for information and reminding him that "definite engagements were undertaken by General Haller not to take part in operations against the Ukrainians" (ibid., 5: 806). In response to these charges, Piłsudski and Paderewski claimed that they had not heard about Haller's "engagements," while Haller denied he had made them; see ibid., 6: 127–8.

107. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3907, file 28011, fol. 82800. Namier's comment is dated 4 June 1919.

108. Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, 141, citing his letter to Namier dated 11 June 1919.

At the end of June Headlam-Morley explained Namier's "fundamentally" different view: "As far as I can understand your view, you would almost welcome unjust Polish gains against Germany, provided that there was strict justice on the eastern frontier of Poland; I am afraid that it seems to me that in the long run the Germans are more important than the Little Russians."¹⁰⁹

While Namier was discouraged by the Allies' passive reaction to the Polish offensive, he was not deterred. On 13 June 1919 he criticized the pro-Polish nature of Maj. Paris's reports on the situation in Eastern Galicia, contrasting the Ukrainian and Polish claims and once again arguing that the solution was not Polish rule: "Major Paris thinks that there is 'good proof that the Ukrainian regime was not one that people could be expected to live under'. Nor is the Polish regime. The outrages alleged to have been committed by the Ukrainians against the Poles in East-Galicia are in no way worse, and indeed on the whole less serious, than those proved to have been committed by the Poles against the Jews."¹¹⁰

Namier's comments continued to influence the British position on Eastern Galicia. In a letter to Namier, dated 17 June 1919, Headlam-Morley commented: "I have just been reading the long telegram to Sir Percy Wyndham [the British representative in Poland], in which I seem to recognize your handiwork; I must congratulate you on it."¹¹¹ Eventually Headlam-Morley himself became quite exasperated with the Polish representatives at the peace conference. He complained in a letter to E. Fullerton Carnegie, dated 23 June 1919, that "the Poles are, I believe, deliberately adopting dilatory methods[,] and I expect that they get support in Paris."¹¹²

Though Namier's efforts seem to have influenced the British position on Eastern Galicia, they were not sufficient to avert Allied recognition of the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia. The British resisted calls for recognizing Polish authority in Eastern Galicia, but when the Americans sided with the French the latter's position prevailed in Paris. The final decision was made at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on 18 May 1919. Balfour once more

suggested the appointment of a High Commissioner for [a neutral] Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations. He also insisted that the Ukrainians "be told that, though the Poles are temporarily in occupation of their country, they [the Poles] are acting under the directions of the League of Nations, and that the Ruthenians

Emphasis added. If confirmation of Headlam-Morley's pro-German sympathies is ever needed, here it is.

109. Ibid., 176–7, citing his letter to Namier dated 30 June 1919.

110. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3907, file 28011, fol. 86258.

111. Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, 146–7.

112. Ibid., 157.

will be given a full opportunity of determining by plebiscite, within limits to be fixed by the League of Nations, what their future status is to be.”¹¹³

On 25 June 1919 the Supreme Council of the peace conference issued a “resolution” to the Ukrainian delegation:

In order to safeguard the persons and properties of the civilian population of Eastern Galicia from the dangers which threaten them from Bolshevik bands, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Countries has resolved to authorize the forces of the Polish Republic to carry their operations to the river Zbruch. This resolution will in no way prejudice the decision, which the Supreme Council will take later on to determine the political status of Galicia.¹¹⁴

Most indicative of the relatively low status that the Ukrainians had at the peace conference is the fact that this resolution was not the authentic text, but a significantly abridged version. The actual resolution, which was issued in full to the Polish government, made no mention of “Bolshevik bands” and authorized the Polish government “to employ all its military forces, *including General Haller’s army*,” in order to carry out this occupation.¹¹⁵

On 2 June 1919 the Ukrainian delegation sent to the president of the peace conference a “most solemn and decisive protest” against this resolution, taking pains to point out that on the territory occupied by Ukrainian forces in Eastern Galicia “all persons and property are protected” and there “had never been any Bolshevik bands, but only complete order.” Appealing to truth and justice, the protest concluded that “the Ukrainian people cannot accept this resolution, and they will by all means defend the independence and integrity of their state.”¹¹⁶ In response, the General Secretariat of the peace conference confirmed that the Polish government had been authorized to create a civil administration in Eastern Galicia, following which Poland would conclude a treaty with the Allies in which “the autonomy of the territory, as well as the political, religious, and personal freedoms of its inhabitants, will be protected.” That treaty would be based on the right of self-determination and would give the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia the right to determine their own political allegiance.¹¹⁷

The Poles’ reaction to the 25 June resolution was quick and decisive. Having received the Allies’ permission to administer, and therefore occupy, all of Eastern Galicia, they dropped all pretences that they were attempting to negotiate with

113. Hunczak, “Sir Lewis Namier,” 205–6, citing P.R.O./F.O. 371/4377, fol. 4389, p. 9.

114. Translated from the Ukrainian version in Lozynsky, *Halychyna v rr. 1918–1920*, 143.

115. *Ibid.*, 149.

116. *Ibid.*, 146. Lozynsky provides the complete text on pp. 143–6.

117. *Ibid.*, 146–7.

the UHA, which now held only a small strip of territory in the southeastern corner of Galicia. Piłsudski hurried to the Galician front and took control of the campaign, and by mid-July the Polish army had reached the river Zbruch.¹¹⁸

Headlam-Morley considered the Allied decision to give Poland authority over Eastern Galicia “incomprehensible.” In a letter to Namier dated 30 June, he blamed the Americans for the decision: “It is quite impossible to follow all that goes on in East Galicia, but the last decision, by which it is apparently to be given over to Poland, seems to me to be quite incomprehensible. Here it is above all the Americans who are responsible; as so often is the case, they let us down on the most important points. I can see no sense of intelligence in their policy.”¹¹⁹

Namier made no immediate comment on the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers. But indications are that he did not despair and continued to speak on behalf of the Ukrainians. On 30 June, in response to the Sejm’s request that Allied representatives be sent to join a Polish commission inquiring into “atrocities in Eastern Galicia,” Namier suggested that if the Allies were to send representatives, that commission should also investigate possible outrages “committed by, as well as on, Poles,” the representatives should be persons with a good knowledge of the country, and that the Ukrainians should also be represented. His suggestions were followed by the comment that “if representatives are sent[,] it would probably be desirable that they should make inquiries independent of [the] Polish Commission.”¹²⁰

On 25 June the Foreign Office received an “expert” report from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on “Alleged Atrocities Committed by Ukrainians.” On 30 June Namier again voiced his concerns regarding the Polish commission and suggested what the motivation for the Polish government’s accusation of

118. Pavliuk, “Skhidna Halychyna,” 44.

119. Cited in Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, 177. A footnote to Headlam-Morley’s comment suggests the centrality of the Bolshevik threat to the decision of the Council of Ministers: “In late June the Council of Ministers took up the question, it had to choose between ordering a Polish withdrawal, thereby opening up Eastern Galicia to the Bolsheviks, or of sanctioning Poland’s military occupation. Reluctantly, it chose the latter.” The Ukrainian mission in Paris does not seem to have made a very favourable impression on the American delegation. In a telegram to the Secretary of State in Washington in mid-October 1919, Frank L. Polk complained that the mission had “flooded” the delegation with “propaganda. We are not aware that it has been recognized by anyone and it is dealt with on the same footings as the numerous delegations of other unrecognized groups.” See *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of the Ukraine, 1918–1949* (Washington, D.C.: National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1984), microfilm publication M1286, reel no. 1, fol. 860e.oo/18.

120. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3907, file 28011, fol. 94173. Namier’s comment is dated 30 June 1919.

atrocities committed by Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia might be: "The Poles, disregarding warnings repeatedly given to them by H. M. Government, invaded East-Galicia. They now try to justify their action by tales of Ruthene atrocities. A peasant in revolt and driven to utter despair is not so soft-handed as his oppressor. But this is not a sufficient reason for continuing Polish dominion over Ruthene country."¹²¹ Namier also questioned the validity of the commission's findings. Ukrainians who claimed that atrocities had been committed against them were allowed to testify before the commission, but Namier pointed out that their interpreter was "Dr. Stephan Dobrowski, attached to the Mission by President Paderewski." Namier rather sarcastically commented that "the use at an inquiry of an interpreter supplied by an interested party is surely 'une haute nouveauté' in judicial procedure and deserves to be noted. One wonders whether this is an exceptional case or whether it is the custom of Allied Missions in Poland."¹²²

Namier also criticized the "expert" report submitted by the Polish government listing atrocities committed by Ukrainians against Poles: "I cannot see how we can take any responsibility for its accuracy. Or if we publish it[,] should we [not] also publish the fact, reported by the D.M.I.'s agent in Poland, that the Lemberg pogrom in which 72 Jews were massacred was authorized by the Polish military authorities? Or that Gen. Razdowski [i.e., Rozwadowski], now the head of the Polish Military Mission in Paris, boasted in conversation with Capt. Johnson of having executed Ruthene prisoners of war?"¹²³ It appears that after the peace conference decided to allow the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia, Namier's criticisms became more bitter in tone.

The Foreign Office's response clearly suggests that Namier's influence continued. On 3 July 1919 it sent a telegram to Balfour in Paris suggesting that the proposed commission's investigations of atrocities in Eastern Galicia "should be—so far as [the] Allied representative is concerned—impartial as between Poles and Ukrainians" and noting that "the fact that allegations have been made against the Poles should be borne in mind."¹²⁴

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Namier's continued support for the Galician Ukrainians' struggle with the Poles occurred when that violent struggle affected him personally. At the beginning of June 1919, about the same time as Namier was criticizing the Poles' "imperialistic" tendencies and defending the

121. *Ibid.*, fol. 95869.

122. *Ibid.* Namier's comment is dated 30 June 1919. The reference to the "Allied Missions in Poland" is probably to Maj. Paris's and Col. Wade's missions and to Namier's suspicions about the one-sided nature of those missions' reports.

123. *Ibid.*

124. *Ibid.*, fol. 94173.

Ukrainians against charges of atrocities, soldiers of the retreating UHA sacked his family's farm at Koshylivtsi, terrorized his family, kidnapped his mother and sister, and killed their estate manager.¹²⁵

The news reached Namier through the Polish Foreign Ministry on 4 July. Considering the source, it is not surprising that he waited until 12 July to write to one of his Polish friends at the Polish Ministry of Health, Dr. Ludwik Rajchman, to request his assistance: "I have received news that our house has been sacked by the Ukrainians. My father, rescued since, is ill in hospital at Kolomea [Kolomyia], my mother and sister have been deported by Ukrainians to Borshchiv. Kozłowski of the Polish Foreign Ministry, who brought the news, suggests that they might be rescued in an exchange of prisoners. Could you help in arranging matters and communicate with my father?"¹²⁶

Namier's letter was transmitted to Dr. Rajchman through Sir Percy Wyndham, who also talked with Piłsudski about the exchange of Ukrainian prisoners for Namier's mother and sister. According to Wyndham, Piłsudski responded quite positively, stating "that he would be glad to be of any assistance possible and that he would send an officer to Kolomea, [which is] now in [under] Roumanian occupation[,] in order to see Mr. Alexander [Joseph?] Bernstein."¹²⁷

By 21 July 1919 the emergency was over. Wyndham reported that "Mr. and Miss Bernstein have returned to Koszyłowce."¹²⁸ But accurate information about his family only came to Namier slowly over time. According to Wyndham, an "aide de camp" sent out by Piłsudski had learned that Ukrainians had forced the Bernsteins to walk to Zalishchyky, despite an injury they had caused to Mrs. Bernstein's leg. Furthermore, the murder of M. Mazurek, the manager of the

125. In early June the UHA was retreating from the Polish forces. It attempted one final counter-offensive on 8 June 1919 near the town of Chortkiv, very near to Koshylivtsi. Namier was never able to determine whether his parents' estate was attacked before or after this counter-offensive.

126. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3923, file 102247, fol. 102247. Julia Namier states that the news came from "a man called Frazer" on 4 July 1919. "Having been confined in Austria during the war, Frazer had known some friends of L[ewis]'s family, had been entrusted with a letter, and was volubly communicative" (Namier, *Lewis Namier*, 142).

127. Ibid., fol. 105826. Wyndham's response is dated 17 July 1919. He seems to have gotten the first name of Namier's father wrong, but not his surname. Julia Namier states that it was most telling to her husband that his father stressed the name Bernstein (Bernsztajn) rather than Niemirowski. This suggested to her husband that his father was hiding behind his Jewishness because the Ukrainians were more antagonistic toward the Poles, particularly the large landowners. Lewis Namier told his wife that "Ukrainians, no less enthusiastic Jew-baiters than were the Poles, confined their pogroms chiefly to small towns and particular villages where Jews clustered. But owners of manor houses were beaten-up, tortured, and killed because they were Poles" (Namier, *Lewis Namier*, 143).

128. Ibid., fol. 104157.

Bernsteins' estate, and of the destruction of their manor and property by UHA troops were confirmed.¹²⁹

Namier read all the reports on his family, which characteristically portrayed the Ukrainians as "barbarians." On 4 August Namier's father told Maj. A. L. Paris—the same Paris whom Namier had repeatedly criticized for his pro-Polish sympathies—that he had been "robbed of practically everything by the Ukrainians, and expressed the opinion that they were worse than Zulus."¹³⁰ At the same time, Bernstein expressed great appreciation for what the Poles had done to help him and his family, and he even travelled to Lviv to thank the Polish general staff in person.¹³¹

A more detailed report, by H. G. [possibly Harold William] Picton, was received at the Foreign Office on 7 August:

Mr. Bernstein stated that he had been very badly treated by the Ukrainian soldiers[,] who robbed him of everything[,] and it is with great difficulty that he escaped and took refuge at a friendly peasant's barn. He remained in this hiding place for 48 hours, when it was discovered by the Ukrainians and Mr. Bernstein and his companions were literally thrown out and dragged into a stable, where a Ukrainian soldier hit M-me. Bernstein in the face so violently that she fell and severely injured her leg. At this time also the soldiers robbed Mr. Bernstein of his last pair of boots. Mr. Bernstein's bailiff, Mr. Mazurek, was taken away to Buczacz [Buchach], where he was shot. Miss Jalowiecka, M-me[,] and Miss Bernstein were imprisoned for 3 days and only released at the approach of the Polish Army.¹³²

And yet, despite Bernstein's repeated condemnations of the "Ukrainian soldiers," he did admit to Picton "that many Jews were among the Ukrainian soldiery," as were "many German and Austrian ex-officers," and Namier's mother identified one of these soldiers as being Mr. Epstein, a Jewish man from Stanyslaviv.

Namier's reaction to his family's personal tragedy suggests an amazing degree of self-control and devotion to principle. Since the founding of the P.I.D. he had been commenting extensively on almost all memoranda that crossed his desk,

129. Ibid., fol. 107643.

130. Ibid., fol. 113659. This report was from Wyndham, but it included a report from Maj. Paris in Lviv.

131. Ibid., fol. 111561. The telegram, dated 2 August 1919, was transmitted via Wyndham from Piłsudski.

132. Ibid., fol. 114763. Picton's reliability is questionable. Ibid., file 103821, fol. 103821 notes that Picton was considered "an inadequate representative" of the British government. He was considered very pro-Polish, and this certainly may have coloured his transmission of Bernstein's statements. However, Namier himself described his father as consistently pro-Polish: "My father was always on the Polish side and known to be closely involved with the Polish nobility. The wave of cruel reprisals could hardly by-pass him" (Namier, *Lewis Namier*, 144).

particularly those regarding Poland and Polish claims in Eastern Galicia. On the cover sheet of Picton's report someone had written "What savages!"¹³³ But this comment was not in Namier's hand. In fact, the only evidence that Namier even read these memoranda at all are his initials ("LBN") with which he signed the cover sheet of each memorandum.

Namier's silence on this matter has been elucidated somewhat by his wife, who recorded the "calamitous" personal impact of the event on both Bernstein and his son: "The political implications L[ewis] had grasped at once. The calamitous human factor—Joseph's bitter humiliation that he later claimed to be the worst of his life—was grievously to affect L some years later."¹³⁴ She noted Namier's relief upon hearing the news that his family was safe. He immediately wrote to Headlam-Morley to thank him for helping to find his family: "My best wishes to you and Kisch for the trouble you have taken. My family were all found at Koszylowce. Only our manager was killed. Details I hope to get by [diplomatic] bag."¹³⁵

According to Julia Namier, throughout the crisis her husband refused to allow his personal feelings to affect his promotion of the Ukrainian cause: "Before L knew his family had survived, he was already veering away from the personal tragedy and, far from inveighing against the Ukrainians[,], was praising them for having maintained order so long."¹³⁶ After this comment, she encloses a short essay written by Namier at the time. It is the clearest explanation of his behaviour during and after the attack on his family's estate.

For all my personal loss and anxieties[,], I do insist that grievous wrong has been done to the Ukrainians. Left in peace to establish a strongly radical but decent government, they might well have organized themselves. Driven to despair, insidiously pushed daily toward bolshevism and into committing atrocious crimes, they know—and we shall see—that a Polish military occupation, as foreshadowed in the Foreign Ministers' decision of 25 June, means disaster without end. And I insist that no number of atrocities[,], however horrible[,], can deprive a nation of its right to independence, nor justify its being put under the heel of its worst enemies and persecutors. If the horrifying excesses reported by the Poles are true, they only prove the intensity of the Ukrainians' detestation of them. The instigators, the Poles, will now retaliate in kind with Allied open support. Where can such folly lead?¹³⁷

Namier concluded that the only "workable" solution in Eastern Galicia and the one he had been advocating for months was to appoint a League of Nations high

133. Ibid., file 102247, fol. 114763.

134. Namier, *Lewis Namier*, 143.

135. Letter quoted in *ibid.*, 143.

136. Ibid., 144.

137. Ibid., 144.

commissioner to supervise the running of an autonomous, neutral Eastern Galicia.¹³⁸

Namier's statements were borne out in his subsequent actions. In fact, as the Polish-Ukrainian conflict continued he became more and more convinced that the Poles were not playing "fair" and were just plain wrong. His comments to the various memoranda on the Polish question became increasingly anti-Polish in nature. When Polish troops captured Lida in the summer of 1919, the Polish government sent a "*note verbale*" defending their actions in that city and denying accusations that Polish troops had committed atrocities there. Namier's response was curt, simple, and probably very effective: "The Germans gave exactly the same excuses for their atrocities in Belgium."¹³⁹

Namier also responded to a report by Wyndham on the Peasant Congress held in Poland in late June 1919. The main goal of the congress was to put pressure on the Sejm to settle the issue of land reform. But Wyndham's report questioned the liberal appearance of some of the congress's resolutions. Resolution four argued that Eastern Galicia, "having belonged to Poland for centuries," had to remain part of Poland, but it allowed that the Ukrainian population in Eastern Galicia should receive "complete autonomy." Resolution seven gave an indication of how the Polish peasant parties thought national-minority rights would be addressed in a renewed Poland: "In view of the fact that national minorities and creeds [shall] enjoy equal rights and equal security in Poland, the Congress opposes all restrictions and clauses for the protection of these minorities and creeds in Poland, as constituting a violation of the sovereignty of Poland and an interference of foreign factors in the internal affairs." Wyndham pointed out that the congress was attended by a number of delegates from territories whose "ownership" had not yet been decided, and he suggested that the resolutions passed on these areas (i.e., Eastern Galicia) indicated "a marked imperialistic tendency in the peasant parties."¹⁴⁰

Interestingly, when Namier was asked to comment on the congress report, and particularly on resolution seven, he limited his comments to a perceptive analysis of the character of the Polish peasant parties, ignoring (or perhaps explaining) Wyndham's suggestion of their imperialistic tendencies.

The rank and file not merely of the party, but even of their representatives in Parliament [the Sejm], do not concern themselves much about foreign politics and usually vote just as told by a few wire-pullers from the "half-intelligentsia" (elementary school-teachers, village priests etc.). The only question which they really care about is agrarian reform, and in that matter even the moderate peasants,

138. Ibid., 144.

139. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3923, file 99129, fol. 99129. Namier's comment is dated 8 July 1919.

140. Ibid., file 99130, fol. 99130.

are utterly uncompromising. When Archbishop Józef Teodorowicz spoke in defence of the land owned by the Church[,] he was continually interrupted by the peasants[,] of whom one even told him that the Church will be much better off if “relieved” of worldly cares.¹⁴¹

Namier’s reaction to Wyndham’s translation of a report from the Sejm’s Agrarian Commission was quite different. He argued that the Sejm did not have the capacity to carry out the reforms suggested by the commission and that something would be forced on the Sejm in the fall, when the question would arise of “who is to work the land for next year?”¹⁴² More importantly, he commented at length on the implications of the report for the “eastern borderlands.” Namier questioned the Sejm’s presumption in legislating for these “borderlands” (Belarus, Volhynia, and Eastern Galicia) before they had been placed under its jurisdiction. He argued that the Polish minister of agriculture, Stanisław Janicki, had explicitly annexed these territories by including them in his reforms, and that the reforms allowed larger estates to be exempted from expropriation in those areas than in Poland proper. The maximum size of estates in the “borderlands” was to be a thousand acres instead of 440 acres, and this differentiation would in fact turn those non-Polish areas into colonies:

It was openly admitted by those who demanded such differentiation that they did so because there [in the “borderlands”] the big landowners are Poles[,] but the peasantry “aliens.” M. Janicki himself referred to them in those terms—not even the Prussians have ever called the Poles in Posnania “aliens,” though the Germans form a very much higher percentage in Posnania than the Poles [do] in Volhynia or East-Galicia.... The Agrarian Reform Bill[,] if carried through by Polish officials in non-Polish lands[,] will undoubtedly to some extent be changed into a Prussian Colonisation Act.¹⁴³

On 15 July 1919, just eleven days after Namier had heard about the raid, he commented on a memorandum describing an interview with Count Aleksander Skrzyński, the Polish acting minister of foreign affairs, on Polish-Romanian relations. Skrzyński claimed that the Poles and the Romanians shared the desire to include in their states territories occupied predominantly by Ukrainians and

141. Ibid. Namier’s comment is dated 8 July 1919.

142. Ibid., fol. 103494. The report is dated 11 July 1919.

143. Ibid. Namier’s comments were signed on 21 July 1919. In another report from Wyndham, dated 11 July 1919, Namier noted that “on July 10th the question of the maximum amount of property to be held by one owner was fixed at one hundred eighty hectares—four hundred and forty (440) acres—in special cases and as a temporary measure the maximum size of properties in the former German provinces and in the eastern provinces is fixed at four hundred hectares or about one thousand (1,000) acres. The majority in favour of this arrangement was one (1) vote: The figures being one hundred and eighty three (183) to one hundred eighty two (182).”

Jews. Recent Polish-Romanian talks had centred around the possibility of establishing a common border between Poland and Romania, thus eliminating the possibility of an autonomous Eastern Galicia. Skrzyński argued that “if Poland and Romania were not to have a point of junction[,] there could be no real cohesion between the two countries, and it would be quite fatal if they were divided by a wedge of Bolshevik Ukania.” He further argued that all Ukrainians represented some form of Bolshevism, that “Ukania” was a German creation, and that it could never endure as an independent state. When questioned on the Poles’ recent anti-Semitic attacks, Skrzyński retorted that they were a response to Jewish Bolsheviks “taking part in the hideous atrocities perpetrated on the Poles.”¹⁴⁴

Namier wondered whether Skrzyński could name the locations where “Jewish Bolsheviks” had attacked Polish manor houses. Perhaps with his recent personal tragedy in mind, he then noted that “there have been attacks delivered against them [the Jews] by the Ukrainian peasantry which[,] however[,] would hurt Jews even worse than it hurts the Polish landlords. But Count Skrzyński seems to think that any story will do.”¹⁴⁵ Namier defended the Jews and questioned the Poles’ police methods and their own Bolshevik tendencies: “As to Jews and Bolsheviks in Poland[,] it is interesting to note that from among 341 Bolshevik agitators registered by the Polish police between January 1st & May 2, 1919, only 159 were Jews, altho’ the Polish police notoriously attacks and arrests even innocent Jews as ‘Bolsheviks’. Anyhow[,] the Poles who on their statements would seem to have nothing ever to do with Bolshevism, on the findings of their own police display quite a lively interest in that Jewish movement.”¹⁴⁶

As before the attack on his family’s estate, Namier did not limit his comments to the Polish oppression of Jews and Ukrainians. On 21 July 1919 the Foreign Office received a protest from Lemkos strongly objecting to the continued Polish occupation of their territory. Namier was quick to suggest that the Poles were not fit to rule there either: “The Lems are all Russophil[,] not “Ukrainian” Ruthenes, & they complain of Polish oppression no less than the Ukrainian separatists. This finally disproves—if any disapproval were needed—the Polish contention that the pro-Russian Ruthenes welcome Polish dominion.”¹⁴⁷

Namier’s concern for the plight of his own ethnic group in Eastern Galicia was also exemplified in a comment he made on one of Maj. Paris’s reports on Polish-Jewish relations. Namier first remarked on the anti-Semitic prejudices

144. *Ibid.*, file 102492, fol. 10249.

145. *Ibid.* Namier’s comment is dated 15 July 1919. The memorandum is dated 7 July 1919.

146. *Ibid.*

147. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3924, fol. 106520. Namier’s comment is dated 25 July 1919.

present in Paris's reports. "Major Paris' evidence—for what it is worth—is, as usual, initiated by his incurable levity as regards the cutting of beards."¹⁴⁸ More importantly, Namier made clear once again how much the Jews detested Polish rule: "Major Paris states that 'a number of Jews' welcomed the Bolsheviks[,] who looted 'the Poles and not the Jews'. As neither the Ukrainians nor the Bolsheviks put such indignities on the Jews and ill-treat them or oppress them as the Poles do, it is but natural that the Jews should welcome them—in fact the Jews would welcome the Martians if these merely freed them from Polish insults and oppression."¹⁴⁹ Namier concluded that Paris seemed incapable of distinguishing between asking for protection and asking to be left alone: "The Jews do not ask the Poles to protect them against anybody[,] but merely demand to be left in peace by the Poles, especially where they inhabit clearly non-Polish territory."¹⁵⁰

On 10 September 1919 Namier provided a critique of the Allies' proposed constitution for that territory. He recommended that the Galician Diet should be given control over agrarian reform and compulsory military service.¹⁵¹ But his main concern reflected his continued support for placing Eastern Galicia under the control of the League of Nations: "The fundamental mistake of the treaty is that we should never have departed from the principle (originally proposed by our delegation) of East-Galicia as a self-governing state under the League of Nations." One further comment suggests Namier's continued adherence to the settlement of the Ukrainians' claim on an ethnographic basis: "Once East-Galicia is handed over to the Poles[,] we might at least abstain from nibbling at it and let the Ukrainians have their fair ethnic frontier."¹⁵²

Namier's critique of the constitutional proposal was very intense and negative. This suggests that he was becoming quite disillusioned, as does the absence of his comments from some important memoranda that came through the Foreign Office in the fall of 1919. He did not comment on Headlam-Morley's memo on supplying Poland with food, raw materials, rolling stock, and advice "which are so essential for Poland at present." Similarly, in October 1919 Namier made no

148. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3907, file 28011, fol. 109220. Paris's report is dated 23 July 1919.

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid.

151. Namier exposed the Poles' attempt to conscript Eastern Galicians in September 1919 in a *Morning Post* article. He wondered how the Poles could conscript all the officers and doctors in "Galicia" when their jurisdiction over the eastern part had not been decided yet. See P.R.O./F.O. 371/3908, file 28011, fol. 142450. Namier's memo is dated 25 September 1919.

152. Ibid., fol. 122897.

comment on an extensive discussion of Poland's bid to annex Eastern Galicia.¹⁵³

Namier rallied in November 1919, however, when the Foreign Office received a number of petitions from Eastern Galician towns that appeared to be calling for their annexation by Poland. These petitions may have been particularly disturbing to Namier, because he had always advocated the right to self-determination. But Namier did not relinquish his position. Instead, he analyzed the location and composition of the towns that called for annexation and denounced them, one after another, as not representative of the majority. On a petition from the "Polish Majority of the Town of Wielkie Oczy," Namier commented that "Wielkie Oczy [Velyki Ochi] is a small town in the district Jaworów [Iavoriv,] & its population consisted in 1900 of 862 Jews (44%), 803 Roman Catholics (41%) & 371 Greek Catholics (15%). In other words[,] there was no Polish majority unless the Jews, invariably described by the Poles as 'internal enemies', have suddenly, under the influence of pogroms, changed into Poles." Namier noted that the claim by the Poles of the town of Turka that they had the concurrence of the local Ukrainians had "yet to be proved," adding that "Cracow has no more right to settle the future of East-Galicia than Venice to settle that of the Yugo-Slav coast."¹⁵⁴ Namier declared an appeal from "the population of Zaleszczyki" (Zalishchyky) as truly coming from only "'the Polish population of Zaleszczyki'[,], of which there is hardly any. I happen to know the town[,] having lived in its neighbourhood several years."¹⁵⁵ According to Namier, most of the petitions that the Foreign Office received from eastern Galician towns were actually only from their Polish inhabitants or from municipal officials, who were, of course, Polish during the Polish occupation.

An indication of how Namier's refutations of these petitions were taken at the Foreign Office and the peace conference is suggested by the response to his dismissal of a petition from the people of Borshchiv district. Edwyn R. Bevan, Namier's close friend and colleague, disputed Namier's rejection of this petition. But Namier made a good case that throughout the whole area the Poles had bribed the citizens with bread: "Complaints about the [same] Polish methods in White Russia have been extremely numerous, and the more impartial organs of the Polish press admitted them to be well-founded." Headlam-Morley wrote that he thought that "Mr. Namier makes out a good case."¹⁵⁶

153. *Ibid.*, fol. 140681. This latter memorandum is dated 13 October 1919.

154. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3908, file 28011, fol. 150013. Namier's comments are dated 13 November 1919. The Velyki Ochi and Turka petitions are in *ibid.*, fol. 150012.

155. *Ibid.*, fol. 151959. The memorandum is dated 10 November 1919. For other petitions and similar refutations by Namier, see *ibid.*, fols. 151960 and 156767.

156. *Ibid.*, fol. 150014. Namier's refutation and Headlam-Morley's comment are both dated 25 November 1919. Bevan was one of the witnesses at Namier's first marriage, on

Yet, for the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia and for Namier the final result of their struggle was failure. On 10 November 1919 British resistance to ceding Eastern Galicia to Poland folded. Sir Eyre Crowe, the British assistant-undersecretary of state at the peace conference, who had been an ardent supporter of the Ukrainians' claims, conceded his position and agreed to the Polish administration of Eastern Galicia under a twenty-five-year mandate. Crowe's agreement was little more than a complete renunciation of the British position. He telegraphed the Foreign Office with the decision: "In accordance with [the] Covenant of [the] League of Nations and in conditions laid down in the present Treaty, Poland accepts [the] mandatory [mandate] to organize and administer Eastern Galicia[,] which will constitute an autonomous territory within boundaries fixed by Article 1. This mandatory is conferred on her for a period of 25 years[,] at expiration of which [the] Council of the League of Nations will have full power to maintain [a] revision or change the status defined by [the] present Treaty."¹⁵⁷ The final phrasing was eventually changed. Ukrainian and Polish objection to the 25-year mandate led the Entente, under great pressure from Prime Minister Clemenceau, to suspend a final decision on the twenty-five-year limit and to allow the matter to become one "for reconsideration later on."¹⁵⁸

The final decision was a grave disappointment to Namier. He expressed his frustration by pointing out the lack of knowledge revealed in the treaty itself: "Articles 5 & 18 speak of the 'Orthodox Greek Catholic Church'; one might just as well speak of the 'Lutheran Roman Catholic Church'. And unfortunately this is only the most palpable, not the most serious, mistake in the detailed provisions of the Treaty."¹⁵⁹

6 January 1917; see Namier, *Lewis Namier*, 132.

157. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3908, file 28011, fol. 150583. The telegram is dated 10 November 1919. For the full text of the treaty in Ukrainian translation, see Lozynsky, *Halychyna v rr. 1918–1920*, 155–60.

158. P.R.O./F.O. 371/3908, file 28011, fol. 161341. Evidence that the Allies ceded Eastern Galicia to Poland as a result of their fear of the Bolshevik threat can be found in fol. 158872. In that document, Sir Horace G. Rumbold reports on a conversation in which Paderewski had argued that the Polish troops fighting the Bolshevik forces in Eastern Galicia would be demoralized if they learned that they might possibly have to give up that territory in twenty-five years. This statement by the Polish premier prompted Lloyd George to try to keep the decision quiet. "[The] Prime Minister has requested that [the] publication of [the] Supreme Council's decisions regarding [Eastern Galicia] should be delayed for a few months in view of Denikin's reverses." It appears, however, that the decision was made public on 4 December 1919. Namier made no comment on fol. 158872.

159. *Ibid.*, fol. 158202. Namier's comment is attached to the final draft and is dated 9 December 1919.

Of course, the Great Powers' decision did not solve the question of Eastern Galicia. Both the Poles and the Ukrainians disagreed with the decision, and in January Namier was still making the most of incoming dispatches in an effort to discredit Polish rule in Eastern Galicia: "Sir H. Rumbold doubts whether 'the Ruthenian population is really fit for autonomy', but from Sir R[eginald] Tower's despatches it seems certain that the Poles are not fit to govern any foreign nation. He does not hesitate to say so pretty clearly with regard to Danzig in his despatch to the Ambassador Conference."¹⁶⁰ Namier's protests were to no avail. The Ukrainians and Jews of Eastern Galicia spent the interwar period as part of a newly reunified Poland.¹⁶¹

Along with many of his academic colleagues and with other European intellectuals, Namier considered the Allies' final settlement in east-central Europe "to be worse than a confined disaster. An outrage of world-wide significance, it had been blindly engineered."¹⁶² None of the important statesmen involved in the peace conference had risen to the task, and the world had thereby missed the opportunity for a lasting peace. And yet, it was the denial of "adult status" to a nation that Namier believed had reached maturity that he took most personally:

After the stupidest rapacities had neatly cut through many baffling complications, the rapacious had won. The general refusal to recognize men's pleasure in crushing other men, had defeated him. Adult status had been refused to an ethnic group he deemed worthy of it. A helpless bystander, he had been forced to observe a new tribal chaos obliterate the waking national dignity of a very old ethnic group; and he had seen its well-wishers turn away in disillusion or disgust. To L[ewis]'s already bitter sense of corporate guilt was added the dismay of personal failure.¹⁶³

On 1 May 1920 Lewis Namier returned to private life at Balliol College, Oxford, and embarked on his path-breaking study of the structure of politics in eighteenth-century Hanoverian England.

160. Ibid., fol. 186542. Namier's note is dated 1 April 1920. Tower's dispatch is dated 17 March 1920 and is in *ibid.*, fol. 187854.

161. On the oppression of Galicia's Ukrainians in interwar Poland, see John-Paul Himka, "Western Ukraine between the Wars," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 34, no. 4 (December 1992): 398–403. On the oppression of the Jews, see Gorovskiy, *Evrei Ukrainy*, 106–14.

162. Namier, *Lewis Namier*, 151.

163. Ibid., 151. On the maturity as a nation that the Ukrainians of Galicia had achieved by the end of the nineteenth century, see Himka, *Galician Villagers*.

Nationhood and Its Discontents: Ukrainian Intellectual History at Empire's End. A Review Article

David McDonald

Ralph Lindheim and George S. N. Luckyj, eds. *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine: An Anthology of Ukrainian Thought from 1710 to 1995*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996. xii, 420 pp. \$24.95 paper, \$65.00 cloth.

Was ever a nation imagined so fervently as Ukraine? The question arises repeatedly and inescapably while reading this important new anthology. This collection presents to English readers for the first time a rich trove of excerpted sources too little known to scholars in Russian, European, and intellectual history. These documents cover an impressive chronological range and reflect the broad variety of perspectives in Ukrainian thought. Chronologically the anthology spans the "Bendery constitution" of 1710, the canonical works of mid-nineteenth-century Ukrainian thought, and the exceptionally diverse writings of the twentieth century, ending with the flux that characterizes post-Soviet Ukraine. In it readers will find an accurate reflection of the breadth of Ukrainian thought, in a spectrum embracing the apolitical views of Hryhorii Skovoroda, the liberalism of Mykola Kostomarov or Bohdan Kistiakovsky, the pragmatism espoused by Mykhailo Hrushevsky in his all-too-brief stint as a national leader, the integral nationalism of Dmytro Dontsov, and the pseudo-national thought of apologists for Soviet Ukraine. Above all, these documents attest to the dogged determination of generations of thinkers to foster the survival of a stateless nation, indeed to defend the very fact of the nation's existence.

This struggle unfolded not only within Ukraine, against the hegemons in St. Petersburg and Moscow, but also outside its historic borders in an emigration that nurtured the flame of nationality. First settled in the rump of the Hetmanate

under Polish and later Habsburg rule, the Ukrainian diaspora later spread throughout the world, including, most notably, the Canada in which this compendium was published. The vitality of Ukrainian culture and national longing in these far-flung sites of exile offers yet further witness to the power of the imagination in sustaining nationhood.

The editors of the volume—Ralph Lindheim and George S. N. Luckyj, a leading scholar in the field—merit especial praise for their attentiveness in selecting mutually connected sources. They reproduce those great debates within the Ukrainian intelligentsia, including integral nationalists and advocates of federation with Russia alike. A lucid and comprehensive introductory essay rehearses the history and thematics of Ukrainian thought. Finally, the editors supplement their introduction with a helpful apparatus that includes introductory notes on each document and explanatory footnotes identifying figures not necessarily known to much of their readership.

Although at the outset of their introduction the editors modestly label their work as “a supplement to any study of Ukrainian history” (p. 3), they conclude by hoping that their compilation will contribute to the ongoing debates over the nation’s fate in the new state and the emigration. As they state hopefully, “[i]t is out of a re-evaluation of the past and the needs of the present that a new Ukrainian identity will gradually arise” (p. 50). Taking up the challenge levied by the editors, the following essay suggests that, given current events, the documents in this collection oblige historians to abandon the heroic narrative that has long dominated Ukrainian historiography. That story ought to give way to alternatives that take into account the national struggle for survival while divesting it of its intrinsic eschatology—that is, by introducing an element of contingency in the development of Ukrainian thought that wrests the focus of historians from the fact of the nation’s survival to understanding the forms in which contending views of nation- and statehood survived. To state the problem somewhat differently, rather than demonstrating how the Ukrainian nation fulfilled its historic mandate despite the obstacles of Russian subjection, one might equally ask how Ukrainian intellectuals came to understand themselves as members of a nation-in-becoming and how they came to place their hopes in the creation of a single-nation state. Given the nature of the Russian and Soviet empires, and the fact that other nations have either stopped short of demanding statehood or have entered multi-ethnic states, there was nothing inevitable about the Ukrainian case. Ukraine’s current divisions only underscore this point and suggest the co-existence of several “national” traditions.

To this end, the following discussion concentrates on four themes that recur with notable frequency throughout the documents in the anthology: the problem of nationality as “constructed”; the contexts that have shaped Ukrainian intellectual history; the constitution of the “other”—almost always the *moskali*—and its role in the development of Ukrainian thought; and finally, the vexing

relationship among ethnicity, nationality, and "statehood" (*derzhavnist*) that continues to preoccupy Ukrainian thinkers and leaders to the present day.

The introduction to this volume presents a highly persuasive version of the familiar Ukrainian historical narrative. It traces the career of the Ukrainian nation from its delivery into bondage under Peter the Great, through the rearguard defence of its autonomy by eighteenth-century Cossack-descended gentry, on to the rebirth of national consciousness in the mid-nineteenth century and its subsequent development to the present day. Over the last century the aspiration to nation-statehood emerged ever more clearly in debates among Ukrainian intellectuals, culminating in the creation of the short-lived Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) from the rubble of the Romanov empire. The early 1920s saw a second theft of statehood, perpetrated by a Soviet government that compounded the crime by erecting a sham Ukrainian SSR. Thereafter the national dream developed in two Ukraines—one in the dissident underground and Gulag of the Soviet Union, the other in the diaspora. Finally, in the 1990s, a Ukrainian republic took its rightful place as an independent state, although in a multinational form that has given rise to yet further debate among intellectuals over Ukraine's ultimate destiny.

The documents in this collection chronicle the various stages in this process and chart the growth of a historical memory and national tradition among the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Taras Shevchenko's and Panteleimon Kulish's reflections on Ukrainian culture soon give way to more contentious literature, including Borys Hrinchenko's critique of Kulish and Ivan Franko's indictment of Mykhailo Drahomanov. In 1917 Hrushevsky could legitimate the new, federated Ukrainian state by referring to a pantheon of "Ukraine's leading sons, Shevchenko, Kostomarov, Kulish, Hulak, Bilozersky, and others" (p. 230). Yet, as the editors themselves suggest, the emergence of this tradition traced a "winding and uneven path" extending from Bendery to the present. In this telling, the existence of this tradition argues for the existence of—to use the current parlance—a primordial Ukrainian nation whose development responded to the intrinsic imperatives of its nationhood, despite the manifold attempts by Russians and Soviets to extirpate it, ranging from the abolition of the Hetmanate in 1775 through the Ems ukase to the horrors of collectivization and Sovietization.

This narrative has enjoyed a long life, and understandably so when one recalls that scholars of Ukrainian culture have assumed a double task: they have engaged in scholarly work *per se* while seeking to distill and preserve the distinctive attributes of Ukrainianness. One gains a sense of this double devotion when Luckyj quotes an assessment he wrote in 1971 noting Shevchenko's joint callings as prophet and poet: "The secret of Shevchenko's appeal to the Ukrainian reader was and still is because his message remains unfulfilled. The great test of his poetry will come when Ukraine becomes a sovereign nation" (p. 15).

Yet, now that Shevchenko's "day of truth" has dawned, many of the materials gathered in this anthology speak differently than they did during the height of the Soviet or the Romanov raj. For the Ukraine that has finally emerged is not the nation-state envisioned by many of its prophets. Contrary to the finality promised by the eschatological national vision, Ukraine's separation from the Russian empire was not a clean break. In free Ukraine, Russians and other ethnic minorities continue to play a role in determining official policy. More tragically, former allies in the national cause, from the churchyards of Galicia to the floor of the national parliament, clash over claims to Ukrainian-ness, also pitting the emigration against those who remained at home. Ukrainians also face the more mundane challenges of recasting the old command economy while depending on elites inherited from the old *nomenklatura*. Externally Ukraine stands in the no-man's-land dividing the Europe recognized by NATO and the European Union from those areas whose contiguity with the Russian Federation renders them especially sensitive in the evolving politics of the post-Cold War security order.

This disparity between the desiderata and the emergent facts of nationhood marks out the space in which the Ukrainian nation was imagined, for much of the material in the anthology suggests with stunning directness that the Ukrainian nation was "imagined" or "constructed" by successive generations of intellectuals. The published extracts confirm repeatedly that Ukrainian intellectuals saw themselves as engaged in imagining and bringing to concrete existence a Ukrainian nation. One finds this sort of invention in such works as the anonymous and apocryphal *Istoriia Rusov* (pp. 82–87) or Kostomarov's famous *Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People* (pp. 94–100) alongside Shevchenko's and Kulish's writings, which brought Ukrainian folk culture to literary life.

By the twentieth century, thinkers contended explicitly that they were imagining or constructing the nation. In 1926 V'iacheslav Lypynsky could write that the nation "exists only in the imagination of writers.... The Ukrainian nation is not outside us, but in us. It is being built all the time by the creative work of each of us" (p. 253). In the same year, Dmytro Dontsov noted "Ukraine does not yet exist, but we can create it in our souls" (p. 263). Most tellingly, the great jurist and commentator Bohdan Kistiakovsky attacked his erstwhile friend and collaborator Petr Struve for derogating Ukrainian culture as created or manufactured: "Allow me, however, to note in answer that in our age of machine manufacturing not only material culture, but every kind of spiritual culture is 'consciously' created. 'Russian' culture too is 'consciously created,' especially under the strong influence of the Russian autocratic and bureaucratic government. You yourself, with all your good and bad sides, are the best proof of this" (p. 220).

To refer to the constructing of Ukrainian nationality, however, is not to accept uncritically the recent scholarly literature—most notably those works inspired by Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm—that claims to have revolutionized the study of nationalism. Documents such as Kostomarov's or the *Istoriia Rusov*, both dating to pre-industrial times, gainsay the ironclad causal nexus linking nationalism to modernity that forms the linchpin of these arguments. Likewise, the Bendery constitution, with its repeated allusions to the *Rossiacae* people and its use of the *pacta conventa* form, suggests that the conceptual underpinnings of nationhood extend far into the past of those groups that came to form nation-states. More seriously, the Bendery tract in particular suggests that nations are not "imagined" out of nothing—the writers' identification of the *Rossiacae* and their use of the Hetmanate's history indicate incontrovertibly the existence of something that contemporary Polish and Hungarian nobles would have called a "nation."

Yet, to question the claims of Anderson or Hobsbawm is not to suggest that nationhood as a constructed category has no merit as an explanation for the development of Ukrainian national thought. After all, the Bendery constitution sought to reform a state that no longer existed: the Mazepist composers of the constitution took refuge abroad, becoming only the first of many generations that preserved Ukrainianness divorced from much of Ukrainian soil. Those who remained entered internal exile, in which their aspirations were dismissed by Russians and others, or were persecuted by the tsarist state. These forces compelled thinkers to ideate the Ukrainian nation without access to the tools of public expression and debate available to nationalists and patriots elsewhere. Those who even dared to defend the distinctness of the Ukrainian language by defining and using it—like Shevchenko, the members of Hromada, or the dissidents of the Soviet era—were forbidden by state power to do so, on pain of imprisonment or physical sanction. Is it any wonder that the Ukrainian intelligentsia had to imagine their nation or that its members fought so fiercely among themselves over its composition and its destiny?

From this point of view, one of the anthology's most valuable contributions is that it demonstrates the diaspora's role in sustaining and cultivating Ukrainian thought. The final third of this volume contains abundant materials from this émigré Ukraine, including the writings of Petro Poltava (pp. 297–302), Ievhen Malaniuk (pp. 316–29), and Lypynsky to documents from the OUN (pp. 291–94) and the Ukrainian National Council (pp. 295–96). This volume itself constitutes an artifact of the diaspora contribution to Ukrainian identity, added to the entire corpus of Ukrainian scholarship that has poured out of Western universities and émigré publishing houses.

If the texts in the anthology open new perspectives on the sources of the Ukrainian nation's construction, they also raise questions about the contexts that influenced and shaped Ukrainian thinkers' views of the problems of nationhood

and statehood. These issues stand at the centre of the task of writing an intellectual history of Ukraine, for the emergence of Ukrainian consciousness in the mid-nineteenth century demands the sort of close attention commanded, for example, by the "move" from Hegel to Marx in Western intellectual history. Yet, in the case of Ukraine—or other nations in imperial eastern Europe—the inherent teleology in which national consciousness and the heroic narrative participate tends to collapse, or render opaque, processes and influences whose interplay was extremely complex and equally contingent, responding to political circumstance, historical possibility (e.g., German and Italian unification or the Balkan independence movements), and even personal relationships among thinkers themselves.

Following common practice, the editors note the importance of Herder and Romantic philosophy in the original "awakening" of the nineteenth century (p. 9). Yet, the Herderian view of nationhood formed only part of the rich complex of anthropological, historical, and ethical thought that came together in those powerful arguments for the necessity of Ukrainian self-determination. As unwilling subjects in the Russian empire, Ukrainian intellectuals and Ukrainophiles read, along with their Russian-speaking contemporaries, such thinkers as Schelling and Hegel, who took Herder's vision and tied it to categories of consciousness, law-governed historical development, and the association of self-determination and freedom. Later, Buckle, Spencer, Darwin, Nietzsche, and others gave historical and ethical content to the romantic form of Herder's philosophy. In the 1890s Borys Hrinchenko used all of these categories in stating that "a nation has its rights ... no one can take them away ... should anyone try to take away its rights, the rights of a nation, a conscious Ukrainian will protest..." (p. 189). If young nationalists learned of the importance of nations as an existential category, it was only through these later thinkers that they learned to see self-determination as an imperative.

Moreover, the arguments of a Herder, a Hegel, or a Nietzsche gained credence less from their meaning than from their ability to explain or critique the circumstances confronting individual thinkers. To this extent the imperial environment provided its own context, beyond the mere fact of repressing Ukrainian culture and identity. Part of this context came from Russian intellectuals who often questioned the distinctness or nationality of Little Russian culture, such as Vissarion Belinsky or Petr Struve. In a vastly different way, the cases of Theofan Prokopovych, Maksym Kovalevsky, or even Kistiakovsky demonstrate that many Ukrainians saw the Russian empire as a legitimate basis for their identity and professional activity. However opportunistic this choice may appear to present commentators (p. 6), thousands of Ukrainians apprehended it as legitimate. The very existence of this choice and its exercise must also be counted as contextual elements in the framing of Ukrainian identity over the last

three centuries; it also illustrates one more dimension of the contingent nature of the process from which that national identity emerged.

The empire shaped Ukrainian thought in other ways as well. Russian repression was governed by its own rhythms—it was not always uniform. Just as among young Russians, the Great Reforms and the retreat from Nicolaevan obscurantism had a leavening effect on Ukrainian thought, giving rise not only to Kostomarov's theories of federalism (so consonant with those of Afanasii Shchapov and others), but also to Kulish's attempts to reconcile Ukraine's distinctness with the fact of the imperial order. Populism, both Russian and Ukrainian, also arose at the end of this hopeful period.

The frank obscurantism of Alexander III's reign drastically modified expectations for the achievement of national goals. If intellectuals of the reform period saw themselves as the harbingers of a national consciousness that would take its place in a post-autocratic federation, such as the one sought by Mykhailo Drahomanov (pp. 171–83), new and more distressing possibilities became visible with the increasingly vigorous reassertion of autocratic fiat. Russification drove many to embrace separation from Russia as the only hope for Ukrainian nationality. Other observers, however, took a much darker view. Oleksander Potebnia, for instance, contemplated the possibility of national extinction or “denationalization” (pp. 167–70), while Ivan Nechui-Levytsky found in the new conditions an almost Manichean definition of the evil embodied by imperial Russia (pp. 184–87). Arguably—excepting possibly such figures as Hrushevsky—the heightened tension between aspiration and reality stemming from Russification helps explain not just the increasing militancy of Ukrainian thought, but the increasing attraction exerted on Ukrainian thinkers by such anti-modern figures as Nietzsche and Charles Maurras.

With its avid repression of Ukrainian language and culture after the Ems decree, the Russian imperial state also fostered yet another underexamined circumstance that played a role in the elaboration of identity among Ukrainian *intelligentsy*. Deprived, outside of Galicia, of a “public sphere,” Ukrainian intellectuals developed their ideas on the margins of public life—underground, or through the medium of Aesopian language, or amid the non-national surroundings of the emigration. This fact imparted a hothouse quality to much of these thinkers' writings, as was the case with all dissent throughout the empire. Questions of territory or inter-ethnic co-operation in a future state went undiscussed because such discussion was impossible; instead, debate revolved around the antinomies of Ukrainian and Russian identities. The lack of public interchange—and the reasons for that absence—precluded the sort of consensus-building that is still largely absent in the national politics of modern-day Ukraine; the same suppression of discussion lent an intensely moral dimension to underground discussion that also persists to the present day, further polarizing debate. In these conditions, one gains new perspective on the attraction of

Nietzsche, but also on the growing emphasis on ethnicity as a marker of national distinction.

In this collection one sees very clearly during the period of the late imperial reaction the crystallization of perhaps the dominant motif in Ukrainian thought—the Russian “other.” The *moskali* pervaded the thoughts and dreams set forth on these pages. The Bendery constitution rehearsed the cruel deceptions dating to the mid-seventeenth-century “union” of Pereiaslav and the chronic conflicts over prerogatives that pitted the Hetmanate against Muscovy (pp. 54–55); Belinsky embodied for many the arrogance of Russian intellectuals. But in the writings of the late imperial period—by Nechui-Levytsky, Hrinchenko, Mykola Mikhnovsky, and others—Russia became the earthly face of evil, accompanied by an equally essentialist view of Ukraine and its historical destiny. In ethno-historical terms, the Russian state and Russians became mutually indistinguishable to such thinkers as Hrinchenko or, later, Lypynsky, Dontsov, and Soviet-era dissidents. The Soviet state tried to co-opt this sense of ethnicity in creating its own fairy tale of the brotherhood of nations, as set out in 1954 in the Communist Party’s Theses on the Tercentenary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav (pp. 303–16). These discussions and the evolving Ukrainian intellectual views of the *katsapy* merit investigation because of their central role in shaping the aspirations of those who assumed leading parts in the Ukrainian Central Rada, the emigration, and even the Soviet Ukrainian state.

The Russian fact in Ukrainian history has tended to veil other problematic relationships confronting the Ukrainian intelligentsia, most notably that tying them to the *narod* within the nation. On one hand, the very existence of an identifiable Ukrainian people—attested through the collections of anthropological and historical materials that began in the mid-nineteenth century—vindicated their own claims to the existence of a Ukrainian nation. In this scenario, intellectuals became the consciousness of the future nation, whose substance would come from a properly conscious people. The same facts served to promise the future success of the Ukrainian nation: the spread of consciousness among the *narod* in time would inevitably—according to the historical philosophy embraced by intellectuals—lead to the nation’s appearance and the end of foreign domination. This idealization of the *narod*, however, endured only so long as intellectuals shared their oppression. The achievement of independence—whether during the UNR period or at present—too often confronted *intelligenty* with deeper-lying conflicts over leadership and goals that separated them from their co-nationals. These conflicts drew in their train the problem of “statehood.”

As Lindheim and Luckyj note in their introduction, the theme of statehood became dominant among Ukrainian thinkers by the early twentieth century. With few exceptions, scholars have paid scant attention to this highly important theme. Yet statehood—the attributes of the state that is to house the nation and the relationship between these two complementary categories—brings into play the

interconnections binding ethnicity, nationhood, self-determination, and the sources of sovereignty. The problem of statehood is all the more compelling today, given the contrast between Ukraine as it exists and as it was conceived by generations of Ukrainian intellectuals.

Well into the 1880s, proponents of the Ukrainian nation sought its political resurrection as a unit within a federal state that was to supplant the Russian empire. This federal program was set forth most clearly in Drahomanov's "Draft Constitution for the Ukrainian Society in the Free Union." By the early 1890s, however, Ukrainian intellectuals began considering statehood as a necessary condition of national existence. Hrinchenko broached the problem in 1892–93 by contrasting the historic "Kyivan" statehood perpetuated by the Hetmanate before its destruction by predatory "Muscovite" statehood (p. 190). Arguing that the Hetmanate had been liquidated illegally, Mykola Mikhnovsky called in 1900 for its resurrection as an "Independent Ukraine" (pp. 200–15).

This focus on statehood sprang from many causes. Certainly, other intellectuals within the empire addressed it. The relationship between nation, people, and state re-emerged as a dominant concern among Polish intellectuals in the late 1880s, after the long period of quiet following the abortive 1863 revolution. Russian intellectuals, from Konstantin Leontev to Pavel Miliukov, began discussing statehood and nationhood at the same time. In retrospect one can see that this interest arose at a time when the autocracy proved increasingly unable to uphold its pretensions to omnipotence, as witnessed by its inability to respond effectively to the famine and epidemics of the early 1890s. Russification and the counter-reforms likewise spurred more active resistance than previously from many sectors in imperial society, ranging from nationalist intellectuals throughout the borderlands to zemstvo leaders in the Russian heartland itself.

By the late 1880s the problem of statehood had also become an area of special interest to legal scholars, with the revival of *Staatswissenschaft* in German legal scholarship and the concomitant spread of political science as a discipline. As practitioners in related fields, Kistiakovsky, Hrushevsky, and Lypynsky would undoubtedly have been acquainted with this literature. But the increasingly patent weakness of the autocracy after the turn of the century inevitably enhanced in the intellectuals' view the prospects of its fall and, with it, the appearance of new states, particularly during the prolonged political crisis that faced the autocracy after the revolutions of 1905–07.

This discussion acquired new content for Ukrainians with the short-lived UNR and its peremptory suppression and replacement with the Soviet Ukrainian republic in the 1920s. One cannot underestimate the enduring importance of this ersatz nation-state for the continuing development of Ukrainian thought during the twentieth century. Its very existence, and its rhetoric of internationalism and pseudo-ethnicity (well reflected by entries in this collection), obliged émigré theorists such as Lypynsky, Osyp Nazaruk (pp. 287–90), and Petro Poltava (pp.

297–302) to devise alternatives that would more truly reflect the national content of a proper Ukrainian state. Their understanding of nationhood and the sources for the state's legitimacy found reflection in the writings of those dissidents who emerged from underground with the formation of Rukh during the Gorbachev years (pp. 341–62).

Yet, despite the rhetorical power and theoretical sophistication evidenced by these thinkers, their obsession with the Soviet Union and continued Russian oppression of their native land led them to work in categories that continue to complicate Ukrainian politics in the present day. The anthology closes with an angry manifesto from the Ukrainian intelligentsia and a sympathetic, though critical, commentary by the prominent contemporary thinker and critic Mykola Riabchuk, both of which lament the unfulfilled prophecy of a truly national Ukrainian state.

In all of these treatments, the problem of giving the nation the state it deserves tended to trump other considerations in the derivation of sovereign power. Moreover, following a by now venerable philosophical-historical tradition, Ukrainian nationalist theorists founded the necessity of Ukraine's existence as a state in its existence as a nation—indeed, according to all of them the nation would not realize its historical destiny unless the state lost at the Battle of Poltava was restored to it.

Ukraine's current travails arise in no small measure from this imperative linking state, nation, and history, because of the tautology binding them. As Lypynsky understood, a nation-state was democratic and self-determining in much the same way as Marxists would claim democracy for a proletarian state. Also as in the Marxist case, Ukrainian intellectuals felt that the nation-state would emerge as a product of history, in which the nation was a primary actor subsuming and providing a vessel for its individual members' fulfillment. One well understands the primary agency they attributed to history—in view of the apparent insuperability of the Russian or Soviet states, the laws of historical development offered hope and the assurance of a predictable (and favourable) outcome.

Yet, such a positing of the state's grounding submerged the question of actual politics and the agency of the people in the nation-state, or, rather, left the solution of these questions to the iron logic of historical development. The sovereign individual so beloved of American and English political theory was not present in these theories for at least two reasons. First, the struggle to assert the nation's existence against Russian repression encouraged arguments that elevated the nation as a centre of attention—a focus encouraged by so much historical writing and political activity in the nineteenth century. Petro Poltava was only one of many writers who denounced multinational imperial states in favour of an "independent national state," which alone could guarantee the full material and spiritual development of the nation (pp. 297–302). Second, for all their

protestations about Russian disdain for the “dark” *narod*, Ukrainian intellectuals were themselves aware of the low level of consciousness—to use their terminology—among their peasant compatriots. In his arguments for a national aristocracy, Lypynsky stated this view forthrightly. Overarching both sets of considerations was the dialectical relationship between the “is” of the Ukrainian SSR and the “ought to be” nation that pervaded the thinking of the émigré and underground intelligentsia, particularly given the virtual monopoly enjoyed within Ukraine by the official Soviet view in these matters.

Shevchenko’s “day of truth” has come twice in Ukraine’s twentieth century. Both times the light of day has confronted intellectual nation-builders with rude and unexpected challenges. If they expected history to yield a unitary nation-state—whether the “aristocratic” state proposed by Lypynsky, Petro Poltava’s “classless” national state, or the “democratic” variants espoused by Rukh—history played a trick on them by creating a highly complex and often divided Ukraine. Today the Ukrainian Uniates and Orthodox contend as to which of them represent the “true” Ukrainian church, and the Ukrainians of Galicia vie with those from other regions as exemplars of authentic Ukrainianness. Former nationalist dissidents sit frustrated in political assemblies as they face a leadership drawn from the old Soviet apparat. Most of all, independent Ukraine has turned out to be almost as multinational as the old empire from which it broke away so hopefully in 1991.

In the collection’s last entry, Mykola Riabchuk captures the present situation by invoking a wry proverb: “*ne tak stalosia iak hadalosia*” (p. 401). Despite the tolerance for other groups that the Ukrainians showed in 1991 when they elected Leonid Kravchuk over V’iacheslav Chornovil, the new state finds itself threatened by a pro-Soviet governing class that seeks to create a “Ukraine without Ukrainians.” Yet, the 1991 election and its political fallout point to the inherent paradox in the national idea as it developed among the Ukrainian intelligentsia during its Babylonian captivity: the nation-state’s fate resides in the will of the electorate, the *narod*. Like their peers throughout the successor states to the Russo-Soviet empire, Ukrainian intellectuals have been brought face to face with the paradox that the *narod*, once extolled as the preservers of nationhood when the elite had become denationalized, forms the majority in their democratic nation-state. Pressed by economic collapse and suspicious of any elite, including the intelligentsia, through centuries of practice, the *narod* has voted according to its understanding of its own interests rather than the larger cause of the nation. In these circumstances and given their habits of thought, the only plausible culprits the intelligentsia can identify are the *nomenklatura* with its machinations, and the people with its false consciousness.

Lindheim and Luckyj’s anthology offers a hopeful solution to this dilemma in excerpts from Hrushevsky, in many ways the most thoughtful and realistic commentator on statehood and its problems (pp. 227–42). As head of the Central

Rada, Hrushevsky embraced the fact that Ukraine was a multinational state. While the state would serve as the homeland for Ukrainians, that nation's suffering at the hands of Russian imperialism guaranteed its sympathies and good relations with the national minorities residing within its boundaries—particularly the Jews and the Belarusians.

Hrushevsky's views represent one of many veins that continue to develop in debates over Ukrainian nationhood and its destinies. The very indeterminacy of Ukraine's present status offers a unique opportunity to examine and assess each of these traditions, freed from the cruel teleologies of 1654, 1709, 1775, or 1920 that used to dominate Ukrainian historiography. The uncertain present has brought into play an impressive diversity of views about Ukrainian nationhood and statehood; it has also cast into doubt the older national historical narrative that served as a lodestar to Ukrainian patriots at home and abroad. By creating this anthology, Lindheim and Luckyj have not only rendered a service to their intended audience of students and interested amateurs—they have also challenged all scholars to recast their understanding of the history of Ukrainian thought. That is no small accomplishment.

Book Reviews

Iaroslav Iu. Tynchenko. *Ukrainske ofitserstvo: Shliakhy skorboty ta zabuttia. Chastyna 1: Biohrafichno-dovidkova*. Kyiv: Tyrazhuvalnyi tsentr URP, 1995. 259 pp.

In his introduction, this young author—when it appeared he was about twenty years old—cites two motives for writing his book. The first was that the new Ukraine, like every country, needs heroes, especially military ones. His second motive stemmed from his reaction to the increasing sympathy with which Russian historians have recently begun writing about the White officers corps in general and about such White leaders as Denikin, Kolchak, and Wrangel in particular. Tynchenko argues that if the Russians can now present the White commanders in a heroic mould, Ukrainians should be able to do the same for the commanders of their national armies during the years 1917–21.

Professional historians might wince at such youthful candour and unabashed patriotism. They might even read no further. That would be a mistake. Admittedly, Tynchenko's presentation is overly tendentious, even polemical. He implies that there has been a historiographical conspiracy to diminish the achievements of the generals of the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). (He intends to treat the Ukrainian officers corps in general in a subsequent volume.) As might be expected, Tynchenko identifies Soviet and White historians as the worst transgressors in this regard. Somewhat surprisingly, he also claims that Galician historians—he mentions *Istoriia ukrainskoho viiska* edited by Ivan Kryp'iakeych and Bohdan Hnatkevych (Lviv: Ivan Tyktor, 1936) as an example—are among those who systematically diminished the achievement of the Army of the UNR and its commanders, considering it less battle-worthy than the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA). Tynchenko attempts to correct this perceived injustice by presenting the generals of the Ukrainian armies in central and eastern Ukraine, primarily the forces of the UNR, in the most positive light possible.

Ukrainske ofitserstvo consists of a brief, polemical but very informative, introduction; short biographies of the five most important Ukrainian military commanders (Mykola Iunakiv, Oleksander Hrekiv, Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Volodymyr Salsky, Vasyl Tiutiunnyk) in the 1917–21 period; and mini-biographies of (a) generals of the Russian imperial army who switched sides and served the various Ukrainian governments of 1917–21, (b) former Russian imperial officers who became generals in the Ukrainian armed forces, and (c) officers of the UNR Army who were later active during World War II. The work concludes with detailed lists of the Ukrainian military units of 1917–20. Surprisingly, the important commander Petro Bolbochan is not included in the study.

Information about the above topics is extremely hard to come by, and Tynchenko deserves great credit for collecting it from such sources as the archives of the Central State Archive of Civic Alliances (TsDAHO) in Kyiv, various memoirs, rare journal articles and monographs, and a variety of encyclopedias. He concludes that the leadership of the Ukrainian national armies in central and eastern Ukraine came almost exclusively from the ranks of the Russian imperial officers corps. Combining his own data with that

provided by Denikin, Tynchenko estimates that of the forty top Russian imperial military commanders before the Revolution of 1917, sixteen (forty percent) served with the Whites, seven (17.5 percent) fought for the Reds, three (7.5 percent) joined the Ukrainian forces, and the remaining fourteen chose to remain neutral. Tynchenko also states that 7.5 percent of Russian imperial army officers served on the Ukrainian side at one time or another; but he does not explain how he reached this conclusion. It appears that the UNR Army, unlike the UHA, had considerable success in attracting experienced officers. One might assume, therefore, that the reason for its defeats should be sought elsewhere.

Tynchenko's well-researched mini-biographies of the Ukrainian generals constitute the most detailed treatment of the social, regional, and educational backgrounds and military careers of the men who led the Ukrainian military forces that is currently available. The principal drawback of these mini-biographies is the author's obvious effort to accentuate the positive about these men. This tendency is at odds with the often disparaging comments that Ukrainian commanders have made about each other in their memoirs. Nonetheless, the data that Tynchenko provides are very valuable. This is especially true of the charts that he meticulously prepared listing the names, numerical strength, deployment, and commanders of the units that constituted the various Ukrainian armies. On balance, despite its drawbacks, *Ukrainske ofitserstvo* is a significant and welcome contribution to Ukrainian military history.

Orest Subtelny
York University

Michael O. Logusz. *Galicia Division: The Waffen-SS 14th Grenadier Division, 1943-1945*. Atglen, Penn.: Schiffer Publishing, 1997. 558 pp. U.S. \$35.00 cloth.

Public records may never definitively settle the current debate over what exactly the soldiers of the Waffen-SS Galicia (Galizien) Division did during their relatively brief appearance under German command in the closing months of the Second World War. Documents do show that parts of the division—which grew out of negotiations between the SS and some (not all) Ukrainian nationalist groups—were deployed in the Ordnungspolizei and in anti-partisan actions before the division as a whole suffered large losses in July 1944 at Brody in northeastern Galicia. That fall, some men fought briefly with the Waffen-SS Wiking Division, after which the Galicia Division served in Slovakia, southeast Austria, and northern Slovenia until various other German-led military groups absorbed it in the spring of 1945.

Just recently, in November 1998, the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association announced that Canada's Minister of Justice found the existing documentary evidence insufficient to warrant court proceedings against any division members suspected of war crimes. With a reaction that reflected the debate's tendency to frame guilt and innocence in absolute terms, the division's defenders hailed the minister's decision as a vindication. Now it would seem constructive for historians to explore the motives behind those actions that are already documented, and to analyze the conditions that gave rise to such motives. Such an analysis would begin with a look at the increasingly violent and exclusionary

practices that characterized the world in which the soldiers of the division had matured. One could trace the development of this atmosphere at least back to the First World War. However, with the exception of some officers, most recruits had spent their formative years in interwar Poland, where political and social dynamics intensified the segregation of Galicia's Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish populations. These recruits had also witnessed the social engineering and deportations of the 1939–41 Soviet occupation and of the first phase of Nazi rule (both the liquidation of the Lviv ghetto and negotiations for the Galicia Division took place in the spring of 1943). It was out of this environment that thousands of Galician Ukrainian men came to the decision to join and fight with the division.

Michael O. Logusz, a major in the U.S. Army Reserve, addresses the soldiers' outlooks and experiences in a text structured around personal accounts. He mostly confines the war-crimes debate to footnotes, while in the main text he describes the soldiers' training and combat, details of which he bases on veterans' memoirs and personal interviews. Logusz's enthusiasm never flags as he invites his reader into the minds of the division's soldiers.

The author portrays the Galicia Division as a group of patriotic Ukrainians who fought to protect their country from the Soviets and neither subscribed to Nazi ideology nor committed war crimes. It is a straightforward message meant to counter allegations of collaboration and treason, and it operates on two premises: first, that Stalin's Soviet Union was a greater threat to Ukraine than Hitler's Germany; and second, that the division would bring essential military training to the Ukrainian national cause. As historians have noted, these same views were held by the Ukrainian leaders who supported the division. Moreover, after Stalingrad many of these leaders anticipated Germany's defeat but believed that well-trained nationalist forces would keep the Red Army at bay until Western armies arrived. Germany's promise to train the division and provide Ukrainian chaplains reinforced nationalist expectations.

Logusz rehearses these points and also attempts to justify the Ukrainians' views. He argues that Soviet propaganda disseminated a false image of Ukrainian nationalists as collaborators and war criminals. It is true that Soviet historians constructed an ideological dichotomy between the (good) partisan and the (bad) fascist/nationalist, with members of the Galicia Division falling into the latter category. At the same time, however, some Western historians have emphasized Stalinist terror to such a degree that they seem to gloss over the consequences of a nation's decision to come to some level of accommodation with the Germans.

The creation of the Galicia Division was one episode in a tale of complicated relationships among Ukrainian nationalist groups and Nazi leaders, who negotiated with each other in the spring of 1943 against the backdrop of an approaching Red Army. Were Logusz to delve into these relationships, there might emerge a valuable analysis of the ideological affinities and disparities between Ukrainian nationalist visions and Nazi racial views, and of the political manoeuvrings that took place as German defeat became imminent. Such an analysis, however, would require a source base broader than Logusz's, as well as a greater emphasis on the chronological context within which to track and explain outlooks that changed during the course of the war.

The author's references show a familiarity with well-known secondary literature on the German-occupied east, but his discussion tends to revolve around the relatively harmonious voices of Ukrainian soldiers and some German officials, thus paying scant

attention to the voices of other nationalities or even Ukrainians who experienced the war differently. Numerous transliteration errors and inconsistencies throughout the text, notes, and bibliography reinforce the reader's impression that not all perspectives are being sufficiently acknowledged. Moreover, in the occasional reference to a Yiddish, Polish, or Russian first-person account, Logusz dismisses that source unless it supports a particular interpretation. One example of this tendency is found in his response to an allegation that a battle group of the Galicia Division killed all the inhabitants of a Polish village in February 1944 (pp. 457 ff., note 37). Logusz attempts to discredit two Polish sources on the basis of their conflicting figures (one refers to "several hundred" victims, the other to "around 500"). Then, ironically, he finds supporting evidence in the memoirs of the Soviet Dmitrii Medvedev, who called the perpetrators "Hitlerites"—a name, Logusz states, reserved for Germans, not Ukrainians. Finally, Logusz asserts that reports from both the Polish government-in-exile and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army verify Medvedev's characterization of this particular Polish village as a partisan stronghold, so that the action was justified for security reasons, even if in such circumstances "civilians frequently are caught in the midst."

Missing from this discussion is the context within which the village was destroyed. Regardless of the position of the Galicia Division in February 1944, the fact remains that bloody conflicts between Poles and Ukrainians continued for some time while the Soviets pushed back the Germans and established control over these borderlands. Logusz passes over such contextual points in silence, thus obscuring some of the darker aspects of warfare. A broader perspective would not necessarily negate the qualities of loyalty, unity, and pride with which Logusz endows the members of the Galicia Division; it would put these characteristics into a more realistic and appropriate framework.

Christine Anne Kulke

University of California, Berkeley

Eugeniusz Misiło [Ievhen Misylo], comp. *Akcja "Wisła": Dokumenty*. Warsaw: Zakład Wydawniczy "Tyrsa," 1993. 524 pp.

Akcja "Wisła" was the code name for the 1947 military operation by Polish military and security units that resulted in the deportation of approximately 150,000 Ukrainians from their autochthonous territories in southeastern Poland to the "regained territories" newly acquired by Poland from Germany. This operation was of historic significance because it was the final major action aimed at "solving" the interwar Polish state's minority "problem." The conduct and consequences of Akcja "Wisła" are of political significance because they helped to define (and complicate) the entire course of relations between Poles and Ukrainians from 1947 on. Last but not least, from a comparative perspective this operation represents an important and, to date, inadequately studied example of what has become known in recent years as ethnic cleansing.

Before the late 1980s the literature on Akcja "Wisła" consisted primarily of tendentious, officially approved accounts published in Poland and of emotional eyewitness accounts of this operation in Ukrainian émigré journals and newspapers. Only a small number of "approved" Polish and Soviet historians had access to the full range of

documentary materials on Akcja "Wisła," and relatively free access to these collections became a reality only after 1989. The collection under review thus represents the first significant attempt to bring together a variety of documents and provide a comprehensive overview of this operation.

This reviewer, who has not conducted research in Polish archives, cannot comment on the extent to which this collection of documents is balanced and truly comprehensive. The compiler acknowledges that he did not have access to all relevant documentary collections, and he states that some important archival materials on this topic were destroyed. Nonetheless, he has done an excellent job of bringing together and carefully annotating a wide range of previously unpublished materials, which include military orders, protocols, and instructions and correspondence of the Polish Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Public Defence, General Staff of the Polish Army, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, and other institutions.

Further archival research is unlikely to modify seriously the overall picture painted by the documents in this collection. In particular, they very effectively support the argument that Akcja "Wisła" was not (as was claimed at the time, and in official Polish historiography prior to 1989) a military operation aimed at countering activities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army along the new Polish-Ukrainian border established during the war. Rather, it represented the culmination of earlier efforts before, during, and immediately following World War II, now backed by the Soviet Union, to create an ethnically uniform Polish state. In sum, these efforts succeeded in making Poland one of the most homogeneous countries of east-central Europe.

However, the success was incomplete, and the identities of Poland's Ukrainian, German, and other minorities have survived. Paradoxically, the vicious and indiscriminate nature of Akcja "Wisła," which emphasized the collective "guilt" of individuals who often did not even possess a distinct ethnic identity (many were illiterate peasants closely tied to a particular village or locality rather than to an ethnic group), may even have strengthened their adherence to a distinct ethnic identity.

This collection, published well before the fiftieth anniversary of Akcja "Wisła" in 1997, has attracted considerable attention in Poland, in part because of a growing interest in promoting a Polish-Ukrainian dialogue and improving relations between Poland and Ukraine. To date this interest has been restricted largely to Poland's elites, and there has been little success in changing the generally negative attitudes towards Ukrainians of the Polish mass public. True, Poland has not been plagued by nationalist extremism to the same extent as countries such as Romania and Slovakia. However, the great suffering of Poland's population during World War II, and the genuine courage and heroism demonstrated by many Polish soldiers and civilians during this traumatic period, have led to a smug self-righteousness among many Poles. It is reflected in a widespread inability to acknowledge that Poles themselves were capable of inflicting grievous harm on others.

Thus a broader debate on the significance of Akcja "Wisła" and its consequences could play a significant cathartic role in encouraging a more realistic view of some of the negative legacies of Polish nationalism. Such a debate could eventually help promote greater tolerance of cultural pluralism in Poland. The publication under review contributes

to this important debate by providing a significant number of documents to those wishing to study the broader significance of Akcja "Wisła."

John (Ivan) Jaworsky
University of Waterloo

Taras Kuzio. *Ukraine under Kuchma: Political Reform, Economic Transformation and Security Policy in Independent Ukraine*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. xxiv, 281 pp. U.S. \$37.50 cloth.

The emergence of Ukraine as a new nation of 52 million people has permanently altered the map of Europe. Taras Kuzio, a research fellow of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham, provides a detailed look at the period of presidency of Leonid Kuchma, a period that is still continuing. The book might be considered, then, less an examination of Ukraine under Kuchma than of the years 1994–96.

The focus is mainly on political issues: the book is divided into six chapters encompassing "A New Ukrainian Parliament," "Issues and Voters in the 1994 Presidential Elections," "The Crimea Returns to Ukraine," "Political Reform and an End to the Soviet System," "Economic Transformation and Structural Change," and "New Foreign and Defense Policies." The general view—it is not really a thesis—is that under the Kuchma presidency Ukraine has been welcomed into the world community and is moving toward Europe rather than Eurasia; the beginnings of economic reform are in evidence; and Kuchma has achieved more success than his predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk, in attaining a consensus of support for his policies. The Crimean recalcitrance has been ended, and relations with Russia are on a more solid footing without any political concessions having been made by Ukraine.

The author has accumulated a wealth of information, though the reader might have wished for more selective coverage. The first two chapters provide exhaustive documentation, for example, of both the parliamentary and presidential elections, but analyze the build up and "myths" more than the results. At times the text becomes bewildering as names suddenly crop up without previous mention or in random chronological order. On p. 97, for example, Kuzio notes the dismissal of Dmytro Tabachnyk as head of the presidential administration in December 1996, and then follows with a paragraph about Volodymyr Horbulin's role in working with Tabachnyk, noting that he takes over Tabachnyk's functions when the latter is unavailable. (Presumably if Tabachnyk was dismissed, then he would be permanently unavailable!)

There are frequent non sequiturs. Take, for example, the following statement: "Horbulin was previously employed with Kuchma at the PIVDENMASH nuclear missile plant in Dnipropetrovsk. He is therefore a strong supporter of the Military-Industrial Complex and of maintaining bilateral ties with Russia" (p. 97). Does one's place of occupation necessarily determine one's political outlook? In the section on myths and legends of the 1994 presidential elections, there is a lengthy discussion of the differences between the presidential elections in Ukraine and Belarus, based on an opening premise that "The comparison of the Ukrainian presidential elections with [sic!] Belarus was

hollow" (p. 40). But who has made such a comparison? No authors are cited; and if no comparison has been made, then what is the point of this debate?

It is often difficult to make sense of the narrative. To cite two of numerous examples of confusing sentences: "Salaries in the state sector were either too low to provide a decent standard of living for they were not paid for months on end, or both" (p. 152); and "Kravchuk is also to be remembered for having ensured that Kuchma and Marchuk exist..." (p. 229). Pp. 108–9 introduce the Ukrainian presidential decree on the status of oblasts, raions, and so on, but then do not tell the reader what the decree contained. The section on the Soviet Ukrainian constitution seems superfluous (p. 110), since no such constitution ever existed. Similarly, it seems odd to entitle a chapter "Economic Transformation" when the analysis within that chapter demonstrates mainly that no such transformation has taken place. And while the tables on privatization (pp. 174–77) are to be welcomed, without citing the percentages of total farms, units, and so on, it is impossible for the reader to make any sense out of the figures listed.

At times the author's statements can be questioned. He cites the Belarusian referendum of May 1995 as turning Belarus into a dominion of Russia (p. 105), when in fact it had no political repercussions on Belarusian sovereignty. Over eighty percent of those polled declared themselves in support of moves toward economic integration only, and Russia rejected even this possibility later in the year. Kuzio states that Ukraine acquired territories from, *inter alia*, Czechoslovakia as a result of the Soviet-German treaty (pp. 185–86). In fact the territories were only acquired from Czechoslovakia as a result of a bilateral Soviet-Czech agreement in the summer of 1945. In examining the new foreign policy directions of President Kuchma (p. 183), Kuzio writes that normalization of relations with Russia would help to stabilize inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine. Several pages later we read that there is no ethnic discrimination in Ukraine according to opinion polls (p. 199), and the author provides other evidence that ethnic relations in Ukraine were not under strain.

Kuzio frequently uses the phrase "normalization" when referring to the desired goal for relations with Russia. The reader might be curious as to what exactly he means by it. Have there been normal relations between these two states historically (it seems unlikely, since Ukraine enjoyed only a brief period of independence hitherto) or since 1991? The question seems pivotal, since the focus of much of the book concerns Ukraine's relations with Russia and the attitude of its first two presidents toward the giant neighbour. Can there be an equal partnership or will Russia use its economic clout as a bargaining chip, as it did at the Black Sea Fleet negotiations at Massandra in 1993? Would normal relations include imports of Russian oil and gas at domestic prices, for example? Would it mean that members of the Russian Duma or Moscow mayor Iurii Luzhkov would refrain from interference in the affairs of Crimea? Kuzio provides a detailed portrayal of where Kuchma believes his interests lie, but it would have been helpful if he had provided his own analysis of this complex question.

The book is crying out for an editor, and one hopes that if there is a new edition the various errors will be rectified. There are footnotes in the Acknowledgements. The Transliteration Note on p. xv manages to get about half the Russian forms wrong (Uzgorod rather than Uzhgorod, Nikolaiv rather than Nikolaev, Krivyi Rog rather than Krivoi Rog, Zaporozhzhia rather than Zaporozh'e, Lvov rather than L'vov, and so on). Even the Ukrainian names are inconsistent or misspelled. Thus one has Khmel'nyts'ky in

the Transliteration Note, Khmel'nyts'kyi on the map on the following page, and Khmel'nytsky (as well as a curious place called Kirivohrad) in the tables on pp. 176–77. Uzhhorod is spelled correctly on the map and wrongly (Uzhorod) in the Transliteration Note. Zhitomir appears in the Russian form throughout except on the maps, where it is Zhytomyr. All of the tables appear in English but are alphabetized according to the Cyrillic alphabet. The publisher perhaps needs to explain why four of the maps produced at the front of the book appear without permission (as explained in the Erratum insert); this fact only adds to the book's idiosyncrasies.

Ukraine under Kuchma clearly fills a gap in our knowledge of the current political situation in Ukraine, and there are few Western researchers who know as much about Ukraine as Dr. Kuzio does. As the book's bibliography indicates, he has kept abreast of current developments in Ukraine for many years with considerable diligence. All scholars of contemporary Ukraine owe him a debt. What is lacking in this volume, however, is the transformation of this undoubted knowledge into a lucid and properly edited text.

David R. Marples
University of Alberta

Yuri Shcherbak. *The Strategic Role of Ukraine: Diplomatic Addresses and Lectures (1994–1997)*. Cambridge: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1998. xiv, 146 pp. U.S. \$12.50 paper. Distributed by Harvard University Press.

This book consists of Yuri (Iurii) Shcherbak's introductory essay on Ukraine's strategic role and of eleven official addresses that he delivered in the years 1994–97 as Ukraine's ambassador to the United States. It also contains a brief epilogue and two appendices: a chronology of Ukrainian-U.S. relations in the years 1989–97, and the text of the July 1997 charter of the partnership between NATO and Ukraine. During Shcherbak's ambassadorship, Ukraine and the United States established a "strategic partnership." The evolution of this partnership away from the Russocentric "atmosphere of distrust and suspicion" of 1992–97 is well covered in the volume.

In his preface, Shcherbak warns that the speeches may appear "dry and guarded" to the reader because "they are in fact representative of the directives of the president of Ukraine and tightly controlled by instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (p. ix). But the speeches are less dry and guarded than the ambassador believes; they are, in fact, at times quite open and revealing, perhaps because he is an intellectual and a novelist who has been involved in Ukraine's democratic movement since the early Gorbachev era.

Ambassador Shcherbak's intellectual depth and acquaintance with published materials is certainly far superior to that of his predecessor, Oleh Bilorus, now a prominent member of former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko's Hromada party. The appointment of Shcherbak as ambassador reflects a more general trend of Leonid Kuchma's presidency, where intellect and ideology have played a far greater role in policy-making than they did during Leonid Kravchuk's presidency. Shcherbak makes no bones of the fact that he prefers Kuchma's presidency over Kravchuk's, which was characterized by "political

romanticism and economic stagnation, self-isolation and [the] absence of practically any reforms" (p. 28).

The change under Kuchma is perhaps best attested to in Shcherbak's introduction on "The Strategic Role of Ukraine." There he not only provides us with an in-depth background to Ukraine's central importance for European security, but also explains in detail why Ukraine has become strategically important to the United States, NATO, and other Western countries. Like many contemporary Ukrainian commentators, Shcherbak sees Ukraine as a victim of aggression, a historical experience common throughout central and eastern Europe. He writes: "Historians have calculated that over the past millennium or so Ukraine has been the object of more than two hundred invasions, wars of aggression, or devastating occupations" (p. 7).

Historical themes play a key role in Shcherbak's understanding of the world and Ukraine's place in it; his understanding is buttressed by a keen interest in the historical works of Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Shcherbak does not mince his words about the fact that Kyivan Rus' is a part of Ukrainian history, that the 1932–33 Soviet Ukrainian famine was artificial, that possession of the Crimea is central to southern Ukraine's security, or that the former USSR was an empire and Ukraine was therefore a colonial dependency. Like many other Ukrainian leaders, he denies that independence was thrust into Ukraine's lap by virtue of a failed putsch in Moscow. On the contrary, "those who know well the history of Ukraine and apply a systematic and objective approach to politics and economics understand that such dramatic events do not occur all of a sudden, they ripen step by step in the depths of the past" (p. 27).

Shcherbak is also clear about the domestic reasons why Ukraine should remain an independent state: both tsarist and Soviet rule were disastrous for Ukraine, turning it from an independent state and eastern European cultural centre in the mid-seventeenth century into an illiterate, backward province two centuries later.

Over centuries Ukraine was a province of the huge Russian and then Soviet Empires. Having no statehood, the Ukrainian people began to lose its national and cultural identity. In connection with the "Russification" which intensified dramatically during Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's rule, the Ukrainian nation was on the verge of the loss of its national tongue, its rich folk heritage. The Chernobyl disaster has endangered the very genetic existence of its people. That is why the Ukrainian people are determined to build an independent state of their own. (P. 35)

Shcherbak follows in a long line of members of Ukraine's elites of all political persuasions when he states that Ukraine's foreign policy goal should be turning "back toward Europe after a century of provincial, semi-colonial existence" (pp. 118–19).

Although Kuchma's foreign-policy-makers (unlike Kravchuk's) do not deny that Russia is also part of "Europe," neither Shcherbak nor Ukraine's leaders make clear if Ukraine will always back its integration into trans-Atlantic and European structures only together with Russia—allowing it a veto, for example, over NATO enlargement in the former USSR—or independently of Russia.

Shcherbak is very critical of Russian politicians and security specialists who advocate relations with Ukraine only on the basis of an imperial core-dependency syndrome. This makes him at times less than optimistic about the chances for full normalization of

Ukrainian-Russian relations. By insisting that these relations be based on equality and the sovereignty of both states, Ukraine, Shcherbak believes, is preventing the rebirth of any Russian or Soviet empire. Ukraine's rejection of any participation in post-Soviet reintegration is contrary to what many Russophile Western commentators (such as Jerry F. Hough, who is quoted on p. 56) believed Kuchma would undertake when he was elected, and to what they advised the American government to wholeheartedly support.

Shcherbak's book clearly shows that the central goal of Ukrainian foreign policy—strengthening the country's independence, sovereignty, and security—has remained unchanged under Kuchma except for the tactics used to achieve this goal. Although Shcherbak clearly defines the objectives of and factors involved in the U.S.-Ukrainian "strategic partnership," no Ukrainian politician has been able to do the same with regard to the amorphous and troubled relationship between Russia and Ukraine. The treaty signed by both countries in May 1997 was not ratified by the Russian State Duma until December 1998.

Shcherbak's book clearly shows the diverging interests of Ukraine and Russia in the post-Soviet era. But Shcherbak and other members of Ukraine's foreign-policy elite are always at pains to stress their interest in good relations with Russia, which has been defined as a priority. Nevertheless, much of their rhetoric has been for domestic consumption only. The reality, as this book shows, is one of growing and diverging security interests. For example, the Soviet-era function of Sevastopol as an anti-American, anti-NATO, and anti-Turkish bridgehead—a function that is still supported by Russia—is pointed out as being redundant because the Ukrainian and Russian navies have "divergent interests" (p. 82) and "Ukraine has no plans for military confrontation with its Black Sea neighbors. Moreover, it does not envisage any future military operations in the Mediterranean" (p. 81). This is clearly sweet music to the United States, NATO, and Turkey, but not to Russia.

The collection brings out some of the common misconceptions that Ukraine's leaders have about foreign policy. Shcherbak, like Kuchma, stresses Ukraine's role as a "bridge" between East and West. This is clearly better and less anti-Russian than Kravchuk's "buffer," but contradicts Ukraine's stated goals. If Ukraine is part of east-central Europe, then for whom is it a "bridge"? Is Ukraine's self-definition not too similar to Turkey's? The similarities are strong, for western Europe remains ambivalent about both Ukraine's and Turkey's membership in "Europe." Although Ukraine was recognized as part of "Europe" in the July 1997 Ukraine-NATO charter, the European Union (EU) clearly sees Ukraine as linked to Russia through its participation in the Eurasian Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Ukraine was not asked to join the "slow-track" group of five countries for future EU membership, let alone the "fast-track" group of six countries.

Shcherbak concedes that Ukraine needs to overcome its economic crisis, reorientate its economy, and "consolidate" society (i.e., undertake state- and nation-building) before it will be eligible for integration into trans-Atlantic and European structures. Whether Kuchma is devoting sufficient attention to the "consolidation" of society is a moot point, while the signing of the March 1998 economic treaty with Russia prevents the reorientation of the Ukrainian economy that Shcherbak and this reviewer believe is essential for Ukraine to achieve its stated security goals. The integration Shcherbak talks of can only mean NATO, for, as has already been pointed out, the EU has closed the door on Ukraine's future membership, while NATO has left the door open after the first wave

of three members. Shcherbak accepts that Ukraine's membership in NATO is currently not on the agenda, but its non-aligned status will not hinder close Ukrainian-NATO co-operation. Ukraine's non-aligned status is again shown to be a rather strange animal, allowing co-operation with NATO and the EU but not with the CIS's collective-security structures. At the same time, Shcherbak warns that any attempt by Russia to forcefully restore its empire "will accelerate the movement of Ukraine toward NATO" (p. 116).

The Strategic Role of Ukraine is a very useful introduction to official Ukrainian foreign policy. At the same time, it introduces many common themes that are increasingly being promoted by Ukraine's elites on the basis of an emerging consensus regarding historical myths (in the positive understanding of that term), the feeling of historical injustice, and the unwillingness to allow the attempt at building an independent state or Ukraine's rightful place as part of Europe—not Eurasia—to be thwarted. This consensus is clearly reflected in the volume.

Taras Kuzio
Honorary Research Fellow
Ukraine Centre
University of North London

Tor Bukvoll. *Ukraine and European Security*. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997. x, 129 pp.

Ukraine, argues Tor Bukvoll in his short but solid monograph, "is one of the defining features of the European security architecture." It occupies the crucial and still developing space between Russia and the West. Its future success or failure will profoundly influence both Russia and NATO, for Ukraine is on the front line for both. For Russia Ukraine's importance goes even further. Ukraine is not only a key external influence, but, given the history of Russian and Soviet imperialism, also a key determinant of Russia's post-Soviet identity. For these and other reasons, Ukraine is central to the emerging European security environment.

Despite its centrality, Ukraine is poorly known by many specialists in the security field. In many respects, the reigning ignorance is often superior to what passes for knowledge: during the years 1990–93 a range of experts predicted Ukraine's collapse on the basis of its economic and political shortcomings, ethnic divisions, and irreconcilable differences with Russia. Bukvoll's book, after a brief introduction, revisits these three issues in short chapters. His analysis is a tonic to both ignorance and harmful myths about Ukraine's fragility. As Bukvoll shows, Ukraine has shortcomings aplenty, but they did not add up—nor do they add up now—to a threat to Ukraine's survival as a state.

Bukvoll's first major chapter focusses on the evolution of Ukrainian democracy. He rightly points to the alliance of national democrats and members of the *nomenklatura* as the key to understanding Ukraine's political evolution. Far from being a breeding ground for "suicidal nationalism," this alliance brought independence, social, regional and ethnic peace, and a surprising stability at the top. Bukvoll's survey of Ukrainian political forces is in need of an update after the party shuffling in 1998, but is right in its basic depiction

of left, centre, and right. There is little in Bukvoll's discussion that portrays the real forces of Ukrainian politics—the competition between competing oligarchies. This kind of politics does not threaten Ukraine's survival, but it certainly hampers Kyiv's ability to follow through on its claims to be a truly European state.

The remainder of the chapter treats social instability and civil-military relations—two more dogs that did not bark. In a few paragraphs, the author rightly notes both the absence of and the preconditions for widespread social instability, yet offers no real analysis for the current state of affairs in Ukraine. Bukvoll spends more time on the Ukrainian military, yet its weak social, institutional, and financial position in the fledgling Ukrainian state made it virtually invisible in the key issues of the past few years that have defined the Ukrainian state. Bukvoll leaves it to other analysts to explain why an institution so deprived yet so potentially powerful has played such a meek role in Ukrainian politics.

The second major chapter looks at ethnic mobilization and separatism. Beginning with various predictions of Ukraine's ethnic fragility, Bukvoll turns to the real heart of the matter: why there have been no serious ethnic conflicts in the Ukrainian state. He notes the divisions within the eastern and southern parts of the state that make a unified political movement difficult to create and sustain, the absence of organized anti-state political activity in these regions, the differences between ethnic Russians in Ukraine and ethnic Russians elsewhere, and the mutability of ethnic identification. Bukvoll rightly goes beyond these factors to analyze what he calls "rational calculating processes on a massive scale" (p. 37). Even discontented individuals have to ask questions about the cost of pushing for greater autonomy or even separatism. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, regardless of their ethnic origins, abhor violence, have little nostalgia for the Soviet or imperial systems, and see that independence has not severed all connections with Russia or made conflict between the two states inevitable. As long as Ukrainian state policies remain liberal in their attitude toward ethnic and language issues, widespread ethnic conflict and separatist politics will remain remote possibilities.

The author wisely treats Crimea as a separate case study. The peculiarities of the region's ethnic mix and political traditions make it at one and the same time a case all to itself, and Ukraine's greatest challenge. In Bukvoll's view, what has defused the Crimean tinderbox is Kyiv's skilful appeals to the local Crimean *nomenklatura* who cared more for getting a share of the fruits of privatization on the peninsula than indulging in Russian nationalist fantasies. The ability of the Ukrainian leadership—including a largely unified Rada—to conduct a drawn out war of laws with the Crimean leadership, and not a test of force, also proved a major factor in stabilizing the peninsula.

Bukvoll's third chapter is devoted to Ukrainian-Russian relations. He notes the difficulty many in the Russian foreign-policy community have with Ukrainian independence. He details Ukraine's skilful diplomacy, both in bilateral ties with Russia and in the CIS, in defense of independence, territorial integrity, and a normal relationship with its northern neighbour. Bukvoll gives very brief snapshots of Ukrainian-Russian efforts to address the division and basing of the Black Sea Fleet, nuclear weapons, and the legal recognition of Ukraine's borders. Unfortunately, he finished writing the book long before the May 1997 agreements with Russia on both the Black Sea Fleet and territorial recognition. The book's time horizon also inadvertently distorts American and Western policy and Ukraine's own turn to the West, for it leaves the discussion at a time when the

central question in Ukrainian-Western relations had been nuclear weapons. In fact, since 1994, particularly in U.S.-Ukrainian relations, the two sides have gone well beyond the limited and largely instrumental involvement Bukvoll describes here.

The discussion of Russian-Ukrainian relations concludes with a set of scenarios ranging from nationalists coming to power in both countries to the triumph of moderates in both. Bukvoll rightly notes that the greatest source of volatility in these scenarios comes from Russia, not Ukraine. Yet none of them truly capture the strategic horizon Ukraine now faces, one deeply shaped by its internal political and economic shortcomings and a continued crisis of power and confidence in Russia.

The author concludes his work by putting his faith in the continued positive evolution of Ukrainian democracy, the low potential for ethnic mobilization—save perhaps in Crimea—and the likelihood that Russian-Ukrainian relations will continue on a pragmatic, if still far from normalized, course. In these conclusions, as in the book as a whole, Bukvoll has shown himself to be an acute observer, rightly skeptical of received wisdom on Ukraine and able to present an alternative view of why Ukraine has done so much better than many in both Russia and the West expected in 1991. I suspect that Ukraine will continue to defy its most pessimistic observers, though it is still far from pleasing its most optimistic ones. Bukvoll's wise book will help the inquisitive reader understand why.

Sherman Garnett

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Washington, D.C.

Anna Reid. *Borderland: A Journey through the History of Ukraine*.

London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997. xiv, 258 pp. £18.99 cloth.

Subscribers to the *Economist* maintain that they receive thoughtful and witty assessments of world affairs, in contrast to North American news journals' fare. Anna Reid's *Borderland* will only reinforce this conviction. This journalist for the *Economist* and the *Daily Telegraph* in Kyiv (1993–95) and holder of a Master's degree in Russian history and reform economics from the London School of Slavonic and East European Studies has produced a fascinating account of Ukraine's present and past interwoven with its geography and people. While the author of this ambitious undertaking does not fully succeed in grouping cultures and historical narratives in each account of a place and depictions of some of its inhabitants, this failing, as well as her occasional historical errors and omissions, can be forgiven.

The ten chapters take the reader from a description of the all-important Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, through Kamianets-Podilskyi, Donetsk and Odesa, Lviv, Chernivtsi, the villages of Matussiv [sic] and Lukovytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Crimea, and Chornobyl. In "The New Jerusalem: Kiev," Reid introduces Ukraine and the history of its ancient capital and Kyivan Rus'. Through her discussion of Kamianets-Podilskyi, she recounts the wars between the Cossacks and the Poles and Ukrainian-Polish relations. In "The Russian Sea: Donetsk and Odessa," the role of the Russian Empire in Ukrainian history and of the Russians of Ukraine is examined. It is with chapter four, "The Books of Genesis," that

some of the structural strains of the volume emerge. While it is true that the early-nineteenth-century Ukrainian revival in the Russian Empire that resulted in Mykola Kostomarov's "Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People" had its greatest success in Austrian-ruled Galicia in the late nineteenth century, the discussion of that movement is dissonant in a chapter that has so little to do with imperial Russia. A deep analysis of late-nineteenth-century Galician affairs and twentieth-century Ukrainian nationalism might have been in order.

In the same way, Chernivtsi might not have emerged as "A Meaningless Fragment" had Reid dealt with the role of the Habsburgs (and put the chapter before the one on Lviv) rather than with the twentieth-century Ukrainian nationalist movement that was centred in Galicia and interwar Poland. She is more successful in apportioning material in the subsequent chapters on the famine in the central Ukrainian villages, the Jews and the Holocaust (in the chapter on Ivano-Frankivsk), and the Tatar question and Russian-Ukrainian tensions (in the chapter on the Crimea). Chornobyl as a place and event are well placed as seminal in the breakup of the Soviet Union and the drive for Ukrainian independence. Past and present, geography, and terminology are brilliantly used in "Europe or Little Russia? Ukraina," a characterization of contemporary Ukraine.

In the first chapter, Reid asserts that "Visitors to Kiev usually hate the place, but those who live there nearly always grow to love it." She follows with a wonderful description of the Ukrainian capital:

The staircase to my one-room flat might have stunk of urine and rotten cabbage, but outside raggedy black crows swung about in the poplars, shaking gobbets of frozen snow on to the rattling trams below. I liked the cobbled streets with their elaborately stuccoed turn-of-the-century houses, so dilapidated that the city authorities strung netting under the balconies to prevent chunks of plaster falling onto the pedestrians' heads. I liked the hillside parks with their brick paths and the rusty wrought-iron pavilions, where teenagers smooched in summer and children in rabbit-fur bonnets tobogganed in winter. I liked the old men playing chess on the benches round the pink-lit fountains on the Independence Square, or shouldering home their tackle-boxes after a day's ice-fishing on the Dnieper. I liked the way the dog-owners promenaded on Sunday mornings, gravely exchanging compliments on their exquisitely trimmed 'Jacks' and 'Johnnys'. I liked the echoey, pigeon-filled covered market, full of peasant women who called you 'little swallow' or 'little sunshine,' and dabbed honey and sour cream onto one's fist to taste. I liked the couples dancing to an accordion—not for money, just for fun—in the dripping underpasses on Friday evenings....

All the same, Kiev was a melancholy city. Its defining features were failures, absences. Some were obvious: only one supermarket (dollars only), few private cars (six at an intersection counted as a traffic jam), a joke of a postal service.... Others one only felt the force of after time. With benefits and pensions virtually non-existent, the crudest health care ... and no insurance ... Kievans were living lives of precariousness unknown in the West, destitution never more than an illness or a family quarrel away. It showed in their wiry bodies and pinched, alert, Depression-era faces: the faces of a people who get by on cheap vodka and stale cigarettes, and know they have to look out after themselves, for nobody else will do it for them.

The absences were physical too. Though better preserved than most ex-Soviet histories, ghosts haunted every corner.... (Pp. 4–5)

Reid came to love Ukraine and its people, but this did not dull her critical senses and fresh approach. This combination makes the book a delight to read. Those who have been to Ukraine will find so many familiar images but, at the same time, interpreted in new ways. Those who have not been there or who know little of Ukraine and Ukrainians will find clarity and richness in Reid's account of Ukraine and its past. Most importantly, she presents the people of Ukraine, thereby giving history and current events a human face.

Like any journalist's account, Reid's captures the Ukrainian present at a certain time—1993–95, only partially mitigated by the writing process in 1996. At the beginning of 1999 one has the advantage of knowing what changed and what did not, regrettably in Ukraine primarily not for the better. Still, in general Reid provides acute observations on the forces and processes, internal and external, shaping Ukraine.

Much of the history recounted in the book is well told and accurate, albeit episodic. Still, the volume has its share of errors. Certainly Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv did not fall to the Germans before Kyiv in 1941 (p. 151), and while one may debate the place of fascist thought in the OUN in the 1930s, it certainly could not be *neo-fascist* (p. 106). In other instances the information is misleading, as when Reid informs the reader that less than half of Bukovyna's population before World War II was Ukrainian, without the clarification that she is not referring to the current Ukrainian province of Bukovyna (prewar northern Bukovyna), in which they were the clear majority (p. 94). At times her observations are questionable, as when she calls the government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic of 1918 "rough-and-ready" (p. 102), thereby missing the great pride that the Galician population had for generations about the functioning of that government. In other cases her comments are neither proven nor placed in a comparative context, such as her assertion that the recorded examples of Ukrainians hiding and helping Jews during World War II were not numerous relative to the size of the Jews' slaughter (p. 156).

The major historical shortcoming of Reid's book is her failure to integrate the history of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ukraine and the Cossacks into her account. Her account of Kyiv as a backwater for half a millennium after its fall to the Tatars, or her use of an unflattering quote from Catherine II about the city after her visit in 1787, will not inform the reader that Kyiv was the intellectual centre of the Orthodox world under Metropolitan Peter Mohyla in the mid-seventeenth century or that the glory of Kyiv of the Golden Domes had re-emerged by the early eighteenth century under the patronage of Hetman Ivan Mazepa (p. 12). Her mention of the lost architecture of Kyiv (p. 4) and the career of Mazepa (pp. 49–52) will alert only the most careful reader to such issues. By neglecting the myth of Kyiv the Second Jerusalem, which pervaded early modern Ukraine, Reid missed an opportunity to deepen her discussion in chapter 1, "The New Jerusalem: Kiev."

The inadequate handling of the Cossacks emerges in Reid's comment that after the cultural Polonization of the old Ruthenian nobility in the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries "Ukrainians and Belorussians did not get their national leaders again until the mid-nineteenth century" (p. 30). While this is true for the Belarusians, the Cossacks and hetmans such as Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Petro Doroshenko, Ivan Mazepa, and Pylyp Orlyk certainly were comparable to the old

Ruthenian nobility as national leaders of the Ukrainians. Reid's rather simplistic view of the Cossacks and her failure to examine the evolution they underwent in the Hetmanate results in such errors as stating that Cossack polities did not have borders and written laws (p. 31).

Reid's commentary might have benefitted if she had engaged in a wider reading of Ukrainian history. While the works that she cites in the notes and selected bibliography undoubtedly do not represent the totality of her reading, one is struck by her not mentioning the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press volumes on Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Russian, Ukrainian-Jewish, and Ukrainian-German relations in a work that deals with these topics so extensively.

It can only be hoped that *Borderland* establishes a new genre of sojourners' delving into the present and past of Ukraine. Authors such as Myrna Kostash (in *Bloodlines: A Journey into Eastern Europe*, 1993) and Janice Kulyk-Keefer (in *Honey and Ashes: A Story of Family*, 1998) have given us accounts of travel through the space and time of family ties that draw them to Ukraine, as has Michael Ignatieff from the perspective of the Russian diaspora, rather than the Ukrainian diaspora, in *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (1993). Anne Applebaum's *Between East and West: Across the Borderlands of Europe* (1994) and Neal Ascherson's *Black Sea* (1995) have taken readers to Ukraine while on a regional journey. All of these accounts have been possible because Ukraine is no longer sealed off from the wider world and the world wishes to know what this large state is and whence it came.

Frank E. Sysyn
University of Alberta

Sukumar Periwal, ed. *Notions of Nationalism*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995. x, 247 pp. £12.99 paper, £35.00 cloth. Distributed by Oxford University Press.

This is one of those books written largely by, and presumably also for, people who know what "consociationalism" means, but not "eschatological," and who prefer not to think of facts if they can help it, but if they must, then they think of them rather as "micro-processes." Since I am not one of these people, I will not assess most of the articles in this volume individually; they do, I am sure, make a fine contribution to social-science theory- and model-building about nations and ethnic groups, especially in light of the dramatic micro-processes of the last decade. For a full survey I recommend Sukumar Periwal's excellent what-it-was-all-about that concludes the volume (pp. 228-40).

One interesting feature of the collection is that it registers the relatively recent integration of the Ukrainian experience into social-science theory. Quite a few of the chapters mention Ukraine's secession from the Soviet Union, and Ukrainianists will run into such familiar names as Mykhailo Drahomanov, Leonid Kravchuk, and Bohdan Krawchenko (none of whom, curiously, make it to the index).

Some of the contributions are particularly noteworthy. The introduction to the volume was written by the late Ernest Gellner, who did an amazing job of stating afresh his

theory of nationalism with characteristic panache in just a few pages (pp. 1–7). There is also a very fine piece by the veteran Ukrainianist and theorist of nationalism John Armstrong (pp. 34–43): a discursive essay on the current state of theories of nationalism, with special attention to the roles of language, religion, and the peasantry. He ends with a plea for biographical studies.

For my money, the best read is an essay by anthropologist Chris Hann entitled “Intellectuals, Ethnic Groups and Nations: Two Late-Twentieth-Century Cases” (pp. 106–28). Hann looks at two living national awakeners and the questions of political and ethical responsibility that their activities raise. One of these living national awakeners is Professor Paul Robert Magocsi, the awakener of the Rusyns and the holder of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto. In Hann’s opinion, based on his fieldwork among the Lemkos in Poland, “the prospects for Paul Robert Magocsi’s Rusyn national movement seem gloomy” (pp. 115–16). This at least was Hann’s view in 1994 when he wrote his piece.

However, some things have changed since then. To Hann “the recognition of a common cultural base and the adoption of a standardized Rusyn language seem[ed] unattainable goals” (p. 115) in 1994. Yet, between then and now there has been a major breakthrough in the standardization of literary Rusyn. The problem of mapping the boundaries of the Rusyns (which Hann discusses on p. 113) has also, it seems, moved in the direction of resolution (see Magocsi’s article in *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, September–December 1997). But the ultimate fate of the Rusyn idea is not really what interests Hann here: it’s the late twentieth-century awakener, who cannot be presented as the unwitting agent of a Gellnerian modernizing process. He knows exactly what he’s constructing.

As fascinating as the case of Magocsi and the Rusyns is, Hann moves on to one that is even more so: that of Wolfgang Feuerstein (and Neal Ascherson!) and the Laz. The Laz, who live in Turkey, speak a language related to Georgian, but they are Muslim, not Orthodox Christian. Fostering a separate Lazi national identity does not seem to interest most Laz themselves, but it has been enthusiastically championed by a German scholar (and a British journalist). Hann has done fieldwork among the Laz as well as the Rusyns, so he knows the situation on the ground. He is not comfortable that someone from outside has invented a Lazi alphabet and propagated notions of nationalism and nationality that were not extant in the society previously. True, without such a reordering of Lazi consciousness, the distinctive language and culture of the Laz stand to disappear as a result of assimilation to the Turkish mainstream, especially now that buses can carry them to Istanbul within twenty-four hours. Those few who have adopted Feuerstein’s alphabet and views face reprisals from the Turkish government, who regard them as potential separatists and allies of the Kurds. But Hann is not only uncomfortable with Feuerstein’s efforts; he is equally uncomfortable with anthropologists to whom he has spoken about the Laz: “For them, Lazi identity was obviously a quite artificial creation, the construction of someone who, if not necessarily a fascist reactionary, must be at best a crackpot or an amiable eccentric” (p. 124). In short, Hann’s article is full of rich uncertainties, which expand as the article progresses.

The book is rather well published. There are many fewer typographical errors than is customary in scholarly publications today. On the whole it is well copy-edited too; oddly

enough, however, the copy editors do not seem to know that rule about the agreement in number of subject and predicate.

In sum, this is a solid book with a few great moments. Three stars.

John-Paul Himka
University of Alberta

Dmytro Čyževs'kyj. *A History of Ukrainian Literature (From the 11th to the End of the 19th Century)*. Second edition. Translated by Dolly Ferguson, Doreen Gorsline, and Ulana Petyk. With *An Overview of the Twentieth Century* by George S. N. Luckyj. Edited, with a foreword to the first edition and a preface to the second edition, by George S. N. Luckyj. New York and Englewood, Colo.: The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences and Ukrainian Academic Press, 1997. xvi, 815 pp. U.S. \$75.00 cloth, U.S. \$90.00 outside North America.

Suppose one had decided to publish a second edition of the English translation of Dmytro Čyževs'kyj's *Istoriia ukrainskoï literatury*—as well one might, given that a quarter of a century after the first edition (1975) there is no other book-length account of this subject in English. How would one proceed?

First, one would have to clarify the limits of one's liberty to modify the text of the first English-language edition. That edition, also edited by George Luckyj, had followed Čyževs'kyj's Ukrainian-language original of 1956, but had included a new chapter entitled "Realism." Published during Čyževs'kyj's lifetime, it must be treated as an authorized text. The editor of a second edition would have little freedom to engage in substantive revision. In any case, the idea of another party "revising" or "updating" Čyževs'kyj would be indefensible. Čyževs'kyj's book is a historical and personal document, imprinted by a number of contextual factors.

Čyževs'kyj was a participant in the formalist tradition in literary scholarship. Whether because of his familiarity with Hegel and a consequent affinity for historical dialectics, or for other reasons, Čyževs'kyj was committed to a vision of literary history as "the repeated alternation of opposite tendencies: styles, and to a certain extent ideologies" (p. 14). Furthermore, the Heidelberg Slavist was close to the intellectual concerns of non-Marxist postwar West German humanities scholarship: European literature as a focus of comparative study; the nexus between literary tradition and literary rhetoric (and its subcategory, the study of trope and figure); and style as the essentially literary and essentially individual component of the literary work. And, not least, Čyževs'kyj was a notoriously subjective reader with passionate likes and dislikes. His history is the opposite of an attempt to express a scholarly *communis opinio*, and must, therefore, stand before the reader at the end of the millennium as Čyževs'kyj left it. More particularly, there is no opening in a new edition to include revisions that would attempt to answer the elaborate critique of Čyževs'kyj advanced by George Grabowicz in his *Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature* (Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1981). (As is well known, Grabowicz challenged the validity of Čyževs'kyj's periodization scheme and his

presentation of the realia of Ukrainian literature through categories transplanted from a reified "Europe." Čyževs'kyj had visualized Ukrainian literature, like the Ukrainian nation, as "incomplete"—a view that, today, is quite intelligible to practitioners of post-colonial studies. Grabowicz argued that any national literature is of necessity complete and talk of its "incompleteness" resulted from a logical fallacy.)

Grabowicz's intervention also listed some mistakes of the 1975 translation. In his preface to the second edition, George Luckyj informs the reader that he has tried to correct these. He has done so in some places—"zahalni mistsia," previously mistranslated as "direct narrative," now appears correctly as "commonplaces" (p. 10)—but not in others. Omelian Ohonovs'kyj still appears as Ohnovs'kyj (p. 637) in the bibliography, and "dukhovno-istorychnyi napriam" and "shukannia 'vplyviv'" (p. 6) are still "the historical and the comparativist" approaches (p. 6).

Grabowicz had also been critical of Čyževs'kyj's surprisingly laconic bibliographies, which had been replicated in the 1975 translation with very few additions. Here the editor of the 1997 edition faced a choice: to update and expand the bibliography substantially, turning it into a guide to the contemporary scholarship; or to leave it without change, treating it as part of Čyževs'kyj's authentic text. In the event, Luckyj opted for the latter course, and in the bibliography that appears immediately after Čyževs'kyj's text the most recent items continue to date from 1971. By way of partial compensation, a bibliography limited to books, some encyclopedia articles, and translations, all of them in English only, is appended at the end of the volume. Naturally, this is a very incomplete guide even to English-language scholarship. The reader is directed to three other bibliographical sources, but all of these limit themselves to publications in English or in English and French. Thus the only works in Slavic languages, including Ukrainian, to which the reader is directed are the items from Čyževs'kyj's bibliography, few of them dating from later than the 1920s and most of them not readily accessible.

But let us return to the editor and publisher who are contemplating the above-mentioned second edition. They must decide whether to do anything about the incompleteness of Čyževs'kyj's *History*, even in its extended 1975 version. Should they remain true to Čyževs'kyj on this? (For the incomplete literature of an incomplete nation, an incomplete literary history?) Or should they try to bring Čyževs'kyj's account up to date? And if so, how? Any attempt to continue "in the spirit" of Čyževs'kyj is, clearly, out of the question, although one can readily imagine that Čyževs'kyj would have viewed modernism and postmodernism as further confirmations of his theory that the history of literature is an oscillation between opposites, an eternal recurrence of the polarity between Renaissance and Baroque. One can also imagine the glee with which he would have quoted Iurii Andrukhovych's amplifications or reported on Ivan Luchuk's palindromes.

Luckyj writes in his preface to the second edition that the idea of adding to Čyževs'kyj a revised version of his, Luckyj's, *Ukrainian Literature in the Twentieth Century: A Reader's Guide* (University of Toronto Press, 1992) caused him initially to hesitate (p. xv). And well it might. The notion of uniting under one cover two books written forty years apart by authors of radically different theoretical persuasions contradicts our accustomed view of authorship or co-authorship as the guarantee of a unified and coherent book. Yet our intuitive resistance is a consequence rather of prejudice than of grounded objection. For if one is to unite Čyževs'kyj with anything at all, then it must be with an account that is relatively neutral as to literary theory. Luckyj, in offering "a contextual

canvas of Ukrainian literature in the twentieth century, relating it to the cultural, political and intellectual background and offering a sampling of contemporary reaction and criticism" (p. xv), chooses a theoretical framework that is so close to the commonsensical view of things as to be quite unobtrusive. The reader receives a narrative that is embedded in the larger story of social and political history and follows its conventional periodization. It is a narrative enlivened by characters (authors), and its main plot, though not announced in so many words, is the tribulations of the Ukrainian nation. This is quite clear even from most of the chapter headings: "The Failed Revolution, 1917–32," "The Thaw and After," "After Independence," and so on.

The volume makes no attempt to gloss over the fundamental differences between the two books that it contains. Luckyj emphasizes the discontinuity in his preface and through the way in which the volume is organized. Each part has its own separate index of names and titles (regrettably, in the index to Luckyj's addendum all the diacritical marks have gone missing). Where Čyževs'kyj has a chapter-by-chapter bibliography, Luckyj prefers footnotes. There is even a slight difference between the typeface used in the two parts. No attempt is made to eliminate repetitions or contradictions. Franko and Lesia Ukrainka are treated by both authors. Čyževs'kyj believes that "Lesja Ukrajinka concludes the history of Ukrainian Realism" (p. 615), while Luckyj regards her as a "major pre-modernist" (p. 696); Čyževs'kyj thinks that "today it is impossible to be overly delighted with her lyrics" (p. 615), while Luckyj is of the view that some of her poems "have become examples of the finest poetry since Ševčenko" (p. 697).

Luckyj's addendum is not quite identical to his *Reader's Guide*. A few pages have been added to cover developments of the 1990s—perhaps impressionistically, but with a fine sense of the spread of phenomena and currently prevailing judgments about them. Some changes have been made in the text. One of Luckyj's devices in the *Reader's Guide* was extensive quotation from contemporary critics. This allowed him to keep for himself the persona of the neutral recorder of "facts, names, titles, and dates" (p. viii) while still giving the reader access to opinions that were interesting in themselves and revealing of the cultural context in which they were made. In the addendum Luckyj strengthens still further the presence of other critics: where previously many quotations were sourced only in the footnotes, their authors are now announced in the main text.

In a way that, almost undoubtedly, was not intended by Luckyj, this odd yet appealing hybrid of a book is very much in tune with its times. On the one hand, it seems to be the very embodiment of the uncertainty that many scholars feel today concerning monolithic, systematic descriptions and explanations. On the other, it fills the practical need for an account in English, and between one set of covers, of Ukrainian literature from the earliest times to our own.

Marko Pavlyshyn
Monash University

Tamara Hundorova. *ProIavlennia slova: Dyskursiia rannoho ukrainskoho modernizmu. Postmoderna interpretatsiia*. Lviv: Litopys, 1997. 299 pp.

The long-accepted view of Ukrainian modernism among Western scholars has been that the current took form in 1900 and exerted its influence until the late 1920s. Regularly described as a pale reflection of more ambitious and radical aesthetic and cultural trends in western Europe, it has been faulted for a half-heartedness in combatting the didacticism of populist literature. Tamara Hundorova challenges this picture. In her account the Ukrainian modern is a broader phenomenon that began, along with other central and east European modernisms, in the 1880s and continued to make its presence felt until the late 1940s in the writings of the émigré MUR group. The earlier writers shared with the later a critique of culture and a commitment to a modernist discourse. What in the 1920s emerged as a debate over the dichotomy "Europe or Prosvita?" had already been prepared not only by the writings of 1900–1917, but also by those of the 1880s and 1890s, the period Ivan Franko described as "Young Ukraine."

Consciousness of the modern was already evident in this earlier generation, which challenged the ideology of the enlightener-populists in the name of a more progressive culture. The rationalist enlightener-populists held definite cultural ideals and operated with attitudes and themes that were increasingly under pressure in the second half of the nineteenth century. The modernists challenged this complex of attitudes with their defence of individualism and subjectivism and with their demand for a high culture. The notable feature in Hundorova's interpretation is her rereading of Franko and Lesia Ukrainka as crucial and dominant figures in modernist discourse. For Hundorova, Franko's poetry collection *Ziv'iale lystia* (1896) and Lesia Ukrainka's drama *Blakytina troianda* (1896) are breaks with an earlier tradition and announcements of a literary position. She sees Franko's book of poems as a conscious "vaccination" against the trend of decadence, but his work in general is described here, as in Hundorova's previous works on the writer, as a struggle with the stubborn mythic structures of populism, which allowed no place for individual dissent. Lesia Ukrainka's writing is viewed as a defence of the rights of the individual. Both writers are cast in the role of protestants in the face of the sacred word and accepted traditions and rituals of the enlightener-populists.

Hundorova's viewpoint is even more original than this. She suggests that the wider conflict here is between the decade-long domination of traditional, hierarchical, and patriarchal views of culture and the shaping of the new. The nineteenth-century Ukrainophiles had their ceremonies and ideals, sacred texts, taboos, and myths. They looked up to their father figures and saw themselves as conducting a mission among the unconverted. These attitudes were, and have remained, so deeply ingrained that their critics appear to be victims of an Oedipal complex. Hundorova's argument suggests that whereas the rationalist-enlighteners were the "conscious" of the Ukrainian movement, modernism was its "subconscious." Conflict and coexistence between the two has been a feature of Ukrainian literature from the 1880s to the present. The reasons for this have to do, firstly, with the strength of the original "complex" and, secondly, with the colonial (or "semi-colonial" according to Hundorova) status of Ukrainian culture. The growing strength of the anti-colonial, national discourse drew writers toward it and reconciled the populists and modernists. In this wider political context, even anti-traditionalism had to be framed

as a form of anti-colonialism: a recovery for the national culture of the full emotional spectrum and the rights of the subjective.

Hundorova's book outlines the coexistence of the old and new models of Ukrainian culture from the 1880s to the present and attributes the first attempts at deconsecration of the old to Franko and Lesia Ukrainka. In this way she captures these writers within the modernization project and reshapes the view of modern literary history.

Along with the other recent works on Ukrainian modernism by Solomiia Pavlychko and Vira Aheieva, this study serves to complicate our view of the movement by projecting it as a multi-faceted phenomenon that combined competing currents, both aesthetic and cultural. Not least among the latter was feminism, a concern that strongly marked Lesia Ukrainka's "protestantism."

Hundorova's study is also a record of her exploration of Western criticism. The volume is replete with references to Julia Kristeva, Roland Barthes, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and numerous other thinkers. In this way it is a stimulating account of Ukrainian writers in the light of contemporary theory. Half of the book is devoted to describing and theorizing the Ukrainian cultural, aesthetic, and modernist discourses. The second half analyzes the semiotics and rhetoric of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Franko, and Lesia Ukrainka. Not the least interest the study provides lies in its adaptation of the critical idiom to Ukrainian. Hundorova introduces new critical terms and a new vocabulary that borrows heavily from English. No doubt, language purists will be offended. They will, however, find compensation in the writer's erudition and originality.

Myroslav Shkandrij
University of Manitoba

Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj. *Ukrainian Futurism, 1914-1930: A Historical and Critical Study*. Cambridge: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1997. xx, 415 pp. U.S. \$18.00 paper, U.S. \$35.00 cloth. Distributed by Harvard University Press.

This is the first scholarly monograph on the subject. It argues that the Ukrainian version of Futurism differed from other national variants in a number of ways: it saw all avant-garde trends as part of one international movement; it aimed at constant innovation, fearing—above all—artistic stagnation and repetition; it was violently opposed to the past; and it was—particularly in its later stages—highly political. Although these features existed in other European avant-garde currents, their blend in Ukrainian Futurism produced a distinct profile that reflected local circumstances.

Overall, Ilnytzkyj's book provides a well-researched and documented exploration of Mykhail Semenko's career and the various organizations that he created. Substantially more than half the study is devoted to history and polemics; relatively little space is given to theoretical pronouncements; and the final section provides a synoptic overview of Ukrainian Futurist verse, prose, and visual poetry. These proportions reflect the treatment accorded Ukrainian Futurism by past commentators and critics.

Ukrainian Futurism has consistently raised the blood pressure of cultural activists and politicians, who have usually been quick to denounce it. Critics, on the other hand, have tended to settle on the opinion that the current never produced outstanding literary works or productive theoretical insights. Hence the need to shock and antagonize has sometimes been seen as an end in itself, born of creative impotence or a frustration with societal indifference. Ilnytzkyj's study argues that this assessment has not done justice to the quality of the Futurists' works or to the coherence of their theory.

Although the study outlines a case for the aptness and wit of the Futurists' writings, their internationalization of diction, their skilful use of parody, and their creative experiments with picture poetry, the significance of their achievement remains debatable. The comparison with LEF inevitably suggests itself. Maiakovsky's achievement as a poet and playwright and the Russian Futurist-Formalist collaboration and impact on literary theory overshadow the work of Semenko and his group in quality and range. True, the latter claimed no desire to achieve "classic" status or produce formally accomplished works; but their desire to have their place in history recognized makes their attacks on past art (in fact, all art) at times appear churlish—a case of sour grapes. How is one to view their "destructivist" theory of art and their fulminations against Great Art? Unlike the Russian Futurists, who turned to the production of "useful" art objects, the Ukrainian current questioned the usefulness of the artistic "system" (p. 344). Consequently the liquidation of art, its absorption into non-art, the dispelling of an illusion à la Marcel Duchamp, became their aim.

But what, after all, is Great Art? Tolstoy and Dostoevsky have survived because they are still read. The *Kreutzer Sonata* still disturbs and shocks in a way that the Futurists' erotic and anti-establishment verse does not. Dostoevsky's critique of the rationalists' crystal palace in *Notes from the Underground* is as unsettlingly relevant today as it was over a century ago. Charged with ideas that polemicized with social attitudes and capable of breaking the artistic rules, these works have survived to disturb future generations. Although the canon has shifted ground, these controversial works still find a place within it. By comparison, the Futurists' own works and demand for the "death of art as an emotional category" appear jejune.

The anti-structural can only exist in opposition to a structure. As views of the canonical structure have shifted, Futurism has, in many respects, come to appear less outrageous. Any art based on shock value has a short shelf life, and, because of this, Futurist work has suffered with the passage of time. Today the Futurists' most interesting contribution appears to be their visual poetry, which has preserved a freshness and immediacy. The growing integration of the arts that has been facilitated by twentieth-century technology and the burgeoning interest in the entire inter-arts project make their idea of fusing poetry and painting and their collaboration with the nascent film industry seem far-sighted.

There was an overtly political side to Futurism. The Futurists' use of critical denunciation was as crude as that of any competing group: if the "tone" of a work suggested to them nostalgia for the bourgeois past, both it and its author were condemned. There was no room in their analysis for a Lukacsian defence of Balzac, Tolstoy, and the glory of European Realism; no Formalist respect for the technical mastery of a Lermontov or Gogol; and no Bakhtinian suggestion of a conflicted or complex authorial view. Anything that was not resolutely and clearly monologic was suspect.

A socio-political determinism dominated in the Futurists' approach. They believed that a new base had to be constructed; only then would a new superstructure emerge, giving birth to a new art that would not be art. In the meantime all past and almost all contemporary authors had to be condemned as dangerous backsliders. This intolerance, of course, enraged the literary public. Ilnytzkyj's contention that the literary establishment and reading public were upset by literary indecorum and a new internationalism does not, it seems to me, deal squarely with this intolerance or its political implications.

Ilnytzkyj's case for the Futurists' principled and independent stance when dealing with political events (he, in fact, claims that they were rather apolitical until the late 1920s) also appears overstated. The more commonly expressed view has been that the Futurists, through their disrespect for tradition and lack of compassion for the individual or collective "other," prepared the ground for Bolshevik and Stalinist assaults on all cultural values and human rights (this, for example, is Nadezhda Mandelshtam's comment on the Russian Futurists). Moreover, as Halina Stephan and Boris Groys have pointed out, they craved power, demanded the right to set the literary tone, and insisted on being recognized as the only legitimate cultural commissars. In their recent books, both Andrei Sinyavsky and Groys have argued that the faith in rationality professed by the Futurists and many cultural revolutionaries was itself irrational. Iurii Sherekh suggested the same in his earlier article on Domontovych.

These issues, which seem to be in the mainstream of the discussion and go to the core of the Futurists' politics and ethics, are not taken up by Ilnytzkyj. Instead his study deals with the Futurists primarily as formal innovators, casting them in the role of opponents of the "literary elite" and, eventually, victims of the "proletarian community." In his narrative they chart an independent course and stick to their artistic principles. Although one can agree with the need to reset the balance, a fuller engagement with the political critique would have been enlightening.

Ilnytzkyj does attempt to rescue the Futurists from the charge of "national nihilism": they were convinced that the "national" period in Ukrainian culture was over, and only used the charge of "nationalism" against opponents as a synonym for "provincialism" (p. 150). Both of these explanations appear quite lame given the political context. Yet, the most obvious argument for the political deafness of the Futurists concerning the national issue is not made.

Eric Hobsbaum has stated that "Nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalism but the other way round." If he is correct, then the political mobilization we tend to call Ukrainian nationalism was a prerequisite for the creation of a nation and a state. Such a nation-building effort had gathered momentum in the years before the First World War, and it included the development of a cultural canon that elevated, among other things, the country's leading literary figures. The European example was indicated to show what a sense of cultural tradition could achieve for national cohesiveness. Into this movement for national consolidation and enlightenment came Semenko with his view that the national in art was passé and that Dadaism, Futurism, and avant-garde trends were the only ones worth studying. The Futurists appeared to be suggesting to illiterate and semi-literate "revolutionaries" that all the "classics" were worthless. The Neoclassicists and others reacted to this, quite understandably and appropriately, by insisting that people first learn something of the "classical"

heritage before embracing the avant-garde. Nothing positive, they cautioned, would come of ignorance.

In Ihnytzyj's account, however, it is the Futurists who played the role of unifiers and behaved with dignity in the face of provocation from nation-splitters and fanatics such as Vaplite and VUSPP. This revisionist line, while casting a new light on some polemical exchanges, is not a convincing portrait of the Futurists, who may not have been "nihilists" on the national question but were certainly not consolidators. The literary intelligentsia and political leadership both seem to have struggled in the 1920s to come to some kind of internal consensus and compromise that would allow them to present a "united front" in the face of centralizing and Russificatory pressures. National nihilism appears to have been the charge thrown at those who destabilized any such fragile consensus, including the Futurists. The instances of this are too numerous to discuss, but a glance at the key issue of cultural colonialism can illustrate the point.

The unresolved national question was never far from the surface of political and cultural debates in the 1920s. The drive for independent statehood during the years 1917–20 had been defeated; the demand that the national question and Russian colonial practices be frankly discussed was raised but quickly suppressed during the Literary Discussion of 1925–28; the arrests of the national intelligentsia began in 1928; and the war on the peasantry, the famine of 1933, and the mass executions were but a few years away. Prominent Russian figures—from the pre-revolutionary Shulgin and Struve to the revolutionary Lebed and Zinovev and the post-revolutionary Gorky—continued denying the viability of Ukraine's language, culture, or statehood. The Ukrainian intelligentsia continued to smart from the accumulated injuries caused by these comments. This issue of cultural colonialism—the disparaging and assimilatory attitude toward Ukraine—was the backdrop to events. Against it the Futurist attacks on national restrictiveness and calls for the death of the national in art appeared to lend support to the views of the Stalinist centralizers in Moscow and Russian chauvinists in Kyiv. It is scarcely surprising, then, that Ukrainian nation-builders ("nationalists" in Hobsbaum's terminology) felt that the Futurists were, if not betraying them, at least making their task more difficult.

The centralizers and Russifiers linked national assertiveness with Khvylovy's position in the Literary Discussion and with fascism. Unfortunately, from an early date the Futurists reinforced this confusion, the consequences of which proved fatal in the 1930s. Moreover, their violent attacks on the peasantry and its "outdated" mentality indirectly helped to desensitize authorities to the fact that peasants were not in the grip of "rural idiocy," but were human beings and carriers of cultural values. This is not to say that the Futurists were the cause of these tragedies or more culpable than other groups, but it is unreasonable to ignore their role.

The struggle for cultural decolonization had focussed for decades on how to break into "Europe", how to demonstrate one's national existence in order to gain international recognition and acceptance. Literature had a role to play in this. Russian and Scandinavian writers, it was pointed out, had, in the late nineteenth century, won recognition for their literatures and garnered respect for their nations. The striving to demonstrate cultural vitality through literary achievement was an underlying desideratum of Ukrainian modernism, and it still remains an important strategy for small and "marginalized" peoples. In their own way, the Futurists themselves attempted to employ this strategy, but their contempt for the efforts of the cultural mainstream set them against most fellow

decolonizers. Such a contextualization of the debate makes the Futurist conflict with the Ukrainian public, an important aspect of Ilnytzkyj's book, more comprehensible. It is a story that needs to be grasped, if only because it is rich in implications for the present.

Perhaps in the end, however, one should not look too hard for logical clarity or political consistency in the Futurists' pronouncements. They were temperamentally opposed to cultural propriety, they insisted upon challenging rules and stereotypes, and, naturally, they had the right to do this. They made their mark on literary life, reached positions of influence, and produced an innovative and visually stunning journal, *Nova generatsiia*. This is enough to guarantee the Futurists a place in literary history. But their legacy also lies in the aura of rebelliousness and creative élan that they brought to their technologically inspired experiments. The dramatization of rebellion and performance of self were equally important legacies that have been picked up by some of the most recent young writers in Ukraine.

Myroslav Shkandrij
University of Manitoba

Futuryzm na Ukrainie: Manifesty i teksty literackie. Compiled, with an introduction and notes, by Bazyli Nazaruk. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1995. 122 pp.

Ukrainskyi futuryzm: Vybrani storinky. Az ukrán futurizmus: Szemelvények. Compiled, with an introduction and annotations, by Mykola Sulyma. Preface by István Udvari. Edited by Angéla Hegyes. Nyíregyháza: Bessenyei György Tanárképző Főiskola, Ukrán és Ruszin Filológiai Tanszék, 1996. 256 pp.

If one were to review the long—and still incomplete—process by which Ukrainian Futurism has been slowly rehabilitated and rediscovered over the last two decades, it would have to be noted that some of the more important publishing milestones on this road have occurred outside of Ukraine. For example, the earliest major printing of the works of Mykhail Semenko, the founder of the Ukrainian movement, was not in Kyiv but in Würzburg, Germany. It was there that Jal-Reprint published in 1979 the first of a two-volume edition of Semenko's works, prepared by his daughter Iryna Semenko, a Moscow-based scholar who was obliged to hide behind the pseudonym Leo Kriger. A more limited, one-volume Kyiv edition of Semenko's work did not follow until 1985. Now again we have non-Ukrainian publishers taking a leadership role. In this instance they are in Poland and Hungary. Anyone fortunate to acquire these two new editions will have a highly complementary body of work, which will serve as an abridged but worthy introduction to the Ukrainian movement.

The subtitle of the Warsaw University Press volume, "Manifestos and Literary Texts," summarizes the contents rather well. Roughly half of the book is devoted to Futurist manifestos, while the rest contains examples of poetic works. An eleven-page essay separates the two parts. The latter was written by a young Ukrainian scholar, Halyna Chernysh—the first person in Ukraine to defend a candidate of sciences thesis on Semenko

and Ukrainian Futurism (1989). Her essay, "Do istorii ukrainskoho futuryzmu," recapitulates in somewhat greater detail the seven-page introductory remarks by Bazyli (Vasyl) Nazaruk. Together the two essays serve as a succinct overture to Semenko, the literary organizations he headed, and the context of the 1920s. It should be said that, with the exception of Nazaruk's introduction and biographical notes, both of which are in Polish, most of the texts are in Ukrainian. In keeping with the originals, several manifestos appear in English, French, German, or Russian.

Scholars studying the Ukrainian Futurist manifestos have always been forced to consult the classic compilation in Aleksandr Leites and Mykola Iashek's *Desiat rokiv ukrainskoi literatury (1917–1927)* (1928; 2d ed. 1930). Although an excellent source containing seven seminal documents related to Futurist theory (not to mention other articles on its history), it was never intended to be anything but a small sampling of the Futurists' theoretical, polemical, and programmatic writings. Even today a comprehensive collection remains a task of the future. The Würzburg edition of Semenko's works (vol. 2, 1983) had improved on Leites and Iashek by providing thirteen theoretical/programmatic works, the same number found in *Futuryzm na Ukrainie*. Interestingly, only six of the tracts overlap between *Futuryzm na Ukrainie* and the Würzburg edition of Semenko's works. Nazaruk's compilation gives us many traditionally anthologized texts, but excludes Semenko's "Mystetstvo iak kult," a long and important article he wrote in 1924. The innovation in Nazaruk's selections lies in four theoretical tracts from the second half of the 1920s, one of which comes from the 1925 Ukrainian Futurist journal *Neo-lif*, a single issue of which appeared, in Moscow. Also original to *Futuryzm na Ukrainie* is the inclusion of Semenko's first inflammatory manifesto, "Sam," which contains the infamous phrase "Ia palii svii 'Kobzar.'" The complete text of this one-page declaration is rarely encountered, so its appearance here is very welcome. Nazaruk also provides "Pro domo sua," Semenko's ironic and sarcastic remarks about his contemporaries from *Kvero-futuryzm* (1914), another very short text that has not previously appeared in any anthology.

The literary section in *Futuryzm na Ukrainie* introduces the reader to six poets. Their work is illustrated by a total of thirty-seven poems and one mock manifesto. Sixteen of the poems are by Semenko; five by Geo Shkurupii; three by Mykola Bazhan; three by Oleksa Vlyzko; four by Oleksa Slisarenko; and seven by Edvard Strikha (Kost Burevii), the famous and fabulous writer of Futurist parodies. One of Strikha's works reprinted here is a mock letter-manifesto that appeared in the Futurist journal *Nova generatsiia* in 1927.

* * *

When one of the most vilified and neglected literary movements becomes a pedagogical tool for the study of Ukrainian as a second language, then attitudes about Ukrainian Futurism must really be changing. *Ukrainskyi futuryzm*, a neatly produced Hungarian anthology of Ukrainian Futurist poetry, is, to my knowledge, the first instance of the movement being used for a didactic purpose. And while the image of Hungarians learning Ukrainian through the assistance of Futurist texts might seem too unusual to be true, it is not without poetic justice. In the 1920s Ukrainian Futurists showed a great deal of respect and interest in the work of Hungary's great native son, László Moholy-Nagy. At that time he was a pre-eminent member of the Bauhaus movement. *Nova generatsiia* featured his

photomontage and stage designs, and considered him an official associate. An article on photography by Moholy-Nagy appeared in a 1929 issue of that journal.

The compiler of *Ukrainskyi futuryzm* is the respected scholar Mykola Sulyma of the Institute of Literature at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. He was one of the pioneers in the struggle to rehabilitate the Ukrainian Futurist movement in the 1980s, when the subject was still relatively taboo in Ukraine. He not only offers a fine selection of works and a concise historical introduction to the movement, but he also comes to the assistance of students by placing stress marks on all the words, including those in his introduction. While Sulyma hails from Kyiv, the volume itself was typeset in Uzhhorod and then published just across the Carpathian border under the auspices of the Department of Ukrainian and Rusyn Philology headed by Professor István Udvari at the György Bessenyei Pedagogical Institute in the Hungarian city of Nyíregyháza. Although this is a very simple and basic softcover edition, it presents all the works crisply and legibly.

Sulyma's introduction, "Try etapy ukrainskoho futuryzmu," is just slightly over eight pages long. Written from the perspective of the leader of Ukrainian Futurism, it is a terse outline of Semenko's life, the literary organizations he headed, and the individuals who collaborated with him. Sulyma's reading is sympathetic of both the leader and his movement, with one exception. He states that "as a poet Semenko was finished sometimes in 1922." This is a view that has been expressed before, but I feel it is not justified. Sulyma himself tempers this categorical statement by pointing to the poetry in *Zustrich na perekhresnii stantsii* (1927). To this we can also add Semenko's *Malyi kobzar i novi virshi* (1928). Both of these publications, not to mention *Nova generatsiia* (1927–30), contain many good works. True, Semenko's poetic output plummeted radically after 1922 and many of his poems became extremely topical and political, but to deny them originality, wit, and real poetic qualities would be too harsh a judgement.

Sulyma must be credited for putting together the first modern anthology of Ukrainian Futurism. Almost all of the works he assembled are in verse—the exceptions being Semenko's six-page tract "Poezomaliarstvo" and six pages from Andrii Chuzhy's "visual novel" "Vedmid poliuie za sontsem," which are reproduced here from *Nova generatsiia* (1928). Thus, a large aspect of the Futurists' writings—i.e., their prose and theory—is virtually left out. But even with this limitation, the anthology is a welcome and useful addition to the still small corpus of post-Soviet literature on Ukrainian Futurism.

Sulyma divides his volume into three parts. The largest (pp. 16–200) is given over to the poets who were among the earliest or most consistent supporters of Semenko and the Futurist line. Each poet is introduced by several sentences of a biographical and bibliographical nature. (In contrast, Nazaruk's notes are more substantial.) Brief annotations ("Komentari") explaining words and phrases to the student appear after nearly every set of selections. The first poet is, naturally, Semenko. He is represented here by nearly eighty works, among which we find his visual poetry (the cycle "Moia mozaika") and a single theoretical tract, "Poezomaliarstvo," which, incidentally, is not included in *Futuryzm na Ukrainie*. "Moia mozaika" has been typeset anew for this edition, giving it a nice refurbished appearance. The typefaces are slightly different from those Semenko used in the two editions of his *Kobzar* (1924 and 1925), but the general appearance of these visual poems remains virtually unchanged. (It should be noted that *Futuryzm na Ukrainie* also reproduces one visual poem by Semenko, but the rendition is very poor and untrue to the original.)

The other poets in Sulyma's first section are represented by substantially fewer poems: some by two poems, but most, on average, by ten. The poets here are Iuliian Shpol, Vasyl Aleshko, Geo Shkurupii, Oleksa Slisarenko, Mykola Tereshchenko, Volodymyr Iaroshenko, Andrii Chuzhy, Iurii Ianovsky, Mykola Bazhan, Vasyl Desniak, Geo Koliada, Oleksander Korzh, and Oleksa Vlyzko.

A second, short section (pp. 201–24) is devoted to eight other poets whose works appeared in *Nova generatsiia*: Hro Vakar, Viktor Ver, Mechyslav Hasko, Sava Holovanivsky, Leonid Zymny, Ivan Malovichko, Iurii Paliichuk, and Mykola Skuba. These were generally younger and lesser-known writers, and their contribution to the movement is illustrated by one, two, or three poems each. Except for their years of birth and death, the anthology provides no other information about them.

The volume is rounded off with a section of parodies of Futurist writing and epigrams on various Futurists (pp. 225–49). Among the eleven authors in this section, some of whose works are in prose, we find a few famous names: Pavlo Fylypovych, Vasyl Ellan-Blakytny (a.k.a. Valer Pronoza), and Mykola Zerov. Perhaps, because Sulyma limited himself to a single source (a 1927 publication by Vasyl Atamaniuk), he unfortunately missed including the most entertaining parodies—those by Edward Strikha.

Editors of any anthology risk being criticized for their choices. I will refrain from this exercise by saying that by and large both Nazaruk's and Sulyma's selections are auspicious. The one instance where I would disagree with them would be over their selection of works by Mykola Bazhan. The two poems contained in Sulyma's collection ("Krov polonianok," "Zalizniakova nich") are excellent but not representative of Bazhan's Futurist phase. More to the point would have been works by Bazhan that appeared in the newspaper *Bilshovyk*, the journals *Chervonyi shliakh* and *Nova generatsiia*, and the miscellany *Holfshstorm*. (Six of his Futurist poems were republished in the *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies* 4, no. 2 [fall 1979]: 22–32). Nazaruk's choice of three poems by Bazhan is also biased toward his more conservative writings. Nevertheless, including "Elehiia atraktsioniv" and "Fokstrot" was a good decision.

In their own way, both of the volumes under review offer something valuable to those who are uninitiated into the intricacies of Ukrainian Futurism. The strength of *Futuryzm na Ukrainie* clearly lies in the manifestos, Nazaruk's introduction and notes, and Chernysh's article. Nazaruk's selection of poetry, however, is not quite as representative as Sulyma's. Semenko comes across well, but with only four other poets (disregarding Strikha) in the volume, Nazaruk's anthology can at best only hint at what the movement actually was. In this respect, *Ukrainskyi futuryzm*, although produced with self-imposed limitations and a narrow academic purpose, does a better job acquainting readers with Ukrainian Futurist poetry.

During the 1920s Futurism was, without a doubt, the most international and cosmopolitan of all the literary movements in Ukraine. Ironically, for a variety of reasons, history has conspired to make it virtually unknown both inside and outside its native borders. If publications like *Futuryzm na Ukrainie* and *Ukrainskyi futuryzm* are any indication, then perhaps Ukrainian Futurism is destined to return to its homeland by way of an international detour.

Oleh S. Ilyntzkyj
University of Alberta

Samuel H. Baron and Nancy Shields Kollman, eds. *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997. viii, 213 pp. U.S. \$34.00 cloth.

This collection of articles resulted from a workshop on early East Slavic culture that took place at Stanford University in summer of 1993. The editors' introduction places the essays in a historiographic context and provides a methodological background to the articles, most of which they position within the framework of "cultural studies." The collection's ten articles are grouped in three sections and deal primarily with issues of popular belief and changes in the religious cultures of Russia and Ukraine during the early-modern period.

In the first section, "Society and Cultural Practice," Janet Martin discusses the "backwardness" of Russian peasant culture in her examination of agricultural practices in the seventeenth-century Russian village. Nancy Shields Kollmann studies the concepts of social identity by analyzing Russian petitions (*chelobitnye*). Frank E. Sysyn gives an overview of Ukraine's social structure on the eve of the Khmelnytsky Revolt.

In the second section, "Religion and Belief," Michael S. Flier examines the change in the Palm Sunday ritual in the context of Patriarch Nikon's reforms. Eve Levin discusses the supplicatory prayers; Isolde Thyrt, Muscovite miracle stories; and Robert O. Crummey, the hagiography of the Old Belief.

The third section, "Image, Identity, and *Mentalité*," features an article by David A. Frick on the issue of cultural identities in the early-modern Ruthenian lands; by Engelina S. Smirnova on the Russian icon painter Simon Ushakov; and by Victor M. Zhivov on the emergence of the individual in Russian literature.

Ukrainian topics are discussed in a number of the articles dealing with the changes in Russian culture and society during the seventeenth century. Two articles deal specifically with Ukrainian history. In "Misrepresentations, Misunderstandings, and Silences: Problems of Seventeenth-Century Ruthenian and Muscovite Cultural History," David Frick presents a theoretical framework for his study of the identities and public discourse in the "borderland" societies. He also explores the phenomenon of lying in the "borderland" cultures using the examples of Meletii Smotrytsky's correspondence with Rome, Lavrentii Zyzanii's discussions in Moscow, and the different attitudes toward the 1654 Pereiaslav Agreement in Ukraine and Muscovy. What he discovers is not so much identities in flux as multiple identities among the people of the borderland, who had become accustomed to living in a society dominated by another culture and had developed an ability to evoke one of their multiple identities as circumstances required. That phenomenon of changing positions in the public discourse clearly outlived seventeenth-century Ukraine.

Frank E. Sysyn begins his essay, "Ukrainian Social Tensions before the Khmelnytsky Uprising" by pointing out one of the overlooked characteristics of that uprising. He states that, unlike other revolts during the same period, the uprising succeeded in overthrowing the existing social order and replacing the old ruling elite with a new one. Sysyn provides a general overview of the corporate orders, associations, and patronage system that existed in Ukraine on the eve of the Cossack revolution. He views the Orthodox Church as one of the associations and points out that the Orthodox brotherhoods, which opened their membership not only to burghers but also to nobles and Cossacks, paved the way for the

common actions of those social strata at the time of the revolt. Sysyn's characterization of the ethnic, social, and religious composition of the two Ukrainian historical centres of Lviv and Kyiv helps one to understand why Kyiv (where, unlike in Lviv, the Orthodox constituted the majority and maintained control of the municipal government) became the principal Ukrainian cultural centre in the first half of the seventeenth century.

The afterword to the volume was written by Edward L. Keenan, who, along with Natalie Zemon Davis, served as a commentator at the Stanford workshop. While Baron and Kollman tried to make sense only of the volume's articles in their introduction, Keenan's comments deal with the larger number of issues discussed at the workshop; they also give us a sense of the prevailing atmosphere there. Keenan's remarks on "the relative primitiveness of Russian religious life" challenge at least the tone, if not the argument, of some articles in this collection.

This volume, whose contributors include historians, linguists, literary scholars, and art historians, reflects the multidisciplinary character of contemporary studies of early-modern East Slavic culture.

Serhii Plokhyy
University of Alberta

Michael Bourdeaux, ed. *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*. Armonk, N.Y. and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1995. xiv, 321 pp. U.S. \$19.95 paper, U.S. \$49.95 cloth.

This volume is the third in a ten-volume series titled the International Politics of Eurasia and produced by the Russian Littoral Project, a joint undertaking of the University of Maryland at College Park and Johns Hopkins University.

The volume's twelve essays are grouped in three sections dealing respectively with Russia, the newly independent states in the former Soviet west, and the newly independent states in the former Soviet south. The religious situation in Ukraine is discussed in three of the four articles in the second section. Some attention is also paid to Ukrainian issues in the articles on the Russian Orthodox Church and religious developments in Russia. John B. Dunlop's essay on "The Russian Orthodox Church as an 'Empire-Saving' Institution" and Dimitry V. Pospelovsky's essay on "The Russian Orthodox Church in the Postcommunist CIS" present two very different views on the role that the Moscow Patriarchate has played in the political life of Russia and the other newly independent states. While Dunlop examines the patriarchate's attempts at preserving its influence in the former Soviet republics in the context of its involvement with the Russian nationalistic forces, Pospelovsky presents the patriarchate primarily as a victim of the anti-church campaign in Russia and downplays the recently exposed links of the top Russian Orthodox hierarchs and Patriarch Aleksii himself with the KGB. But both authors have a negative attitude toward the alignment of some Orthodox hierarchs with the Russian "brown-reds."

The religious situation in Ukraine is analyzed in the articles by Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, Vasyl Markus, and Serhiy Bilokin. The late Professor Bociurkiw's essay, "Politics and

Religion in Ukraine: The Orthodox and the Greek Catholic," is the last contribution on that subject by one of the main authorities in the field. It presents the most comprehensive account of the current status of the two leading Ukrainian denominations and their relations with each other and with the Ukrainian authorities. Bociurkiw is very critical of the unqualified support that the Ukrainian government gave in the early 1990s to Metropolitan Filaret. Nonetheless, he believes that, "as in the past, the Russian church is likely to use every 'canonical weapon' in its arsenal to prevent a diminution of its ecclesiastical empire" (p. 153).

Vasyl Markus's essay, "Politics and Religion in Ukraine: In Search of a New Pluralistic Dimension," deals with the non-traditional churches and religious groups in Ukraine. He rightfully states that "Ukraine is presently undergoing a complex process of transition from historical domination by Eastern (Orthodox) rite national churches serving the needs of a state-controlled society to a pluralist and secular religious and social model" (p. 163).

Serhiy Bilokin's essay, "The Kiev Patriarchate and the State," resembles another essay in the volume, by Vsevolod Chaplin, the director of public relations at the Moscow Patriarchate's Department for External Church Relations: both read more like accounts by participants in the events they describe than ones by independent scholars. Bilokin's highly charged defence of the Kyiv Patriarchate demonstrates the intensity of the religious conflict in contemporary Ukraine.

In the volume's preface, Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot, the editors of the series, pose a number of questions to the authors, including questions on the possible impact of the religious revival on the internal and international politics of the newly independent states. In the introduction to the volume, Michael Bourdeaux tries to answer those questions and points to the role played by the legalization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the weakening of Soviet rule in Ukraine. He also discusses the issue of the divisions between Greek Catholic, nationalistic western Ukraine and Orthodox central and eastern Ukraine, which he sees as a possible threat to the integrity of the Ukrainian state.

It appears now that political scientists, including Samuel P. Huntington, have exaggerated the threat to Ukrainian unity posed by the cultural and religious divisions in the country. The time that has passed since this volume was published indicates that although Orthodox-Catholic religious divisions in Ukraine resulted in numerous conflicts and tensions in the recent past, they present little, if any, threat to the unity of the Ukrainian state today.

Serhii Plokhyy
University of Alberta

Books Received

- Andrukhovych, Yuri. *Recreations*. Trans. and intro. by Marko Pavlyshyn. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1998. 132 pp. \$29.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.
- Brucan, Silviu. *Social Change in Russia and Eastern Europe: From Party Hacks to Nouveaux Riches*. Westport, Conn. and London: Praeger, 1998. xiv, 119 pp. U.S. \$49.95 cloth.
- Chandler, Andrea. *Institutions of Isolation: Border Controls in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States, 1917–1993*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998. xvi, 205 pp. \$44.95 cloth.
- Croissant, Michael P. *The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications*. Westport, Conn. and London: Praeger, 1998. xviii, 174 pp. U.S. \$59.95 cloth.
- Danopoulos, Constantine P. and Daniel Zirker. *The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc*. Boulder, Colo. and Oxford: Westview Press, 1999. xiv, 232 pp. U.S. \$55.00 cloth.
- DeLuca, Anthony R. *Politics, Diplomacy, and the Media: Gorbachev's Legacy in the West*. Westport, Conn. and London: Praeger, 1998. x, 166 pp. U.S. \$55.00 cloth.
- Floria, Boris et al, eds. *Dokumenty rosiiskykh arkhiviv z istorii Ukrainy*. Vol. 1. *Dokumenty do istorii zaporozkoho kozatstva 1613–1620 rr*. Lviv: Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies; Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; and Ivan Krypiakevych Institute of Ukrainian Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1998. 443 pp.
- Heuman, Susan. *Kistiakovsky: The Struggle for National and Constitutional Rights in the Last Years of Tsarism*. Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1998. xvi, 220 pp. U.S. \$32.95 cloth, U.S. \$18.00 paper. Distributed by Harvard University Press.
- Iatridis, Demetrius S. and June Gary Hopps, eds. *Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe Perspectives and Approaches*. Westport, Conn. and London: Praeger, 1998. xiv, 209 pp. U.S. \$59.95 cloth.
- Karmansky, P[etro]. *Mavpiache dzerkalo (Lysty z Kanady i pro Kanadu do "Kanady")*. Prepared, with an intro., by Myroslav Shkandrij. Winnipeg: The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Canada, 1998. 94 pp.
- Keefer, Janice Kulyk. *Honey and Ashes: A Story of Family*. Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 1998. xiv, 338 pp. \$27.00 cloth.
- Keefer, Janice Kulyk, and Solomea Pavlychko, eds. *Two Lands: New Visions. Stories from Canada and Ukraine*. Trans. Marco Carynnyk and Marta Horban. Regina: Coteau Books, 1998. xvi, 312 pp. Can. \$15.95, U.S. \$13.95 paper. Distributed in the USA by General Distribution Services, 85 River Rock Dr., ste. 202, Buffalo, NY 14207.

- Kuromiya, Hiroaki. *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s–1990s*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. xiv, 363 pp. U.S. \$44.95 cloth.
- Ledeneva, Alena V. *Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. xiv, 241 pp. U.S. \$59.95 cloth, U.S. \$21.95 paper.
- Minahan, James. *A Historical Dictionary of the Newly Independent States*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998. xii, 340 pp. U.S. \$75.00 cloth.
- Partykevich, Andre. *Between Kyiv and Constantinople: Oleksander Lototsky and the Quest for Ukrainian Autocephaly*. Church Studies Papers, no. 1. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1998. xviii, 101 pp. \$15.00 paper.
- Pavlyshyn, Marko et al, eds. *Ukrainci v Avstralii*. Vol. 2. Melbourne: Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organizations, 1998. xii, 1104 pp. AUSTRAL. \$49.95. Distributed by Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organizations, P. O. Box 251, Essendon, VIC 3040, Australia.
- Pelenski, Jaroslaw. *The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus'*. Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1998. xxiv, 325 pp. U.S. \$42.00 cloth, U.S. \$48.00 outside the USA. Distributed by Columbia University Press.
- Sas, Petro M. *Politychna kultura ukrainskoho suspilstva (kinets xvi–persha polovyna XVII st.)*. Kyiv: Lybid, 1998. 296 pp.
- Vasyliiev, Valerii and Lynne Viola. *Kolektyvizatsiia i selianskyi opir na Ukraini (lystopad 1929–berezyn 1930 rr.)*. Vinnytsia: Lohos, 1997. 536 pp. U.S. \$40.00 cloth. Distributed by Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh.
- Wanner, Catherine. *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998. xxviii, 255 pp. U.S. \$50.00 cloth, U.S. \$18.95 paper.
- Zuzowski, Robert. *Political Change in Eastern Europe since 1989: Prospects for Liberal Democracy and a Market Economy*. Westport, Conn. and London: Praeger, 1998. x, 166 pp. U.S. \$57.95 cloth.

Зустрічі і Прощання

Григорій Костюк

The second volume of Hryhory Kostiuk's memoirs is a unique document of the development of Ukrainian culture and community outside Ukraine. This volume depicts the extraordinarily dynamic, stormy and creative life which swept up the Ukrainians in the western diaspora in the second half of the XX century.

Kostiuk continues his saga about the important events in his life from the beginnings of the German occupation of central Ukraine (September 1941 p.) to the present. He describes his dislocation from the Donbas to Kyiv in 1941. From there he moves to Lviv, then to Plauen and Bavaria. In each of these places, Kostiuk involves himself in Ukrainian community, cultural and political organizations. This gives him plenty of opportunities to meet with prominent figures in the Ukrainian community. Kostiuk provides the reader with interesting portraits of such authors as Iurii Klen, Ivan Bahrianyi, Halyna Zhurba, Mykola Shlemkevych, Todos' Os'machka, Iurii Kosach and many other political, cultural and community activists of the Ukrainian diaspora.

Kostiuk was a participant (often a leading one) in many important events in the life of Ukrainians outside Ukraine. The reader will find detailed retellings of such events as the founding of the Ukrainian Revolutionary-Democratic Party, the preservation of Volodymyr Vynnychenko's personal archives, the dedication of a monument to Taras Shevchenko in Washington DC, the founding of the Union of Ukrainian Authors "Slovo" and about the first attempts to establish contacts with the intelligentsia of Soviet Ukraine.

Zustrichi i Proshchannia, Hryhorii Kostiuk

xi, 609 pp., illus. (in Ukrainian)

Cloth \$39.95 (+GST) ISBN 1-895571-18-9

Two volume set \$60.00 (+GST)

Add \$4.00 for Shipping and Handling

Credit card orders may be FAXed to (403) 492-4967



CIUS, 352 Athabasca Hall, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6G 2E8
Email to: cius@ualberta.ca Catalogue on-line at: www.utoronto.ca/cius/

News from

HURI PUBLICATIONS



Harvard Ukrainian Studies (journal)
Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies
Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature
Harvard Papers in Ukrainian Studies
Renovatio
Ottoman Documents

Harvard Ukrainian Studies. Vol. 18 (3/4), vol. 19, and vol. 20 all have appeared in the eighteen months. Vol. 18 (3/4) contains articles that range from Kyivan Rus issues to documentary evidence of Ukrainian resistance in eastern Ukraine during WWII. Vol. 19 is a festschrift in honor of Professor Edward Keenan, with articles concentrating on medieval and early-modern East Slavic studies. Vol. 20 is a special volume entitled "Ukraine in the World," which contains thirteen articles on Ukrainian foreign relations and geo-political and geo-strategic issues.

New Monograph Titles. 1998 saw six new HURI monographs published, including: *The Strategic Role of Ukraine: Diplomatic Addresses and Essays (1994–1997)*, by Yuri Shcherbak; *Kistiakovsky: The Struggle for National and Constitutional Rights in the Last Years of Tsarism*, by Susan Heuman; *The Origins of the Old Rus' Weights and Monetary Systems*, by Omeljan Pritsak; *Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State*, ed. by Lubomyr A. Hajda (monograph version of *HUS*, vol. 20); *Crisis and Reform: The Metropolitanate of Kyiv, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest*, by Borys Gudziak; and, *The Slavonic Book of Esther: Text, Lexicon, Linguistic Analysis, Problems of Translation*, by Horace G. Lunt and Moshe Taube.

Other activity. New material has been added to our website, including working papers, bibliographies, directories, and indices. See the URL below.

For a **free catalog** of all of the publications of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, including the journal *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, contact—

HURI Publications, 1583 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138

tel. 617.495.4053 / fax. 617.495.8097

huri@fas.harvard.edu / <http://www.sabre.org/huri>

CANADIAN SLAVONIC PAPERS

REVUE CANADIENNE DES SLAVISTES

Vol. XL, Nos. 3–4
September–December 1998

Appearing Spring 1999

Articles by Alla Nedashkivska Adams on Contemporary Ukrainian Usage; Vessela Balinska-Ourdeva on Iurii Andrukhovych's *Rekreatsii*; John Bartle on Dostoevsky as Editor of *Time*; Mary Besemeres on Eva Hoffman's *Lost in Translation*; Bożena Karwowska on Miłosz's Reception in English-Speaking Countries; Donald Loewen on Solov'ev's Views of Pushkin; Paul Morris on Nabokov's Reception in Russian Émigré Criticism; Ryszard Paradowski on Leo Gumilëv's Scientific Ideology; Munir Sendich on English Translations of Andrić's *Travnička Hronika*; Harry Walsh on Andrei Kurbskii in Contemporary Russian Literature; Theodore Weeks on Polish-Jewish Relations, 1903–1914; and a new translation of Mickiewicz's "Crimean Sonnets" by Christopher Adam.

For more information, contact: *Canadian Slavonic Papers*,
200 Arts Building, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta,
T6G 2E6, Canada.

Note for Contributors

Contributions should be submitted in two copies, double-spaced throughout. Use footnotes. A copy of the article or review should also be provided on an IBM or Macintosh compatible disc, in either WordPerfect or MS Word format. The *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* uses the modified Library of Congress transliteration system shown below. Articles should be from five to twenty-five double-spaced pages in length (2,000-10,000 words), and authors should include a brief biography with their submissions. The *Journal* does not consider articles that have been published or are being considered for publication elsewhere. The editors reserve the right to edit all submissions.

а—a	н—n
б—b	о—o
в—v	п—p
г—h	р—r
г—g	с—s
д—d	т—t
е—e	у—u
є—ie	ф—f
ж—zh	х—kh
з—z	ц—ts
и—y	ш—sh
і—i	щ—shch
ї—i	ю—iu
й—i	я—ia
к—k	ь—
л—l	ий—y in endings of personal names only.
м—m	

Journal of Ukrainian Studies
 Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures
 University of Toronto
 Toronto, Ont., M5S 1A1
 Canada

telephone: (416) 978-8669/978-6934
 fax: (416) 978-2672
 e-mail: r.senkus@utoronto.ca

